As he lay on his bed day after day
slowly recovering he woke up to the fact which most
men arrive at sooner or later, I mean that very few
care two straws about truth, or have any confidence
that it is righter and better to believe what is true
than what is untrue, even though belief in the untruth
may seem at first sight most expedient. Yet it
is only these few who can be said to believe anything
at all; the rest are simply unbelievers in disguise.
Perhaps, after all, these last are right. They
have numbers and prosperity on their side. They
have all which the rationalist appeals to as his tests
of right and wrong. Right, according to him,
is what seems right to the majority of sensible, well-to-do
people; we know of no safer criterion than this, but
what does the decision thus arrived at involve?
Simply this, that a conspiracy of silence about things
whose truth would be immediately apparent to disinterested
enquirers is not only tolerable but righteous on the
part of those who profess to be and take money for
being par excellence guardians and teachers
of truth.
Ernest saw no logical escape from
this conclusion. He saw that belief on the part
of the early Christians in the miraculous nature of
Christ’s Resurrection was explicable, without
any supposition of miracle. The explanation
lay under the eyes of anyone who chose to take a moderate
degree of trouble; it had been put before the world
again and again, and there had been no serious attempt
to refute it. How was it that Dean Alford for
example who had made the New Testament his speciality,
could not or would not see what was so obvious to
Ernest himself? Could it be for any other reason
than that he did not want to see it, and if so was
he not a traitor to the cause of truth? Yes,
but was he not also a respectable and successful man,
and were not the vast majority of respectable and
successful men, such for example, as all the bishops
and archbishops, doing exactly as Dean Alford did,
and did not this make their action right, no matter
though it had been cannibalism or infanticide, or
even habitual untruthfulness of mind?
Monstrous, odious falsehood!
Ernest’s feeble pulse quickened and his pale
face flushed as this hateful view of life presented
itself to him in all its logical consistency.
It was not the fact of most men being liars that
shocked him—that was all right enough; but
even the momentary doubt whether the few who were
not liars ought not to become liars too. There
was no hope left if this were so; if this were so,
let him die, the sooner the better. “Lord,”
he exclaimed inwardly, “I don’t believe
one word of it. Strengthen Thou and confirm
my disbelief.” It seemed to him that he
could never henceforth see a bishop going to consecration
without saying to himself: “There, but
for the grace of God, went Ernest Pontifex.”
It was no doing of his. He could not boast;
if he had lived in the time of Christ he might himself
have been an early Christian, or even an Apostle for
aught he knew. On the whole he felt that he had
much to be thankful for.
The conclusion, then, that it might
be better to believe error than truth should be ordered
out of court at once, no matter by how clear a logic
it had been arrived at; but what was the alternative?
It was this, that our criterion of truth—i.e.
that truth is what commends itself to the great majority
of sensible and successful people—is not
infallible. The rule is sound, and covers by
far the greater number of cases, but it has its exceptions.
He asked himself, what were they?
Ah! that was a difficult matter; there were so many,
and the rules which governed them were sometimes so
subtle, that mistakes always had and always would
be made; it was just this that made it impossible
to reduce life to an exact science. There was
a rough and ready rule-of-thumb test of truth, and
a number of rules as regards exceptions which could
be mastered without much trouble, yet there was a
residue of cases in which decision was difficult—so
difficult that a man had better follow his instinct
than attempt to decide them by any process of reasoning.
Instinct then is the ultimate court
of appeal. And what is instinct? It is
a mode of faith in the evidence of things not actually
seen. And so my hero returned almost to the
point from which he had started originally, namely
that the just shall live by faith.
And this is what the just—that
is to say reasonable people—do as regards
those daily affairs of life which most concern them.
They settle smaller matters by the exercise of their
own deliberation. More important ones, such
as the cure of their own bodies and the bodies of
those whom they love, the investment of their money,
the extrication of their affairs from any serious
mess—these things they generally entrust
to others of whose capacity they know little save from
general report; they act therefore on the strength
of faith, not of knowledge. So the English nation
entrusts the welfare of its fleet and naval defences
to a First Lord of the Admiralty, who, not being a
sailor can know nothing about these matters except
by acts of faith. There can be no doubt about
faith and not reason being the ultima ratio.
