Varieties of Religious Experience, A Study in Human Nature

THE VALUE OF SAINTLINESS

We have now passed in review the more important of the phenomena which are regarded as fruits of genuine religion and characteristics of men who are devout.  Today we have to change our attitude from that of description to that of appreciation; we have to ask whether the fruits in question can help us to judge the absolute value of what religion adds to human life.  Were I to parody Kant, I should say that a “Critique of pure Saintliness” must be our theme.

If, in turning to this theme, we could descend upon our subject from above like Catholic theologians, with our fixed definitions of man and man’s perfection and our positive dogmas about God, we should have an easy time of it.  Man’s perfection would be the fulfillment of his end; and his end would be union with his Maker.  That union could be pursued by him along three paths, active, purgative, and contemplative, respectively; and progress along either path would be a simple matter to measure by the application of a limited number of theological and moral conceptions and definitions.  The absolute significance and value of any bit of religious experience we might hear of would thus be given almost mathematically into our hands.

If convenience were everything, we ought now to grieve at finding ourselves cut off from so admirably convenient a method as this.  But we did cut ourselves off from it deliberately in those remarks which you remember we made, in our first lecture, about the empirical method; and it must be 321 confessed that after that act of renunciation we can never hope for clean-cut and scholastic results.  WE cannot divide man sharply into an animal and a rational part.  WE cannot distinguish natural from supernatural effects; nor among the latter know which are favors of God, and which are counterfeit operations of the demon.  WE have merely to collect things together without any special a priori theological system, and out of an aggregate of piecemeal judgments as to the value of this and that experience—­judgments in which our general philosophic prejudices, our instincts, and our common sense are our only guides—­decide that ON THE WHOLE one type of religion is approved by its fruits, and another type condemned.  “On the whole”—­I fear we shall never escape complicity with that qualification, so dear to your practical man, so repugnant to your systematizer!

I also fear that as I make this frank confession, I may seem to some of you to throw our compass overboard, and to adopt caprice as our pilot.  Skepticism or wayward choice, you may think, can be the only results of such a formless method as I have taken up.  A few remarks in deprecation of such an opinion, and in farther explanation of the empiricist principles which I profess, may therefore appear at this point to be in place.

Abstractly, it would seem illogical to try to measure the worth of a religion’s fruits in merely human terms of value.  How CAN you measure their worth without considering whether the God really exists who is supposed to inspire them?  If he really exists, then all the conduct instituted by men to meet his wants must necessarily be a reasonable fruit of his religion—­it would be unreasonable only in case he did not exist.  If, for instance, you were to condemn a religion of human or animal sacrifices by virtue of your subjective sentiments, and if all the while a deity were really there demanding such sacrifices, you would be making a theoretical mistake by tacitly assuming that the deity must be non-existent; you would be setting up a theology of your own as much as if you were a scholastic philosopher.

To this extent, to the extent of disbelieving peremptorily in certain types of deity, I frankly confess that we must be theologians.  If disbeliefs can be said to constitute a theology, then the prejudices, instincts, and common sense which I chose as our guides make theological partisans of us whenever they make certain beliefs abhorrent.

But such common-sense prejudices and instincts are themselves the fruit of an empirical evolution.  Nothing is more striking than the secular alteration that goes on in the moral and religious tone of men, as their insight into nature and their social arrangements progressively develop.  After an interval of a few generations the mental climate proves unfavorable to notions of the deity which at an earlier date were perfectly satisfactory:  the older gods have fallen below the common secular level, and can no longer be believed in.  Today a deity who should require bleeding sacrifices to placate him would be too sanguinary to be taken seriously.  Even if powerful historical credentials were put forward in his favor, we would not look at them.  Once, on the contrary, his cruel appetites were of themselves credentials.

They positively recommended him to men’s imaginations in ages when such coarse signs of power were respected and no others could be understood.  Such deities then were worshiped because such fruits were relished.

Doubtless historic accidents always played some later part, but the original factor in fixing the figure of the gods must always have been psychological.  The deity to whom the prophets, seers, and devotees who founded the particular cult bore witness was worth something to them personally.  They could use him.  He guided their imagination, warranted their hopes, and controlled their will—­or else they required him as a safeguard against the demon and a curber of other people’s crimes.  In any case, they chose him for the value of the fruits he seemed to them to yield.

So soon as the fruits began to seem quite worthless; so soon as they conflicted with indispensable human ideals, or thwarted too extensively other values; so soon as they appeared childish, contemptible, or immoral when reflected on, the deity grew discredited, and was erelong neglected and forgotten.  It was in this way that the Greek and Roman gods ceased to be believed in by educated pagans; it is thus that we ourselves judge of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Mohammedan theologies; Protestants have so dealt with the Catholic notions of deity, and liberal Protestants with older Protestant notions; it is thus that Chinamen judge of us, and that all of us now living will be judged by our descendants.  When we cease to admire or approve what the definition of a deity implies, we end by deeming that deity incredible.

Few historic changes are more curious than these mutations of theological opinion.  The monarchical type of sovereignty was, for example, so ineradicably planted in the mind of our own forefathers that a dose of cruelty and arbitrariness in their deity seems positively to have been required by their imagination.  They called the cruelty “retributive justice,” and a God without it would certainly have struck them as not “sovereign” enough.  But today we abhor the very notion of eternal suffering inflicted; and that arbitrary dealing-out of salvation and damnation to selected individuals, of which Jonathan Edwards could persuade himself that he had not only a conviction, but a “delightful conviction,” as of a doctrine “exceeding pleasant, bright, and sweet,” appears to us, if sovereignly anything, sovereignly irrational and mean.  Not only the cruelty, but the paltriness of character of the gods believed in by earlier centuries also strikes later centuries with surprise.  We shall see examples of it from the annals of Catholic saintship which makes us rub our Protestant eyes.  Ritual worship in general appears to the modern transcendentalist, as well as to the ultra-puritanic type of mind, as if addressed to a deity of an almost absurdly childish character, taking delight in toy-shop furniture, tapers and tinsel, costume and mumbling and mummery, and finding his “glory” incomprehensibly enhanced thereby:—­just as on the other hand the formless spaciousness of pantheism appears quite empty to ritualistic natures, and the gaunt theism of evangelical sects seems intolerably bald and chalky and bleak.

Luther, says Emerson, would have cut off his right hand rather than nail his theses to the door at Wittenberg, if he had supposed that they were destined to lead to the pale negations of Boston Unitarianism.

So far, then, although we are compelled, whatever may be our pretensions to empiricism, to employ some sort of a standard of theological probability of our own whenever we assume to estimate the fruits of other men’s religion, yet this very standard has been begotten out of the drift of common life.  It is the voice of human experience within us, judging and condemning all gods that stand athwart the pathway along which it feels itself to be advancing.  Experience, if we take it in the largest sense, is thus the parent of those disbeliefs which, it was charged, were inconsistent with the experiential method.  The inconsistency, you see, is immaterial, and the charge may be neglected.

If we pass from disbeliefs to positive beliefs, it seems to me that there is not even a formal inconsistency to be laid against our method.  The gods we stand by are the gods we need and can use, the gods whose demands on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and on one another.  What I then propose to do is, briefly stated, to test saintliness by common sense, to use human standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends itself as an ideal kind of human activity.  If it commends itself, then any theological beliefs that may inspire it, in so far forth will stand accredited.  If not, then they will be discredited, and all without reference to anything but human working principles.  It is but the elimination of the humanly unfit, and the survival of the humanly fittest, applied to religious beliefs; and if we look at history candidly and without prejudice, we have to admit that no religion has ever in the long run established or proved itself in any other way.  Religions have APPROVED themselves; they have ministered to sundry vital needs which they found reigning.  When they violated other needs too strongly, or when other faiths came which served the same needs better, the first religions were supplanted.

The needs were always many, and the tests were never sharp.  So the reproach of vagueness and subjectivity and “on the whole”-ness, which can with perfect legitimacy be addressed to the empirical method as we are forced to use it, is after all a reproach to which the entire life of man in dealing with these matters is obnoxious.  No religion has ever yet owed its prevalence to “apodictic certainty.”  In a later lecture I will ask whether objective certainty can ever be added by theological reasoning to a religion that already empirically prevails.

One word, also, about the reproach that in following this sort of an empirical method we are handing ourselves over to systematic skepticism.

Since it is impossible to deny secular alterations in our sentiments and needs, it would be absurd to affirm that one’s own age of the world can be beyond correction by the next age.  Skepticism cannot, therefore, be ruled out by any set of thinkers as a possibility against which their conclusions are secure; and no empiricist ought to claim exemption from this universal liability.  But to admit one’s liability to correction is one thing, and to embark upon a sea of wanton doubt is another.  Of willfully playing into the hands of skepticism we cannot be accused.  He who acknowledges the imperfectness of his instrument, and makes allowance 326 for it in discussing his observations, is in a much better position for gaining truth than if he claimed his instrument to be infallible.  Or is dogmatic or scholastic theology less doubted in point of fact for claiming, as it does, to be in point of right undoubtable?  And if not, what command over truth would this kind of theology really lose if, instead of absolute certainty, she only claimed reasonable probability for her conclusions?  If WE claim only reasonable probability, it will be as much as men who love the truth can ever at any given moment hope to have within their grasp.  Pretty surely it will be more than we could have had, if we were unconscious of our liability to err.

Nevertheless, dogmatism will doubtless continue to condemn us for this confession.  The mere outward form of inalterable certainty is so precious to some minds that to renounce it explicitly is for them out of the question.  They will claim it even where the facts most patently pronounce its folly.  But the safe thing is surely to recognize that all the insights of creatures of a day like ourselves must be provisional.  The wisest of critics is an altering being, subject to the better insight of the morrow, and right at any moment, only “up to date” and “on the whole.”  When larger ranges of truth open, it is surely best to be able to open ourselves to their reception, unfettered by our previous pretensions.  “Heartily know, when half-gods go, the gods arrive.”

