Section 1
Viewed from the standpoint of a sane
and ambitious social order, it is difficult to understand,
and it would be tedious to follow, the motives that
plunged mankind into the war that fills the histories
of the middle decades of the twentieth century.
It must always be remembered that
the political structure of the world at that time
was everywhere extraordinarily behind the collective
intelligence. That is the central fact of that
history. For two hundred years there had been
no great changes in political or legal methods and
pretensions, the utmost change had been a certain shifting
of boundaries and slight readjustment of procedure,
while in nearly every other aspect of life there had
been fundamental revolutions, gigantic releases, and
an enormous enlargement of scope and outlook.
The absurdities of courts and the indignities of representative
parliamentary government, coupled with the opening
of vast fields of opportunity in other directions,
had withdrawn the best intelligences more and more
from public affairs. The ostensible governments
of the world in the twentieth century were following
in the wake of the ostensible religions. They
were ceasing to command the services of any but second-rate
men. After the middle of the eighteenth century
there are no more great ecclesiastics upon the world’s
memory, after the opening of the twentieth no more
statesmen. Everywhere one finds an energetic,
ambitious, short-sighted, common-place type in the
seats of authority, blind to the new possibilities
and litigiously reliant upon the traditions of the
past.
Perhaps the most dangerous of those
outworn traditions were the boundaries of the various
‘sovereign states,’ and the conception
of a general predominance in human affairs on the
part of some one particular state. The memory
of the empires of Rome and Alexander squatted, an
unlaid carnivorous ghost, in the human imagination—it
bored into the human brain like some grisly parasite
and filled it with disordered thoughts and violent
impulses. For more than a century the French
system exhausted its vitality in belligerent convulsions,
and then the infection passed to the German-speaking
peoples who were the heart and centre of Europe, and
from them onward to the Slavs. Later ages were
to store and neglect the vast insane literature of
this obsession, the intricate treaties, the secret
agreements, the infinite knowingness of the political
writer, the cunning refusals to accept plain facts,
the strategic devices, the tactical manoeuvres, the
records of mobilisations and counter-mobilisations.
It ceased to be credible almost as soon as it ceased
to happen, but in the very dawn of the new age their
state craftsmen sat with their historical candles
burning, and, in spite of strange, new reflections
and unfamiliar lights and shadows, still wrangling
and planning to rearrange the maps of Europe and the
world.
It was to become a matter for subtle
inquiry how far the millions of men and women outside
the world of these specialists sympathised and agreed
with their portentous activities. One school of
psychologists inclined to minimise this participation,
but the balance of evidence goes to show that there
were massive responses to these suggestions of the
belligerent schemer. Primitive man had been a
fiercely combative animal; innumerable generations
had passed their lives in tribal warfare, and the
weight of tradition, the example of history, the ideals
of loyalty and devotion fell in easily enough with
the incitements of the international mischief-maker.
The political ideas of the common man were picked
up haphazard, there was practically nothing in such
education as he was given that was ever intended to
fit him for citizenship as such (that conception only
appeared, indeed, with the development of Modern State
ideas), and it was therefore a comparatively easy matter
to fill his vacant mind with the sounds and fury of
exasperated suspicion and national aggression.
For example, Barnet describes the
London crowd as noisily patriotic when presently his
battalion came up from the depot to London, to entrain
for the French frontier. He tells of children
and women and lads and old men cheering and shouting,
of the streets and rows hung with the flags of the
Allied Powers, of a real enthusiasm even among the
destitute and unemployed. The Labour Bureaux
were now partially transformed into enrolment offices,
and were centres of hotly patriotic excitement.
At every convenient place upon the line on either side
of the Channel Tunnel there were enthusiastic spectators,
and the feeling in the regiment, if a little stiffened
and darkened by grim anticipations, was none the less
warlike.
But all this emotion was the fickle
emotion of minds without established ideas; it was
with most of them, Barnet says, as it was with himself,
a natural response to collective movement, and to martial
sounds and colours, and the exhilarating challenge
of vague dangers. And people had been so long
oppressed by the threat of and preparation for war
that its arrival came with an effect of positive relief.