Even Euclid, who has laid himself
as little open to the charge of credulity as any writer
who ever lived, cannot get beyond this. He has
no demonstrable first premise. He requires postulates
and axioms which transcend demonstration, and without
which he can do nothing. His superstructure
indeed is demonstration, but his ground is faith.
Nor again can he get further than telling a man he
is a fool if he persists in differing from him.
He says “which is absurd,” and declines
to discuss the matter further. Faith and authority,
therefore, prove to be as necessary for him as for
anyone else. “By faith in what, then,”
asked Ernest of himself, “shall a just man endeavour
to live at this present time?” He answered
to himself, “At any rate not by faith in the
supernatural element of the Christian religion.”
And how should he best persuade his
fellow-countrymen to leave off believing in this supernatural
element? Looking at the matter from a practical
point of view he thought the Archbishop of Canterbury
afforded the most promising key to the situation.
It lay between him and the Pope. The Pope was
perhaps best in theory, but in practice the Archbishop
of Canterbury would do sufficiently well. If
he could only manage to sprinkle a pinch of salt,
as it were, on the Archbishop’s tail, he might
convert the whole Church of England to free thought
by a coup de main. There must be an amount
of cogency which even an Archbishop—an
Archbishop whose perceptions had never been quickened
by imprisonment for assault—would not be
able to withstand. When brought face to face
with the facts, as he, Ernest, could arrange them;
his Grace would have no resource but to admit them;
being an honourable man he would at once resign his
Archbishopric, and Christianity would become extinct
in England within a few months’ time.
This, at any rate, was how things ought to be.
But all the time Ernest had no confidence in the
Archbishop’s not hopping off just as the pinch
was about to fall on him, and this seemed so unfair
that his blood boiled at the thought of it. If
this was to be so, he must try if he could not fix
him by the judicious use of bird-lime or a snare,
or throw the salt on his tail from an ambuscade.
To do him justice it was not himself
that he greatly cared about. He knew he had
been humbugged, and he knew also that the greater part
of the ills which had afflicted him were due, indirectly,
in chief measure to the influence of Christian teaching;
still, if the mischief had ended with himself, he
should have thought little about it, but there was
his sister, and his brother Joey, and the hundreds
and thousands of young people throughout England whose
lives were being blighted through the lies told them
by people whose business it was to know better, but
who scamped their work and shirked difficulties instead
of facing them. It was this which made him think
it worth while to be angry, and to consider whether
he could not at least do something towards saving others
from such years of waste and misery as he had had
to pass himself. If there was no truth in the
miraculous accounts of Christ’s Death and Resurrection,
the whole of the religion founded upon the historic
truth of those events tumbled to the ground.
“My,” he exclaimed, with all the arrogance
of youth, “they put a gipsy or fortune-teller
into prison for getting money out of silly people
who think they have supernatural power; why should
they not put a clergyman in prison for pretending that
he can absolve sins, or turn bread and wine into the
flesh and blood of One who died two thousand years
ago? What,” he asked himself, “could
be more pure ‘hanky-panky’ than that a
bishop should lay his hands upon a young man and pretend
to convey to him the spiritual power to work this
miracle? It was all very well to talk about toleration;
toleration, like everything else, had its limits;
besides, if it was to include the bishop let it include
the fortune-teller too.” He would explain
all this to the Archbishop of Canterbury by and by,
but as he could not get hold of him just now, it occurred
to him that he might experimentalise advantageously
upon the viler soul of the prison chaplain. It
was only those who took the first and most obvious
step in their power who ever did great things in the
end, so one day, when Mr Hughes—for this
was the chaplain’s name—was talking
with him, Ernest introduced the question of Christian
evidences, and tried to raise a discussion upon them.
Mr Hughes had been very kind to him, but he was more
than twice my hero’s age, and had long taken
the measure of such objections as Ernest tried to put
before him. I do not suppose he believed in
the actual objective truth of the stories about Christ’s
Resurrection and Ascension any more than Ernest did,
but he knew that this was a small matter, and that
the real issue lay much deeper than this.
Mr Hughes was a man who had been in
authority for many years, and he brushed Ernest on
one side as if he had been a fly. He did it so
well that my hero never ventured to tackle him again,
and confined his conversation with him for the future
to such matters as what he had better do when he got
out of prison; and here Mr Hughes was ever ready to
listen to him with sympathy and kindness.