The fact of diverse judgments about religious phenomena is therefore entirely unescapable, whatever may be one’s own desire to attain the irreversible.  But apart from that fact, a more fundamental question awaits us, the question whether men’s opinions ought to be expected to be absolutely uniform in this field.  Ought all men to have the same religion?  Ought they to approve the same fruits and follow the same leadings?  Are they so like in their inner needs that, for hard and soft, for proud and humble, for strenuous and lazy, for healthy-minded and despairing, exactly the same religious incentives are required?  Or are different functions in the organism of humanity allotted to different types of man, so that some may really be the better for a religion of consolation and reassurance, whilst others are better for one of terror and reproof?  It might conceivably be so; and we shall, I think, more and more suspect it to be so as we go on.  And if it be so, how can any possible judge or critic help being biased in favor of the religion by which his own needs are best met?  He aspires to impartiality; but he is too close to the struggle not to be to some degree a participant, and he is sure to approve most warmly those fruits of piety in others which taste most good and prove most nourishing to HIM.

I am well aware of how anarchic much of what I say may sound.  Expressing myself thus abstractly and briefly, I may seem to despair of the very notion of truth.  But I beseech you to reserve your judgment until we see it applied to the details which lie before us.  I do indeed disbelieve that we or any other mortal men can attain on a given day to absolutely incorrigible and unimprovable truth about such matters of fact as those with which religions deal.  But I reject this dogmatic ideal not out of a perverse delight in intellectual instability.  I am no lover of disorder and doubt as such.  Rather do I fear to lose truth by this pretension to possess it already wholly.  That we can gain more and more of it by moving always in the right direction, I believe as much as any one, and I hope to bring you all to my way of thinking before the termination of these lectures.  Till then, do not, I pray you, harden your minds irrevocably against the empiricism which I profess.

I will waste no more words, then, in abstract justification of my method, but seek immediately to use it upon the facts.

In critically judging of the value of religious phenomena, it is very important to insist on the distinction between religion as an individual personal function, and religion as an institutional, corporate, or tribal product.  I drew this distinction, you may remember, in my second lecture.  The word “religion,” as ordinarily used, is equivocal.  A survey of history shows us that, as a rule, religious geniuses attract disciples, and produce groups of sympathizers.  When these groups get strong enough to “organize” themselves, they become ecclesiastical institutions with corporate ambitions of their own.  The spirit of politics and the lust of dogmatic rule are then apt to enter and to contaminate the originally innocent thing; so that when we hear the word “religion” nowadays, we think inevitably of some “church” or other; and to some persons the word “church” suggests so much hypocrisy and tyranny and meanness and tenacity of superstition that in a wholesale undiscerning way they glory in saying that they are “down” on religion altogether.  Even we who belong to churches do not exempt other churches than our own from the general condemnation.

But in this course of lectures ecclesiastical institutions hardly concern us at all.  The religious experience which we are studying is that which lives itself out within the private breast.  First-hand individual experience of this kind has always appeared as a heretical sort of innovation to those who witnessed its birth.  Naked comes it into the world and lonely; and it has always, for a time at least, driven him who had it into the wilderness, often into the literal wilderness out of doors, where the Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, St. Francis, George Fox, and so many others had to go.  George Fox expresses well this isolation; and I can do no better at this point than read to you a page from his Journal, referring to the period of his youth when religion began to ferment within him seriously.

“I fasted much,” Fox says, “walked abroad in solitary places many days, and often took my Bible, and sat in hollow trees and lonesome places until night came on; and frequently in the night walked mournfully about by myself; for I was a man of sorrows in the time of the first workings of the Lord in me.

“During all this time I was never joined in profession of religion with any, but gave up myself to the Lord, having forsaken all evil company, taking leave of father and mother, and all other relations, and traveled up and down as a stranger on the earth, which way the Lord inclined my heart; taking a chamber to myself in the town where I came, and tarrying sometimes more, sometimes less in a place:  for I durst not stay long in a place, being afraid both of professor and profane, lest, being a tender young man, I should be hurt by conversing much with either.  For which reason I kept much as a stranger, seeking heavenly wisdom and getting knowledge from the Lord; and was brought off from outward things, to rely on the Lord alone.  As I had forsaken the priests, so I left the separate preachers also, and those called the most experienced people; for I saw there was none among them all that could speak to my condition.  And when all my hopes in them and in all men were gone so that I had nothing outwardly to help me, nor could tell what to do; then, oh then, I heard a voice which said, ’There is one, even Jesus Christ, that can speak to thy condition.’  When I heard it, my heart did leap for joy.  Then the Lord let me see why there was none upon the earth that could speak to my condition.  I had not fellowship with any people, priests, nor professors, nor any sort of separated people.  I was afraid of all carnal talk and talkers, for I could see nothing but corruptions.  When I was in the deep, under all shut up, I could not believe that I should ever overcome; my troubles, my sorrows, and my temptations were so great that I often thought I should have despaired, I was so tempted.  But when Christ opened to me how he was tempted by the same devil, and had overcome him, and had bruised his head; and that through him and his power, life, grace, and spirit, I should overcome also, I had confidence in him.  If I had had a king’s diet, palace, and attendance, all would have been as nothing, for nothing gave me comfort but the Lord by his power.  I saw professors, priests, and people were whole and at ease in that condition which was my misery, and they loved that which I would have been rid of.  But the Lord did stay my desires upon himself, and my care was cast upon him alone.”[198]

[198] George Fox:  Journal, Philadelphia, 1800, pp. 59-61, abridged.

A genuine first-hand religious experience like this is bound to be a heterodoxy to its witnesses, the prophet appearing as a mere lonely madman.  If his doctrine prove contagious enough to spread to any others, it becomes a definite and labeled heresy.  But if it then still prove contagious enough to triumph over persecution, it becomes itself an orthodoxy; and when a religion has become an orthodoxy, its day of inwardness is over:  the spring is dry; the faithful live at second hand exclusively and stone the prophets in their turn.  The new church, in spite of whatever human goodness it may foster, can be henceforth counted on as a staunch ally in every attempt to stifle the spontaneous religious spirit, and to stop all later bubblings of the fountain from which in purer days it drew its own supply of inspiration.  Unless, indeed, by adopting new movements of the spirit it can make capital out of them and use them for its selfish corporate designs!  Of protective action of this politic sort, promptly or tardily decided on, the dealings of the Roman ecclesiasticism with many individual saints and prophets yield examples enough for our instruction.

The plain fact is that men’s minds are built, as has been often said, in water-tight compartments.  Religious after a fashion, they yet have many other things in them beside their religion, and unholy entanglements and associations inevitably obtain.  The basenesses so commonly charged to religion’s account are thus, almost all of them, not chargeable at all to religion proper, but rather to religion’s wicked practical partner, the spirit of corporate dominion.  And the bigotries are most of them in their turn chargeable to religion’s wicked intellectual partner, the spirit of dogmatic dominion, the passion for laying down the law in the form of an absolutely closed-in theoretic system.  The ecclesiastical spirit in general is the sum of these two spirits of dominion; and I beseech you never to confound the phenomena of mere tribal or corporate psychology which it presents with those manifestations of the purely interior life which are the exclusive object of our study.  The baiting of Jews, the hunting of Albigenses and Waldenses, the stoning of Quakers and ducking of Methodists, the murdering of Mormons and the massacring of Armenians, express much rather that aboriginal human neophobia, that pugnacity of which we all share the vestiges, and that inborn hatred of the alien and of eccentric and non-conforming men as aliens, than they express the positive piety of the various perpetrators.  Piety is the mask, the inner force is tribal instinct.  You believe as little as I do, in spite of the Christian unction with which the German emperor addressed his troops upon their way to China, that the conduct which he suggested, and in which other Christian armies went beyond them, had anything whatever to do with the interior religious life of those concerned in the performance.

Well, no more for past atrocities than for this atrocity should we make piety responsible.  At most we may blame piety for not availing to check our natural passions, and sometimes for supplying them with hypocritical pretexts.  But hypocrisy also imposes obligations, and with the pretext usually couples some restriction; and when the passion gust is over, the piety may bring a reaction of repentance which the irreligious natural man would not have shown.

For many of the historic aberrations which have been laid to her charge, religion as such, then, is not to blame.  Yet of the charge that over-zealousness or fanaticism is one of her liabilities we cannot wholly acquit her, so I will next make a remark upon that point.  But I will preface it by a preliminary remark which connects itself with much that follows.

Our survey of the phenomena of saintliness has unquestionably produced in your minds an impression of extravagance.  Is it necessary, some of you have asked, as one example after another came before us, to be quite so fantastically good as that?  We who have no vocation for the extremer ranges of sanctity will surely be let off at the last day if our humility, asceticism, and devoutness prove of a less convulsive sort.  This practically amounts to saying that much that it is legitimate to admire in this field need nevertheless not be imitated, and that religious phenomena, like all other human phenomena, are subject to the law of the golden mean.  Political reformers accomplish their successive tasks in the history of nations by being blind for the time to other causes.  Great schools of art work out the effects which it is their mission to reveal, at the cost of a one-sidedness for which other schools must make amends.  We accept a John Howard, a Mazzini, a Botticelli, a Michael Angelo, with a kind of indulgence.  We are glad they existed to show us that way, but we are glad there are also other ways of seeing and taking life.  So of many of the saints whom we have looked at.  We are proud of a human nature that could be so passionately extreme, but we shrink from advising others to follow the example.  The conduct we blame ourselves for not following lies nearer to the middle line of human effort.  It is less dependent on particular beliefs and doctrines.  It is such as wears well in different ages, such as under different skies all judges are able to commend.

The fruits of religion, in other words, are, like all human products, liable to corruption by excess.  Common sense must judge them.  It need not blame the votary; but it may be able to praise him only conditionally, as one who acts faithfully according to his lights.  He shows us heroism in one way, but the unconditionally good way is that for which no indulgence need be asked.

We find that error by excess is exemplified by every saintly virtue.  Excess, in human faculties, means usually one-sidedness or want of balance; for it is hard to imagine an essential faculty too strong, if only other faculties equally strong be there to cooperate with it in action.  Strong affections need a strong will; strong active powers need a strong intellect; strong intellect needs strong sympathies, to keep life steady.  If the balance exist, no one faculty can possibly be too strong—­we only get the stronger all-round character.  In the life of saints, technically so called, the spiritual faculties are strong, but what gives the impression of extravagance proves usually on examination to be a relative deficiency of intellect.  Spiritual excitement takes pathological forms whenever other interests are too few and the intellect too narrow.  We find this exemplified by all the saintly attributes in turn—­devout love of God, purity, charity, asceticism, all may lead astray.  I will run over these virtues in succession.

First of all let us take Devoutness.  When unbalanced, one of its vices is called Fanaticism.  Fanaticism (when not a mere expression of ecclesiastical ambition) is only loyalty carried to a convulsive extreme.  When an intensely loyal and narrow mind is once grasped by the feeling that a certain superhuman person is worthy of its exclusive devotion, one of the first things that happens is that it idealizes the devotion itself.  To adequately realize the merits of the idol gets to be considered the one great merit of the worshiper; and the sacrifices and servilities by which savage tribesmen have from time immemorial exhibited their faithfulness to chieftains are now outbid in favor of the deity.  Vocabularies are exhausted and languages altered in the attempt to praise him enough; death is looked on as gain if it attract his grateful notice; and the personal attitude of being his devotee becomes what one might almost call a new and exalted kind of professional specialty within the tribe.[199] The legends that gather round the lives of holy persons are fruits of this impulse to celebrate and glorify.  The Buddha²⁰⁰ and Mohammed²⁰¹ and their companions and many Christian saints are incrusted with a heavy jewelry of anecdotes which are meant to be honorific, but are simply abgeschmackt and silly, and form a touching expression of man’s misguided propensity to praise.

[199] Christian saints have had their specialties of devotion, Saint Francis to Christ’s wounds; Saint Anthony of Padua to Christ’s childhood; Saint Bernard to his humanity; Saint Teresa to Saint Joseph, etc.  The Shi-ite Mohammedans venerate Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, instead of Abu-bekr, his brother-in-law.  Vambery describes a dervish whom he met in Persia, “who had solemnly vowed, thirty years before, that he would never employ his organs of speech otherwise but in uttering, everlastingly, the name of his favorite, Ali, Ali.  He thus wished to signify to the world that he was the most devoted partisan of that Ali who had been dead a thousand years.  In his own home, speaking with his wife, children, and friends, no other word but ‘Ali!’ ever passed his lips.  If he wanted food or drink or anything else, he expressed his wants still by repeating ‘Ali!’ Begging or buying at the bazaar, it was always ‘Ali!’ Treated ill or generously, he would still harp on his monotonous ‘Ali!’ Latterly his zeal assumed such tremendous proportions that, like a madman, he would race, the whole day, up and down the streets of the town, throwing his stick high up into the air, and shriek our, all the while, at the top of his voice, ‘Ali!’ This dervish was venerated by everybody as a saint, and received everywhere with the greatest distinction.”  Arminius Vambery, his Life and Adventures, written by Himself, London, 1889, p. 69.  On the anniversary of the death of Hussein, Ali’s son, the Shi-ite Moslems still make the air resound with cries of his name and Ali’s.

[200] Compare H. C. Warren:  Buddhism in Translation, Cambridge, U.S., 1898, passim.

[201] Compare J. L. Merrick:  The Life and Religion of Mohammed, as contained in the Sheeah traditions of the Hyat-ul-Kuloob, Boston. 1850, passim.

An immediate consequence of this condition of mind is jealousy for the deity’s honor.  How can the devotee show his loyalty better than by sensitiveness in this regard?  The slightest affront or neglect must be resented, the deity’s enemies must be put to shame.  In exceedingly narrow minds and active wills, such a care may become an engrossing preoccupation; and crusades have been preached and massacres instigated for no other reason than to remove a fancied slight upon the God.  Theologies representing the gods as mindful of their glory, and churches with imperialistic policies, have conspired to fan this temper to a glow, so that intolerance and persecution have come to be vices associated by some of us inseparably with the saintly mind.  They are unquestionably its besetting sins.  The saintly temper is a moral temper, and a moral temper has often to be cruel.  It is a partisan temper, and that is cruel.  Between his own and Jehovah’s enemies a David knows no difference; a Catherine of Siena, panting to stop the warfare among Christians which was the scandal of her epoch, can think of no better method of union among them than a crusade to massacre the Turks; Luther finds no word of protest or regret over the atrocious tortures with which the Anabaptist leaders were put to death; and a Cromwell praises the Lord for delivering his enemies into his hands for “execution.”  Politics come in in all such cases; but piety finds the partnership not quite unnatural.  So, when “freethinkers” tell us that religion and fanaticism are twins, we cannot make an unqualified denial of the charge.

Fanaticism must then be inscribed on the wrong side of religion’s account, so long as the religious person’s intellect is on the stage which the despotic kind of God satisfies.  But as soon as the God is represented as less intent on his own honor and glory, it ceases to be a danger.

Fanaticism is found only where the character is masterful and aggressive.  In gentle characters, where devoutness is intense and the intellect feeble, we have an imaginative absorption in the love of God to the exclusion of all practical human interests, which, though innocent enough, is too one-sided to be admirable.  A mind too narrow has room but for one kind of affection.  When the love of God takes possession of such a mind, it expels all human loves and human uses.  There is no English name for such a sweet excess of devotion, so I will refer to it as a theopathic condition.

The blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque may serve as an example.

“To be loved here upon the earth,” her recent biographer exclaims:  “to be loved by a noble, elevated, distinguished being; to be loved with fidelity, with devotion—­what enchantment!  But to be loved by God! and loved by him to distraction [aime jusqu’a la folie]!—­Margaret melted away with love at the thought of such a thing.  Like Saint Philip of Neri in former times, or like Saint Francis Xavier, she said to God:  ’Hold back, O my God, these torrents which overwhelm me, or else enlarge my capacity for their reception.”[202]

[202] Bougaud:  Hist. de la bienheureuse Marguerite Marie, Paris, 1894, p. 145.

The most signal proofs of God’s love which Margaret Mary received were her hallucinations of sight, touch, and hearing, and the most signal in turn of these were the revelations of Christ’s sacred heart, “surrounded with rays more brilliant than the Sun, and transparent like a crystal.  The wound which he received on the cross visibly appeared upon it.  There was a crown of thorns round about this divine Heart, and a cross above it.”  At the same time Christ’s voice told her that, unable longer to contain the flames of his love for mankind, he had chosen her by a miracle to spread the knowledge of them.  He thereupon took out her mortal heart, placed it inside of his own and inflamed it, and then replaced it in her breast, adding:  “Hitherto thou hast taken the name of my slave, hereafter thou shalt be called the well-beloved disciple of my Sacred Heart.”

In a later vision the Saviour revealed to her in detail the “great design” which he wished to establish through her instrumentality.  “I ask of thee to bring it about that every first Friday after the week of holy Sacrament shall be made into a special holy day for honoring my Heart by a general communion and by services intended to make honorable amends for the indignities which it has received.  And I promise thee that my Heart will dilate to shed with abundance the influences of its love upon all those who pay to it these honors, or who bring it about that others do the same.”

“This revelation,” says Mgr.  Bougaud, “is unquestionably the most important of all the revelations which have illumined the Church since that of the Incarnation and of the Lord’s Supper. . . .  After the Eucharist, the supreme effort of the Sacred Heart.”[203] Well, what were its good fruits for Margaret Mary’s life?  Apparently little else but sufferings and prayers and absences of mind and swoons and ecstasies.  She became increasingly useless about the convent, her absorption in Christ’s love—­

“which grew upon her daily, rendering her more and more incapable of attending to external duties.  They tried her in the infirmary, but without much success, although her kindness, zeal, and devotion were without bounds, and her charity rose to acts of such a heroism that our readers would not bear the recital of them.  They tried her in the kitchen, but were forced to give it up as hopeless—­everything dropped out of her hands.  The admirable humility with which she made amends for her clumsiness could not prevent this from being prejudicial to the order and regularity which must always reign in a community.  They put her in the school, where the little girls cherished her, and cut pieces out of her clothes [for relics] as if she were already a saint, but where she was too absorbed inwardly to pay the necessary attention.  Poor dear sister, even less after her visions than before them was she a denizen of earth, and they had to leave her in her heaven.”[204]

[203] Bougaud:  Hist. de la bienheureuse Marguerite Marie, Paris, 1894, pp. 365, 241.

[204] Bougaud:  Op. cit., p. 267.

Poor dear sister, indeed!  Amiable and good, but so feeble of intellectual outlook that it would be too much to ask of us, with our Protestant and modern education, to feel anything but indulgent pity for the kind of saintship which she embodies.  A lower example still of theopathic saintliness is that of Saint Gertrude, a Benedictine nun of the thirteenth century, whose “Revelations,” a well-known mystical authority, consist mainly of proofs of Christ’s partiality for her undeserving person.  Assurances of his love, intimacies and caresses and compliments of the most absurd and puerile sort, addressed by Christ to Gertrude as an individual, form the tissue of this paltry-minded recital.[205] In reading such a narrative, we realize the gap between the thirteenth and the twentieth century, and we feel that saintliness of character may yield almost absolutely worthless fruits if it be associated with such inferior intellectual sympathies.  What with science, idealism, and democracy, our own imagination has grown to need a God of an entirely different temperament from that Being interested exclusively in dealing out personal favors, with whom our ancestors were so contented.  Smitten as we are with the vision of social righteousness, a God indifferent to everything but adulation, and full of partiality for his individual favorites, lacks an essential element of largeness; and even the best professional sainthood of former centuries, pent in as it is to such a conception, seems to us curiously shallow and unedifying.

[205] Examples:  “Suffering from a headache, she sought, for the glory of God, to relieve herself by holding certain odoriferous substances in her mouth, when the Lord appeared to her to lean over towards her lovingly, and to find comfort Himself in these odors.  After having gently breathed them in, He arose, and said with a gratified air to the Saints, as if contented with what He had done:  ‘see the new present which my betrothed has given Me!’

“One day, at chapel, she heard supernaturally sung the words ‘Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus.’  The son of God leaning towards her like a sweet lover, and giving to her soul the softest kiss, said to her at the second Sanctus:  ’In this Sanctus addressed to my person, receive with this kiss all the sanctity of my divinity and of my humanity, and let it be to thee a sufficient preparation for approaching the communion table.’  And the next following Sunday, while she was thanking God for this favor, behold the Son of God, more beauteous than thousands of angels, takes her in His arms as if He were proud of her and presents her to God the Father, in that perfection of sanctity with which He had dowered her.  And the Father took such delight in this soul thus presented by His only son, that, as if unable longer to restrain Himself, He gave her, and the Holy Ghost gave her also, the sanctity attributed to each by His own Sanctus—­and thus she remained endowed with the plenary fullness of the blessing of Sanctity, bestowed on her by Omnipotence, by Wisdom, and by Love.”  Revelations de Sainte Gertrude, Paris, 1898, i. 44, 186.

Take Saint Teresa, for example, one of the ablest women, in many respects, of whose life we have the record.  She had a powerful intellect of the practical order.  She wrote admirable descriptive psychology, possessed a will equal to any emergency, great talent for politics and business, a buoyant disposition, and a first-rate literary style.  She was tenaciously aspiring, and put her whole life at the service of her religious ideals.  Yet so paltry were these, according to our present way of thinking, that (although I know that others have been moved differently) I confess that my only feeling in reading her has been pity that so much vitality of soul should have found such poor employment.

In spite of the sufferings which she endured, there is a curious flavor of superficiality about her genius.  A Birmingham anthropologist, Dr. Jordan, has divided the human race into two types, whom he calls “shrews” and “nonshrews” respectively.[206] The shrew-type is defined as possessing an “active unimpassioned temperament.”  In other words, shrews are the “motors,” rather than the “sensories,”[207] and their expressions are as a rule more energetic than the feelings which appear to prompt them.  Saint Teresa, paradoxical as such a judgment may sound, was a typical shrew, in this sense of the term.  The bustle of her style, as well as of her life, proves it.  Not only must she receive unheard-of personal favors and spiritual graces from her Saviour, but she must immediately write about them and exploiter them professionally, and use her expertness to give instruction to those less privileged.  Her voluble egotism; her sense, not of radical bad being, as the really contrite have it, but of her “faults” and “imperfections” in the plural; her stereotyped humility and return upon herself, as covered with “confusion” at each new manifestation of God’s singular partiality for a person so unworthy, are typical of shrewdom:  a paramountly feeling nature would be objectively lost in gratitude, and silent.  She had some public instincts, it is true; she hated the Lutherans, and longed for the church’s triumph over them; but in the main her idea of religion seems to have been that of an endless amatory flirtation—­if one may say so without irreverence—­ between the devotee and the deity; and apart from helping younger nuns to go in this direction by the inspiration of her example and instruction, there is absolutely no human use in her, or sign of any general human interest.  Yet the spirit of her age, far from rebuking her, exalted her as superhuman.

[206] Furneaux Jordan:  Character in Birth and Parentage, first edition.  Later editions change the nomenclature.

[207] As to this distinction, see the admirably practical account in J. M. Baldwin’s little book, The Story of the Mind, 1898.

We have to pass a similar judgment on the whole notion of saintship based on merits.  Any God who, on the one hand, can care to keep a pedantically minute account of individual shortcomings, and on the other can feel such partialities, and load particular creatures with such insipid marks of favor, is too small-minded a God for our credence.  When Luther, in his immense manly way, swept off by a stroke of his hand the very notion of a debit and credit account kept with individuals by the Almighty, he stretched the soul’s imagination and saved theology from puerility.

So much for mere devotion, divorced from the intellectual conceptions which might guide it towards bearing useful human fruit.

The next saintly virtue in which we find excess is Purity.  In theopathic characters, like those whom we have just considered, the love of God must not be mixed with any other love.  Father and mother, sisters, brothers, and friends are felt as interfering distractions; for sensitiveness and narrowness, when they occur together, as they often do, require above all things a simplified world to dwell in.  Variety and confusion are too much for their powers of comfortable adaptation.  But whereas your aggressive pietist reaches his unity objectively, by forcibly stamping disorder and divergence out, your retiring pietist reaches his subjectively, leaving disorder in the world at large, but making a smaller world in which he dwells himself and from which he eliminates it altogether.  Thus, alongside of the church militant with its prisons, dragonnades, and inquisition methods, we have the church fugient, as one might call it, with its hermitages, monasteries, and sectarian organizations, both churches pursuing the same object—­to unify the life,[208] and simplify the spectacle presented to the soul.  A mind extremely sensitive to inner discords will drop one external relation after another, as interfering with the absorption of consciousness in spiritual things.  Amusements must go first, then conventional “society,” then business, then family duties, until at last seclusion, with a subdivision of the day into hours for stated religious acts, is the only thing that can be borne.  The lives of saints are a history of successive renunciations of complication, one form of contact with the outer life being dropped after another, to save the purity of inner tone.[209] “Is it not better,” a young sister asks her Superior, “that I should not speak at all during the hour of recreation, so as not to run the risk, by speaking, of falling into some sin of which I might not be conscious?”[210] If the life remains a social one at all, those who take part in it must follow one identical rule.

Embosomed in this monotony, the zealot for purity feels clean and free once more.  The minuteness of uniformity maintained in certain sectarian communities, whether monastic or not, is something almost inconceivable to a man of the world.  Costume, phraseology, hours, and habits are absolutely stereotyped, and there is no doubt that some persons are so made as to find in this stability an incomparable kind of mental rest.

[208] On this subject I refer to the work of M. Murisier (Les Maladies du sentiment Religieux, Paris, 1901), who makes inner unification the mainspring of the whole religious life.  But ALL strongly ideal interests, religious or irreligious, unify the mind and tend to subordinate everything to themselves.  One would infer from M. Murisier’s pages that this formal condition was peculiarly characteristic of religion, and that one might in comparison almost neglect material content, in studying the latter.  I trust that the present work will convince the reader that religion has plenty of material content which is characteristic and which is more important by far than any general psychological form.  In spite of this criticism, I find M. Murisier’s book highly instructive.

[209] Example:  “At the first beginning of the Servitor’s [Suso’s] interior life, after he had purified his soul properly by confession, he marked out for himself, in thought, three circles, within which he shut himself up, as in a spiritual intrenchment.  The first circle was his cell, his chapel, and the choir.  When he was within this circle, he seemed to himself in complete security.  The second circle was the whole monastery as far as the outer gate.  The third and outermost circle was the gate itself, and here it was necessary for him to stand well upon his guard.  When he went outside these circles, it seemed to him that he was in the plight of some wild animal which is outside its hole, and surrounded by the hunt, and therefore in need of all its cunning and watchfulness.”  The Life of the Blessed Henry Suso, by Himself, translated by Knox, London, 1865, p. 168.

[210] Vie des premieres Religieuses Dominicaines de la Congregation de St. Dominique, a Nancy; Nancy, 1896, p. 129.

We have no time to multiply examples, so I will let the case of Saint Louis of Gonzaga serve as a type of excess in purification.

I think you will agree that this youth carried the elimination of the external and discordant to a point which we cannot unreservedly admire.  At the age of ten, his biographer says:—­

“The inspiration came to him to consecrate to the Mother of God his own virginity—­that being to her the most agreeable of possible presents.  Without delay, then, and with all the fervor there was in him, joyous of heart, and burning with love, he made his vow of perpetual chastity.  Mary accepted the offering of his innocent heart, and obtained for him from God, as a recompense, the extraordinary grace of never feeling during his entire life the slightest touch of temptation against the virtue of purity.  This was an altogether exceptional favor, rarely accorded even to Saints themselves, and all the more marvelous in that Louis dwelt always in courts and among great folks, where danger and opportunity are so unusually frequent.  It is true that Louis from his earliest childhood had shown a natural repugnance for whatever might be impure or unvirginal, and even for relations of any sort whatever between persons of opposite sex.  But this made it all the more surprising that he should, especially since this vow, feel it necessary to have recourse to such a number of expedients for protecting against even the shadow of danger the virginity which he had thus consecrated.  One might suppose that if any one could have contented himself with the ordinary precautions, prescribed for all Christians, it would assuredly have been he.  But no!  In the use of preservatives and means of defense, in flight from the most insignificant occasions, from every possibility of peril, just as in the mortification of his flesh, he went farther than the majority of saints.  He, who by an extraordinary protection of God’s grace was never tempted, measured all his steps as if he were threatened on every side by particular dangers.  Thenceforward he never raised his eyes, either when walking in the streets, or when in society.  Not only did he avoid all business with females even more scrupulously than before, but he renounced all conversation and every kind of social recreation with them, although his father tried to make him take part; and he commenced only too early to deliver his innocent body to austerities of every kind.”[211]

[211] Meschler’s Life of Saint Louis of Gonzaga, French translation by Lebrequier, 1891, p. 40.

At the age of twelve, we read of this young man that “if by chance his mother sent one of her maids of honor to him with a message, he never allowed her to come in, but listened to her through the barely opened door, and dismissed her immediately.  He did not like to be alone with his own mother, whether at table or in conversation; and when the rest of the company withdrew, he sought also a pretext for retiring. . . .  Several great ladies, relatives of his, he avoided learning to know even by sight; and he made a sort of treaty with his father, engaging promptly and readily to accede to all his wishes, if he might only be excused from all visits to ladies.”

[212] Ibid., p. 71.

When he was seventeen years old Louis joined the Jesuit order,[213] against his father’s passionate entreaties, for he was heir of a princely house; and when a year later the father died, he took the loss as a “particular attention” to himself on God’s part, and wrote letters of stilted good advice, as from a spiritual superior, to his grieving mother.  He soon became so good a monk that if any one asked him the number of his brothers and sisters, he had to reflect and count them over before replying.  A Father asked him one day if he were never troubled by the thought of his family, to which, “I never think of them except when praying for them,” was his only answer.  Never was he seen to hold in his hand a flower or anything perfumed, that he might take pleasure in it.  On the contrary, in the hospital, he used to seek for whatever was most disgusting, and eagerly snatch the bandages of ulcers, etc., from the hands of his companions.  He avoided worldly talk, and immediately tried to turn every conversation on to pious subjects, or else he remained silent.  He systematically refused to notice his surroundings.  Being ordered one day to bring a book from the rector’s seat in the refectory, he had to ask where the rector sat, for in the three months he had eaten bread there, so carefully did he guard his eyes that he had not noticed the place.  One day, during recess, having looked by chance on one of his companions, he reproached himself as for a grave sin against modesty.  He cultivated silence, as preserving from sins of the tongue; and his greatest penance was the limit which his superiors set to his bodily penances.  He sought after false accusations and unjust reprimands as opportunities of humility; and such was his obedience that, when a room-mate, having no more paper, asked him for a sheet, he did not feel free to give it to him without first obtaining the permission of the superior, who, as such, stood in the place of God, and transmitted his orders.

[213] In his boyish note-book he praises the monastic life for its freedom from sin, and for the imperishable treasures, which it enables us to store up, “of merit in God’s eyes which makes of Him our debtor for all Eternity.”  Loc. cit., p. 62.

I can find no other sorts of fruit than these of Louis’s saintship.  He died in 1591, in his twenty-ninth year, and is known in the Church as the patron of all young people.  On his festival, the altar in the chapel devoted to him in a certain church in Rome “is embosomed in flowers, arranged with exquisite taste; and a pile of letters may be seen at its foot, written to the Saint by young men and women, and directed to ‘Paradiso.’  They are supposed to be burnt unread except by San Luigi, who must find singular petitions in these pretty little missives, tied up now with a green ribbon, expressive of hope, now with a red one, emblematic of love,” etc.[214]

[214] Mademoiselle Mori, a novel quoted in Hare’s Walks in Rome, 1900, i. 55.

I cannot resist the temptation to quote from Starbuck’s book, p. 388, another case of purification by elimination.  It runs as follows:—­

“The signs of abnormality which sanctified persons show are of frequent occurrence.  They get out of tune with other people; often they will have nothing to do with churches, which they regard as worldly; they become hypercritical towards others; they grow careless of their social, political, and financial obligations.  As an instance of this type may be mentioned a woman of sixty-eight of whom the writer made a special study.  She had been a member of one of the most active and progressive churches in a busy part of a large city.  Her pastor described her as having reached the censorious stage.  She had grown more and more out of sympathy with the church; her connection with it finally consisted simply in attendance at prayer-meeting, at which her only message was that of reproof and condemnation of the others for living on a low plane.  At last she withdrew from fellowship with any church.  The writer found her living alone in a little room on the top story of a cheap boarding-house quite out of touch with all human relations, but apparently happy in the enjoyment of her own spiritual blessings.  Her time was occupied in writing booklets on sanctification—­page after page of dreamy rhapsody.  She proved to be one of a small group of persons who claim that entire salvation involves three steps instead of two; not only must there be conversion and sanctification, but a third, which they call ‘crucifixion’ or ‘perfect redemption,’ and which seems to bear the same relation to sanctification that this bears to conversion.  She related how the Spirit had said to her, ’Stop going to church.  Stop going to holiness meetings.  Go to your own room and I will teach you.’  She professes to care nothing for colleges, or preachers, or churches, but only cares to listen to what God says to her.  Her description of her experience seemed entirely consistent; she is happy and contented, and her life is entirely satisfactory to herself.  While listening to her own story, one was tempted to forget that it was from the life of a person who could not live by it in conjunction with her fellows.”

Our final judgment of the worth of such a life as this will depend largely on our conception of God, and of the sort of conduct he is best pleased with in his creatures.  The Catholicism of the sixteenth century paid little heed to social righteousness; and to leave the world to the devil whilst saving one’s own soul was then accounted no discreditable scheme.  To-day, rightly or wrongly, helpfulness in general human affairs is, in consequence of one of those secular mutations in moral sentiment of which I spoke, deemed an essential element of worth in character; and to be of some public or private use is also reckoned as a species of divine service.  Other early Jesuits, especially the missionaries among them, the Xaviers, Brebeufs, Jogues, were objective minds, and fought in their way for the world’s welfare; so their lives to-day inspire us.  But when the intellect, as in this Louis, is originally no larger than a pin’s head, and cherishes ideas of God of corresponding smallness, the result, notwithstanding the heroism put forth, is on the whole repulsive.  Purity, we see in the object-lesson, is NOT the one thing needful; and it is better that a life should contract many a dirt-mark, than forfeit usefulness in its efforts to remain unspotted.

Proceeding onwards in our search of religious extravagance, we next come upon excesses of Tenderness and Charity.  Here saintliness has to face the charge of preserving the unfit, and breeding parasites and beggars.  “Resist not evil,” “Love your enemies,” these are saintly maxims of which men of this world find it hard to speak without impatience.  Are the men of this world right, or are the saints in possession of the deeper range of truth?

No simple answer is possible.  Here, if anywhere, one feels the complexity of the moral life, and the mysteriousness of the way in which facts and ideals are interwoven.

Perfect conduct is a relation between three terms:  the actor, the objects for which he acts, and the recipients of the action.  In order that conduct should be abstractly perfect, all three terms, intention, execution, and reception, should be suited to one another.  The best intention will fail if it either work by false means or address itself to the wrong recipient.  Thus no critic or estimator of the value of conduct can confine himself to the actor’s animus alone, apart from the other elements of the performance.  As there is no worse lie than a truth misunderstood by those who hear it, so reasonable arguments, challenges to magnanimity, and appeals to sympathy or justice, are folly when we are dealing with human crocodiles and boa-constrictors.  The saint may simply give the universe into the hands of the enemy by his trustfulness.  He may by non-resistance cut off his own survival.

Herbert Spencer tells us that the perfect man’s conduct will appear perfect only when the environment is perfect:  to no inferior environment is it suitably adapted.  We may paraphrase this by cordially admitting that saintly conduct would be the most perfect conduct conceivable in an environment where all were saints already; but by adding that in an environment where few are saints, and many the exact reverse of saints, it must be ill adapted.  We must frankly confess, then, using our empirical common sense and ordinary practical prejudices, that in the world that actually is, the virtues of sympathy, charity, and non-resistance may be, and often have been, manifested in excess.

The powers of darkness have systematically taken advantage of them.  The whole modern scientific organization of charity is a consequence of the failure of simply giving alms.  The whole history of constitutional government is a commentary on the excellence of resisting evil, and when one cheek is smitten, of smiting back and not turning the other cheek also.

You will agree to this in general, for in spite of the Gospel, in spite of Quakerism, in spite of Tolstoi, you believe in fighting fire with fire, in shooting down usurpers, locking up thieves, and freezing out vagabonds and swindlers.

And yet you are sure, as I am sure, that were the world confined to these hard-headed, hard-hearted, and hard-fisted methods exclusively, were there no one prompt to help a brother first, and find out afterwards whether he were worthy; no one willing to drown his private wrongs in pity for the wronger’s person; no one ready to be duped many a time rather than live always on suspicion; no one glad to treat individuals passionately and impulsively rather than by general rules of prudence; the world would be an infinitely worse place than it is now to live in.  The tender grace, not of a day that is dead, but of a day yet to be born somehow, with the golden rule grown natural, would be cut out from the perspective of our imaginations.

The saints, existing in this way, may, with their extravagances of human tenderness, be prophetic.  Nay, innumerable times they have proved themselves prophetic.  Treating those whom they met, in spite of the past, in spite of all appearances, as worthy, they have stimulated them to BE worthy, miraculously transformed them by their radiant example and by the challenge of their expectation.

From this point of view we may admit the human charity which we find in all saints, and the great excess of it which we find in some saints, to be a genuinely creative social force, tending to make real a degree of virtue which it alone is ready to assume as possible.  The saints are authors, auctores, increasers, of goodness.  The potentialities of development in human souls are unfathomable.  So many who seemed irretrievably hardened have in point of fact been softened, converted, regenerated, in ways that amazed the subjects even more than they surprised the spectators, that we never can be sure in advance of any man that his salvation by the way of love is hopeless.  We have no right to speak of human crocodiles and boa-constrictors as of fixedly incurable beings.  We know not the complexities of personality, the smouldering emotional fires, the other facets of the character-polyhedron, the resources of the subliminal region.  St. Paul long ago made our ancestors familiar with the idea that every soul is virtually sacred.  Since Christ died for us all without exception, St. Paul said, we must despair of no one.  This belief in the essential sacredness of every one expresses itself to-day in all sorts of humane customs and reformatory institutions, and in a growing aversion to the death penalty and to brutality in punishment.  The saints, with their extravagance of human tenderness, are the great torch-bearers of this belief, the tip of the wedge, the clearers of the darkness.  Like the single drops which sparkle in the sun as they are flung far ahead of the advancing edge of a wave-crest or of a flood, they show the way and are forerunners.  The world is not yet with them, so they often seem in the midst of the world’s affairs to be preposterous.  Yet they are impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animaters of potentialities of goodness which but for them would lie forever dormant.  It is not possible to be quite as mean as we naturally are, when they have passed before us.  One fire kindles another; and without that over-trust in human worth which they show, the rest of us would lie in spiritual stagnancy.

Momentarily considered, then, the saint may waste his tenderness and be the dupe and victim of his charitable fever, but the general function of his charity in social evolution is vital and essential.  If things are ever to move upward, some one must be ready to take the first step, and assume the risk of it.  No one who is not willing to try charity, to try non-resistance as the saint is always willing, can tell whether these methods will or will not succeed.  When they do succeed, they are far more powerfully successful than force or worldly prudence.  Force destroys enemies; and the best that can be said of prudence is that it keeps what we already have in safety.  But non-resistance, when successful, turns enemies into friends; and charity regenerates its objects.  These saintly methods are, as I said, creative energies; and genuine saints find in the elevated excitement with which their faith endows them an authority and impressiveness which makes them irresistible in situations where men of shallower nature cannot get on at all without the use of worldly prudence.  This practical proof that worldly wisdom may be safely transcended is the saint’s magic gift to mankind.[215] Not only does his vision of a better world console us for the generally prevailing prose and barrenness; but even when on the whole we have to confess him ill adapted, he makes some converts, and the environment gets better for his ministry.  He is an effective ferment of goodness, a slow transmuter of the earthly into a more heavenly order.

[215] The best missionary lives abound in the victorious combination of non-resistance with personal authority.  John G. Paton, for example, in the New Hebrides, among brutish Melanesian cannibals, preserves a charmed life by dint of it.  When it comes to the point, no one ever dares actually to strike him.  Native converts, inspired by him, showed analogous virtue.  “One of our chiefs, full of the Christ-kindled desire to seek and to save, sent a message to an inland chief, that he and four attendants would come on Sabbath and tell them the gospel of Jehovah God.  The reply came back sternly forbidding their visit, and threatening with death any Christian that approached their village.  Our chief sent in response a loving message, telling them that Jehovah had taught the Christians to return good for evil, and that they would come unarmed to tell them the story of how the Son of God came into the world and died in order to bless and save his enemies.  The heathen chief sent back a stern and prompt reply once more:  ‘If you come, you will be killed.’  On Sabbath morn the Christian chief and his four companions were met outside the village by the heathen chief, who implored and threatened them once more.  But the former said:—­

“’We come to you without weapons of war!  We come only to tell you about Jesus.  We believe that He will protect us to-day.’

“As they pressed steadily forward towards the village, spears began to be thrown at them.  Some they evaded, being all except one dexterous warriors; and others they literally received with their bare hands, and turned them aside in an incredible manner.  The heathen, apparently thunderstruck at these men thus approaching them without weapons of war, and not even flinging back their own spears which they had caught, after having thrown what the old chief called ‘a shower of spears,’ desisted from mere surprise.  Our Christian chief called out, as he and his companions drew up in the midst of them on the village public ground:—­

“’Jehovah thus protects us.  He has given us all your spears!  Once we would have thrown them back at you and killed you.  But now we come, not to fight but to tell you about Jesus.  He has changed our dark hearts.  He asks you now to lay down all these your other weapons of war, and to hear what we can tell you about the love of God, our great Father, the only living God.’

“The heathen were perfectly overawed.  They manifestly looked on these Christians as protected by some Invisible One.  They listened for the first time to the story of the Gospel and of the Cross.  We lived to see that chief and all his tribe sitting in the school of Christ.  And there is perhaps not an island in these southern seas, amongst all those won for Christ, where similar acts of heroism on the part of converts cannot be recited.”  John G. Paton, Missionary to the New Hebrides, An Autobiography, second part, London, 1890, p. 243.

In this respect the Utopian dreams of social justice in which many contemporary socialists and anarchists indulge are, in spite of their impracticability and non-adaptation to present environmental conditions, analogous to the saint’s belief in an existent kingdom of heaven.  They help to break the edge of the general reign of hardness and are slow leavens of a better order.

The next topic in order is Asceticism, which I fancy you are all ready to consider without argument a virtue liable to extravagance and excess.  The optimism and refinement of the modern imagination has, as I have already said elsewhere, changed the attitude of the church towards corporeal mortification, and a Suso or a Saint Peter of Alcantara²¹⁶ appear to us to-day rather in the light of tragic mountebanks than of sane men inspiring us with respect.  If the inner dispositions are right, we ask, what need of all this torment, this violation of the outer nature?  It keeps the outer nature too important.  Any one who is genuinely emancipated from the flesh will look on pleasures and pains, abundance and privation, as alike irrelevant and indifferent.  He can engage in actions and experience enjoyments without fear of corruption or enslavement.  As the Bhagavad-Gita says, only those need renounce worldly actions who are still inwardly attached thereto.  If one be really unattached to the fruits of action, one may mix in the world with equanimity.  I quoted in a former lecture Saint Augustine’s antinomian saying:  If you only love God enough, you may safely follow all your inclinations.  “He needs no devotional practices,” is one of Ramakrishna’s maxims, “whose heart is moved to tears at the mere mention of the name of 354 Hari.”[217] And the Buddha, in pointing out what he called “the middle way” to his disciples, told them to abstain from both extremes, excessive mortification being as unreal and unworthy as mere desire and pleasure.  The only perfect life, he said, is that of inner wisdom, which makes one thing as indifferent to us as another, and thus leads to rest, to peace, and to Nirvana.[218]

[216] Saint Peter, Saint Teresa tells us in her autobiography (French translation, p. 333), “had passed forty years without ever sleeping more than an hour and a half a day.  Of all his mortifications, this was the one that had cost him the most.  To compass it, he kept always on his knees or on his feet.  The little sleep he allowed nature to take was snatched in a sitting posture, his head leaning against a piece of wood fixed in the wall.  Even had he wished to lie down, it would have been impossible, because his cell was only four feet and a half long.  In the course of all these years he never raised his hood, no matter what the ardor of the sun or the rain’s strength.  He never put on a shoe.  He wore a garment of coarse sackcloth, with nothing else upon his skin.  This garment was as scant as possible, and over it a little cloak of the same stuff.  When the cold was great he took off the cloak and opened for a while the door and little window of his cell.  Then he closed them and resumed the mantle—­his way, as he told us, of warming himself, and making his body feel a better temperature.  It was a frequent thing with him to eat once only in three days; and when I expressed my surprise, he said that it was very easy if one once had acquired the habit.  One of his companions has assured me that he has gone sometimes eight days without food. . . .  His poverty was extreme; and his mortification, even in his youth, was such that he told me he had passed three years in a house of his order without knowing any of the monks otherwise than by the sound of their voice, for he never raised his eyes, and only found his way about by following the others.  He showed this same modesty on public highways.  He spent many years without ever laying eyes upon a woman; but he confessed to me that at the age he had reached it was indifferent to him whether he laid eyes on them or not.  He was very old when I first came to know him, and his body so attenuated that it seemed formed of nothing so much as of so many roots of trees.  With all this sanctity he was very affable.  He never spoke unless he was questioned, but his intellectual right-mindedness and grace gave to all his words an irresistible charm.”

[217] F. Max Muller:  Ramakrishna, his Life and sayings, 1899, p. 180.

[218] Oldenberg:  Buddha; translated by W. Hoey, London, 1882, p. 127.

We find accordingly that as ascetic saints have grown older, and directors of conscience more experienced, they usually have shown a tendency to lay less stress on special bodily mortifications.  Catholic teachers have always professed the rule that, since health is needed for efficiency in God’s service, health must not be sacrificed to mortification.  The general optimism and healthy-mindedness of liberal Protestant circles to-day makes mortification for mortification’s sake repugnant to us.  We can no longer sympathize with cruel deities, and the notion that God can take delight in the spectacle of sufferings self-inflicted in his honor is abhorrent.  In consequence of all these motives you probably are disposed, unless some special utility can be shown in some individual’s discipline, to treat the general tendency to asceticism as pathological.

Yet I believe that a more careful consideration of the whole matter, distinguishing between the general good intention of asceticism and the uselessness of some of the particular acts of which it may be guilty, ought to rehabilitate it in our esteem.  For in its spiritual meaning asceticism stands for nothing less than for the essence of the twice-born philosophy.  It symbolizes, lamely enough no doubt, but sincerely, the belief that there is an element of real wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor evaded, but which must be squarely met and overcome by an appeal to the soul’s heroic resources, and neutralized and cleansed away by suffering.  As against this view, the ultra-optimistic form of the once-born philosophy thinks we may treat evil by the method of ignoring.  Let a man who, by fortunate health and circumstances, escapes the suffering of any great amount of evil in his own person, also close his eyes to it as it exists in the wider universe outside his private experience, and he will be quit of it altogether, and can sail through life happily on a healthy-minded basis.  But we saw in our lectures on melancholy how precarious this attempt necessarily is.  Moreover it is but for the individual; and leaves the evil outside of him, unredeemed and unprovided for in his philosophy.

No such attempt can be a GENERAL solution of the problem; and to minds of sombre tinge, who naturally feel life as a tragic mystery, such optimism is a shallow dodge or mean evasion.  It accepts, in lieu of a real deliverance, what is a lucky personal accident merely, a cranny to escape by.  It leaves the general world unhelped and still in the clutch of Satan.  The real deliverance, the twice-born folk insist, must be of universal application.  Pain and wrong and death must be fairly met and overcome in higher excitement, or else their sting remains essentially unbroken.  If one has ever taken the fact of the prevalence of tragic death in this world’s history fairly into his mind—­freezing, drowning entombment alive, wild beasts, worse men, and hideous diseases—­he can with difficulty, it seems to me, continue his own career of worldly prosperity without suspecting that he may all the while not be really inside the game, that he may lack the great initiation.

Well, this is exactly what asceticism thinks; and it voluntarily takes the initiation.  Life is neither farce nor genteel comedy, it says, but something we must sit at in mourning garments, hoping its bitter taste will purge us of our folly.  The wild and the heroic are indeed such rooted parts of it that healthy-mindedness pure and simple, with its sentimental optimism, can hardly be regarded by any thinking man as a serious solution.  Phrases of neatness, cosiness, and comfort can never be an answer to the sphinx’s riddle.

In these remarks I am leaning only upon mankind’s common instinct for reality, which in point of fact has always held the world to be essentially a theatre for heroism.  In heroism, we feel, life’s supreme mystery is hidden.  We tolerate no one who has no capacity whatever for it in any direction.  On the other hand, no matter what a man’s frailties otherwise may be, if he be willing to risk death, and still more if he suffer it heroically, in the service he has chosen, the fact consecrates him forever.  Inferior to ourselves in this or that way, if yet we cling to life, and he is able “to fling it away like a flower” as caring nothing for it, we account him in the deepest way our born superior.  Each of us in his own person feels that a high-hearted indifference to life would expiate all his shortcomings.

The metaphysical mystery, thus recognized by common sense, that he who feeds on death that feeds on men possesses life supereminently and excellently, and meets best the secret demands of the universe, is the truth of which asceticism has been the faithful champion.  The folly of the cross, so inexplicable by the intellect, has yet its indestructible vital meaning.

Representatively, then, and symbolically, and apart from the vagaries into which the unenlightened intellect of former times may have let it wander, asceticism must, I believe, be acknowledged to go with the profounder way of handling the gift of existence.  Naturalistic optimism is mere syllabub and flattery and sponge-cake in comparison.  The practical course of action for us, as religious men, would therefore, it seems to me, not be simply to turn our backs upon the ascetic impulse, as most of us to-day turn them, but rather to discover some outlet for it of which the fruits in the way of privation and hardship might be objectively useful.  The older monastic asceticism occupied itself with pathetic futilities, or terminated in the mere egotism of the individual, increasing his own perfection.[219] But is it not possible for us to discard most of these older forms of mortification, and yet find saner channels for the heroism which inspired them?

[219] “The vanities of all others may die out, but the vanity of a saint as regards his sainthood is hard indeed to wear away.”  Ramakrishna his Life and Sayings, 1899, p. 172.

Does not, for example, the worship of material luxury and wealth, which constitutes so large a portion of the “spirit” of our age, make somewhat for effeminacy and unmanliness?  Is not the exclusively sympathetic and facetious way in which most children are brought up to-day—­so different from the education of a hundred years ago, especially in evangelical circles—­in danger, in spite of its many advantages, of developing a certain trashiness of fibre?  Are there not hereabouts some points of application for a renovated and revised ascetic discipline?

Many of you would recognize such dangers, but would point to athletics, militarism, and individual and national enterprise and adventure as the remedies.  These contemporary ideals are quite as remarkable for the energy with which they make for heroic standards of life, as contemporary religion is remarkable for the way in which it neglects them.[220] War and adventure assuredly keep all who engage in them from treating themselves too tenderly.  They demand such incredible efforts, depth beyond depth of exertion, both in degree and in duration, that the whole scale of motivation alters.  Discomfort and annoyance, hunger and wet, pain and cold, squalor and filth, cease to have any deterrent operation whatever.  Death turns into a commonplace matter, and its usual power to check our action vanishes.  With the annulling of these customary inhibitions, ranges of new energy are set free, and life seems cast upon a higher plane of power.

[220] “When a church has to be run by oysters, ice-cream, and fun,” I read in an American religious paper, “you may be sure that it is running away from Christ.”  Such, if one may judge by appearances, is the present plight of many of our churches.

The beauty of war in this respect is that it is so congruous with ordinary human nature.  Ancestral evolution has made us all potential warriors; so the most insignificant individual, when thrown into an army in the field, is weaned from whatever excess of tenderness toward his precious person he may bring with him, and may easily develop into a monster of insensibility.

But when we compare the military type of self-severity with that of the ascetic saint, we find a world-wide difference in all their spiritual concomitants.

“‘Live and let live,’” writes a clear-headed Austrian officer, “is no device for an army.  Contempt for one’s own comrades, for the troops of the enemy, and, above all, fierce contempt for one’s own person, are what war demands of every one.  Far better is it for an army to be too savage, too cruel, too barbarous, than to possess too much sentimentality and human reasonableness.

If the soldier is to be good for anything as a soldier, he must be exactly the opposite of a reasoning and thinking man.  The measure of goodness in him is his possible use in war.  War, and even peace, require of the soldier absolutely peculiar standards of morality.  The recruit brings with him common moral notions, of which he must seek immediately to get rid.  For him victory, success, must be EVERYTHING.  The most barbaric tendencies in men come to life again in war, and for war’s uses they are incommensurably good.”[221]

[221] C. V. B. K.:  Friedens-und Kriegs-moral der Heere.  Quoted by Hamon:  Psychologie du Militaire professional, 1895, p. xli.

These words are of course literally true.  The immediate aim of the soldier’s life is, as Moltke said, destruction, and nothing but destruction; and whatever constructions wars result in are remote and non-military.  Consequently the soldier cannot train himself to be too feelingless to all those usual sympathies and respects, whether for persons or for things, that make for conservation.  Yet the fact remains that war is a school of strenuous life and heroism; and, being in the line of aboriginal instinct, is the only school that as yet is universally available.  But when we gravely ask ourselves whether this wholesale organization of irrationality and crime be our only bulwark against effeminacy, we stand aghast at the thought, and think more kindly of ascetic religion.  One hears of the mechanical equivalent of heat.  What we now need to discover in the social realm is the moral equivalent of war:  something heroic that will speak to men as universally as war does, and yet will be as compatible with their spiritual selves as war has proved itself to be incompatible.  I have often thought that in the old monkish poverty-worship, in spite of the pedantry which infested it, there might be something like that moral equivalent of war which we are seeking.  May not voluntarily accepted poverty be “the strenuous life,” without the need of crushing weaker peoples?

Poverty indeed IS the strenuous life—­without brass bands or uniforms or hysteric popular applause or lies or circumlocutions; and when one sees the way in which wealth- getting enters as an ideal into the very bone and marrow of our generation, one wonders whether a revival of the belief that poverty is a worthy religious vocation may not be “the transformation of military courage,” and the spiritual reform which our time stands most in need of.

Among us English-speaking peoples especially do the praises of poverty need once more to be boldly sung.  We have grown literally afraid to be poor.  We despise any one who elects to be poor in order to simplify and save his inner life.  If he does not join the general scramble and pant with the money-making street, we deem him spiritless and lacking in ambition.  We have lost the power even of imagining what the ancient idealization of poverty could have meant:  the liberation from material attachments, the unbribed soul, the manlier indifference, the paying our way by what we are or do and not by what we have, the right to fling away our life at any moment irresponsibly—­the more athletic trim, in short, the moral fighting shape.  When we of the so-called better classes are scared as men were never scared in history at material ugliness and hardship; when we put off marriage until our house can be artistic, and quake at the thought of having a child without a bank-account and doomed to manual labor, it is time for thinking men to protest against so unmanly and irreligious a state of opinion.

It is true that so far as wealth gives time for ideal ends and exercise to ideal energies, wealth is better than poverty and ought to be chosen.  But wealth does this in only a portion of the actual cases.  Elsewhere the desire to gain wealth and the fear to lose it are our chief breeders of cowardice and propagators of corruption.  There are thousands of conjunctures in which a wealth-bound man must be a slave, whilst a man for whom poverty has no terrors becomes a freeman.  Think of the strength which personal indifference to poverty would give us if we were devoted to unpopular causes.  We need no longer hold our tongues or fear to vote the revolutionary or reformatory ticket.  Our stocks might fall, our hopes of promotion vanish, our salaries stop, our club doors close in our faces; yet, while we lived, we would imperturbably bear witness to the spirit, and our example would help to set free our generation.  The cause would need its funds, but we its servants would be potent in proportion as we personally were contented with our poverty.

I recommend this matter to your serious pondering, for it is certain that the prevalent fear of poverty among the educated classes is the worst moral disease from which our civilization suffers.

I have now said all that I can usefully say about the several fruits of religion as they are manifested in saintly lives, so I will make a brief review and pass to my more general conclusions.

Our question, you will remember, is as to whether religion stands approved by its fruits, as these are exhibited in the saintly type of character.  Single attributes of saintliness may, it is true, be temperamental endowments, found in non-religious individuals.  But the whole group of them forms a combination which, as such, is religious, for it seems to flow from the sense of the divine as from its psychological centre.  Whoever possesses strongly this sense comes naturally to think that the smallest details of this world derive infinite significance from their relation to an unseen divine order.  The thought of this order yields him a superior denomination of happiness, and a steadfastness of soul with which no other can compare.  In social relations his serviceability is exemplary; he abounds in impulses to help.  His help is inward as well as outward, for his sympathy reaches souls as well as bodies, and kindles unsuspected faculties therein.  Instead of placing happiness where common men place it, in comfort, he places it in a higher kind of inner excitement, which converts discomforts into sources of cheer and annuls unhappiness.  So he turns his back upon no duty, however thankless; and when we are in need of assistance, we can count upon the saint lending his hand with more certainty than we can count upon any other person.  Finally, his humble-mindedness and his ascetic tendencies save him from the petty personal pretensions which so obstruct our ordinary social intercourse, and his purity gives us in him a clean man for a companion.  Felicity, purity, charity, patience, self-severity—­these are splendid excellencies, and the saint of all men shows them in the completest possible measure.

But, as we saw, all these things together do not make saints infallible.  When their intellectual outlook is narrow, they fall into all sorts of holy excesses, fanaticism or theopathic absorption, self-torment, prudery, scrupulosity, gullibility, and morbid inability to meet the world.  By the very intensity of his fidelity to the paltry ideals with which an inferior intellect may inspire him, a saint can be even more objectionable and damnable than a superficial carnal man would be in the same situation.  We must judge him not sentimentally only, and not in isolation, but using our own intellectual standards, placing him in his environment, and estimating his total function.

Now in the matter of intellectual standards, we must bear in mind that it is unfair, where we find narrowness of mind, always to impute it as a vice to the individual, for in religious and theological matters he probably absorbs his narrowness from his generation.  Moreover, we must not confound the essentials of saintliness, which are those general passions of which I have spoken, with its accidents, which are the special determinations of these passions at any historical moment.  In these determinations the saints will usually be loyal to the temporary idols of their tribe.  Taking refuge in monasteries was as much an idol of the tribe in the middle ages, as bearing a hand in the world’s work is to-day.  Saint Francis or Saint Bernard, were they living to-day, would undoubtedly be leading consecrated lives of some sort, but quite as undoubtedly they would not lead them in retirement.  Our animosity to special historic manifestations must not lead us to give away the saintly impulses in their essential nature to the tender mercies of inimical critics.

The most inimical critic of the saintly impulses whom I know is Nietzsche.  He contrasts them with the worldly passions as we find these embodied in the predaceous military character, altogether to the advantage of the latter.  Your born saint, it must be confessed, has something about him which often makes the gorge of a carnal man rise, so it will be worth while to consider the contrast in question more fully.

Dislike of the saintly nature seems to be a negative result of the biologically useful instinct of welcoming leadership, and glorifying the chief of the tribe.  The chief is the potential, if not the actual tyrant, the masterful, overpowering man of prey.  We confess our inferiority and grovel before him.  We quail under his glance, and are at the same time proud of owning so dangerous a lord.  Such instinctive and submissive hero-worship must have been indispensable in primeval tribal life.  In the endless wars of those times, leaders were absolutely needed for the tribe’s survival.  If there were any tribes who owned no leaders, they can have left no issue to narrate their doom.  The leaders always had good consciences, for conscience in them coalesced with will, and those who looked on their face were as much smitten with wonder at their freedom from inner restraint as with awe at the energy of their outward performances.

Compared with these beaked and taloned graspers of the world, saints are herbivorous animals, tame and harmless barn-yard poultry.  There are saints whose beard you may, if you ever care to, pull with impunity.  Such a man excites no thrills of wonder veiled in terror; his conscience is full of scruples and returns; he stuns us neither by his inward freedom nor his outward power; and unless he found within us an altogether different faculty of admiration to appeal to, we should pass him by with contempt.

In point of fact, he does appeal to a different faculty.  Reenacted in human nature is the fable of the wind, the sun, and the traveler.  The sexes embody the discrepancy.  The woman loves the man the more admiringly the stormier he shows himself, and the world deifies its rulers the more for being willful and unaccountable.  But the woman in turn subjugates the man by the mystery of gentleness in beauty, and the saint has always charmed the world by something similar.  Mankind is susceptible and suggestible in opposite directions, and the rivalry of influences is unsleeping.  The saintly and the worldly ideal pursue their feud in literature as much as in real life.

For Nietzsche the saint represents little but sneakingness and slavishness.  He is the sophisticated invalid, the degenerate par excellence, the man of insufficient vitality.  His prevalence would put the human type in danger.

“The sick are the greatest danger for the well.  The weaker, not the stronger, are the strong’s undoing.  It is not FEAR of our fellow-man, which we should wish to see diminished; for fear rouses those who are strong to become terrible in turn themselves, and preserves the hard-earned and successful type of humanity.  What is to be dreaded by us more than any other doom is not fear, but rather the great disgust, not fear, but rather the great pity—­disgust and pity for our human fellows. . . .  The MORBID are our greatest peril—­not the ‘bad’ men, not the predatory beings.  Those born wrong, the miscarried, the broken—­ they it is, the WEAKEST who are undermining the vitality of the race, poisoning our trust in life, and putting humanity in question.  Every look of them is a sigh—­’Would I were something other!  I am sick and tired of what I am.’  In this swamp-soil of self-contempt, every poisonous weed flourishes, and all so small, so secret, so dishonest, and so sweetly rotten.  Here swarm the worms of sensitiveness and resentment, here the air smells odious with secrecy, with what is not to be acknowledged; here is woven endlessly the net of the meanest of conspiracies, the conspiracy of those who suffer against those who succeed and are victorious; here the very aspect of the victorious is hated—­as if health, success, strength, pride, and the sense of power were in themselves things vicious, for which one ought eventually to make bitter expiation.  Oh, how these people would themselves like to inflict the expiation, how they thirst to be the hangmen!  And all the while their duplicity never confesses their hatred to be hatred.”[222]

[222] Zur Genealogie der Moral, Dritte Abhandlung, Section 14.  I have abridged, and in one place transposed, a sentence.

Poor Nietzsche’s antipathy is itself sickly enough, but we all know what he means, and he expresses well the clash between the two Ideals.  The carnivorous-minded “strong man,” the adult male and cannibal, can see nothing but mouldiness and morbidness in the saint’s gentleness and self-severity, and regards him with pure loathing.  The whole feud revolves essentially upon two pivots:  Shall the seen world or the unseen world be our chief sphere of adaptation? and must our means of adaptation in this seen world be aggressiveness or non-resistance?

The debate is serious.  In some sense and to some degree both worlds must be acknowledged and taken account of; and in the seen world both aggressiveness and non-resistance are needful.  It is a question of emphasis, of more or less.  Is the saint’s type or the strong-man’s type the more ideal?

It has often been supposed, and even now, I think, it is supposed by most persons, that there can be one intrinsically ideal type of human character.  A certain kind of man, it is imagined, must be the best man absolutely and apart from the utility of his function, apart from economical considerations.  The saint’s type, and the knight’s or gentleman’s type, have always been rival claimants of this absolute ideality; and in the ideal of military religious orders both types were in a manner blended.  According to the empirical philosophy, however, all ideals are matters of relation.  It would be absurd, for example, to ask for a definition of “the ideal horse,” so long as dragging drays and running races, bearing children, and jogging about with tradesmen’s packages all remain as indispensable differentiations of equine function.  You may take what you call a general all-round animal as a compromise, but he will be inferior to any horse of a more specialized type, in some one particular direction.  We must not forget this now when, in discussing saintliness, we ask if it be an ideal type of manhood.  We must test it by its economical relations.

I think that the method which Mr. Spencer uses in his Data of Ethics will help to fix our opinion.  Ideality in conduct is altogether a matter of adaptation.  A society where all were invariably aggressive would destroy itself by inner friction, and in a society where some are aggressive, others must be non-resistant, if there is to be any kind of order.  This is the present constitution of society, and to the mixture we owe many of our blessings.  But the aggressive members of society are always tending to become bullies, robbers, and swindlers; and no one believes that such a state of things as we now live in is the millennium.  It is meanwhile quite possible to conceive an imaginary society in which there should be no aggressiveness, but only sympathy and fairness—­any small community of true friends now realizes such a society.  Abstractly considered, such a society on a large scale would be the millennium, for every good thing might be realized there with no expense of friction.  To such a millennial society the saint would be entirely adapted.  His peaceful modes of appeal would be efficacious over his companions, and there would be no one extant to take advantage of his non-resistance.  The saint is therefore abstractly a higher type of man than the “strong man,” because he is adapted to the highest society conceivable, whether that society ever be concretely possible or not.  The strong man would immediately tend by his presence to make that society deteriorate.  It would become inferior in everything save in a certain kind of bellicose excitement, dear to men as they now are.

But if we turn from the abstract question to the actual situation, we find that the individual saint may be well or ill adapted, according to particular circumstances.  There is, in short, no absoluteness in the excellence of sainthood.  It must be confessed that as far as this world goes, anyone who makes an out-and-out saint of himself does so at his peril.  If he is not a large enough man, he may appear more insignificant and contemptible, for all his saintship, than if he had remained a worldling.[223] Accordingly religion has seldom been so radically taken in our Western world that the devotee could not mix it with some worldly temper.  It has always found good men who could follow most of its impulses, but who stopped short when it came to non-resistance.  Christ himself was fierce upon occasion.  Cromwells, Stonewall Jacksons, Gordons, show that Christians can be strong men also.

[223] We all know DAFT saints, and they inspire a queer kind of aversion.  But in comparing saints with strong men we must choose individuals on the same intellectual level.  The under-witted strong man homologous in his sphere with the under-witted saint, is the bully of the slums, the hooligan or rowdy.  Surely on this level also the saint preserves a certain superiority.

How is success to be absolutely measured when there are so many environments and so many ways of looking at the adaptation?  It cannot be measured absolutely; the verdict will vary according to the point of view adopted.  From the biological point of view Saint Paul was a failure, because he was beheaded.  Yet he was magnificently adapted to the larger environment of history; and so far as any saint’s example is a leaven of righteousness in the world, and draws it in the direction of more prevalent habits of saintliness, he is a success, no matter what his immediate bad fortune may be.  The greatest saints, the spiritual heroes whom every one acknowledges, the Francises, Bernards, Luthers, Loyolas, Wesleys, Channings, Moodys, Gratrys, the Phillips Brookses, the Agnes Joneses, Margaret Hallahans, and Dora Pattisons, are successes from the outset.  They show themselves, and there is no question; every one perceives their strength and stature.  Their sense of mystery in things, their passion, their goodness, irradiate about them and enlarge their outlines while they soften them.  They are like pictures with an atmosphere and background; and, placed alongside of them, the strong men of this world and no other seem as dry as sticks, as hard and crude as blocks of stone or brick-bats.

In a general way, then, and “on the whole,”[224] our abandonment of theological criteria, and our testing of religion by practical common sense and the empirical method, leave it in possession of its towering place in history.  Economically, the saintly group of qualities is indispensable to the world’s welfare.  The great saints are immediate successes; the smaller ones are at least heralds and harbingers, and they may be leavens also, of a better mundane order.  Let us be saints, then, if we can, whether or not we succeed visibly and temporally.  But in our Father’s house are many mansions, and each of us must discover for himself the kind of religion and the amount of saintship which best comports with what he believes to be his powers and feels to be his truest mission and vocation.  There are no successes to be guaranteed and no set orders to be given to individuals, so long as we follow the methods of empirical philosophy.

[224] See above, p. 321.

This is my conclusion so far.  I know that on some of your minds it leaves a feeling of wonder that such a method should have been applied to such a subject, and this in spite of all those remarks about empiricism which I made at the beginning of Lecture XIII.[225] How, you say, can religion, which believes in two worlds and an invisible order, be estimated by the adaptation of its fruits to this world’s order alone?  It is its truth, not its utility, you insist, upon which our verdict ought to depend.  If religion is true, its fruits are good fruits, even though in this world they should prove uniformly ill adapted and full of naught but pathos.  It goes back, then, after all, to the question of the truth of theology.  The plot inevitably thickens upon us; we cannot escape theoretical considerations.  I propose, then, that to some degree we face the responsibility.  Religious persons have often, though not uniformly, professed to see truth in a special manner.  That manner is known as mysticism.  I will consequently now proceed to treat at some length of mystical phenomena, and after that, though more briefly, I will consider religious philosophy.

[225] Above, pp. 321-327