This much, however, we may say in
the meantime, that having lived to be nearly seventy-three
years old and died rich he must have been in very
fair harmony with his surroundings. I have heard
it said sometimes that such and such a person’s
life was a lie: but no man’s life can be
a very bad lie; as long as it continues at all it
is at worst nine-tenths of it true.
Mr Pontifex’s life not only
continued a long time, but was prosperous right up
to the end. Is not this enough? Being in
this world is it not our most obvious business to
make the most of it—to observe what things
do bona fide tend to long life and comfort,
and to act accordingly? All animals, except
man, know that the principal business of life is to
enjoy it—and they do enjoy it as much as
man and other circumstances will allow. He has
spent his life best who has enjoyed it most; God will
take care that we do not enjoy it any more than is
good for us. If Mr Pontifex is to be blamed
it is for not having eaten and drunk less and thus
suffered less from his liver, and lived perhaps a year
or two longer.
Goodness is naught unless it tends
towards old age and sufficiency of means. I
speak broadly and exceptis excipiendis.
So the psalmist says, “The righteous shall
not lack anything that is good.” Either
this is mere poetical license, or it follows that
he who lacks anything that is good is not righteous;
there is a presumption also that he who has passed
a long life without lacking anything that is good has
himself also been good enough for practical purposes.
Mr Pontifex never lacked anything
he much cared about. True, he might have been
happier than he was if he had cared about things which
he did not care for, but the gist of this lies in
the “if he had cared.” We have all
sinned and come short of the glory of making ourselves
as comfortable as we easily might have done, but in
this particular case Mr Pontifex did not care, and
would not have gained much by getting what he did
not want.
There is no casting of swine’s
meat before men worse than that which would flatter
virtue as though her true origin were not good enough
for her, but she must have a lineage, deduced as it
were by spiritual heralds, from some stock with which
she has nothing to do. Virtue’s true lineage
is older and more respectable than any that can be
invented for her. She springs from man’s
experience concerning his own well-being—and
this, though not infallible, is still the least fallible
thing we have. A system which cannot stand without
a better foundation than this must have something
so unstable within itself that it will topple over
on whatever pedestal we place it.
The world has long ago settled that
morality and virtue are what bring men peace at the
last. “Be virtuous,” says the copy-book,
“and you will be happy.” Surely
if a reputed virtue fails often in this respect it
is only an insidious form of vice, and if a reputed
vice brings no very serious mischief on a man’s
later years it is not so bad a vice as it is said
to be. Unfortunately though we are all of a mind
about the main opinion that virtue is what tends to
happiness, and vice what ends in sorrow, we are not
so unanimous about details—that is to say
as to whether any given course, such, we will say,
as smoking, has a tendency to happiness or the reverse.
I submit it as the result of my own
poor observation, that a good deal of unkindness and
selfishness on the part of parents towards children
is not generally followed by ill consequences to the
parents themselves. They may cast a gloom over
their children’s lives for many years without
having to suffer anything that will hurt them.
I should say, then, that it shows no great moral
obliquity on the part of parents if within certain
limits they make their children’s lives a burden
to them.
Granted that Mr Pontifex’s was
not a very exalted character, ordinary men are not
required to have very exalted characters. It
is enough if we are of the same moral and mental stature
as the “main” or “mean” part
of men—that is to say as the average.
It is involved in the very essence
of things that rich men who die old shall have been
mean. The greatest and wisest of mankind will
be almost always found to be the meanest—the
ones who have kept the “mean” best between
excess either of virtue or vice. They hardly
ever have been prosperous if they have not done this,
and, considering how many miscarry altogether, it
is no small feather in a man’s cap if he has
been no worse than his neighbours. Homer tells
us about some one who made it his business [Greek
text]—always to excel and to stand higher
than other people. What an uncompanionable disagreeable
person he must have been! Homer’s heroes
generally came to a bad end, and I doubt not that this
gentleman, whoever he was, did so sooner or later.
A very high standard, again, involves
the possession of rare virtues, and rare virtues are
like rare plants or animals, things that have not been
able to hold their own in the world. A virtue
to be serviceable must, like gold, be alloyed with
some commoner but more durable metal.
People divide off vice and virtue
as though they were two things, neither of which had
with it anything of the other. This is not so.
There is no useful virtue which has not some alloy
of vice, and hardly any vice, if any, which carries
not with it a little dash of virtue; virtue and vice
are like life and death, or mind and matter—things
which cannot exist without being qualified by their
opposite. The most absolute life contains death,
and the corpse is still in many respects living; so
also it has been said, “If thou, Lord, wilt
be extreme to mark what is done amiss,” which
shows that even the highest ideal we can conceive will
yet admit so much compromise with vice as shall countenance
the poor abuses of the time, if they are not too outrageous.
That vice pays homage to virtue is notorious; we
call this hypocrisy; there should be a word found
for the homage which virtue not unfrequently pays,
or at any rate would be wise in paying, to vice.
I grant that some men will find happiness
in having what we all feel to be a higher moral standard
than others. If they go in for this, however,
they must be content with virtue as her own reward,
and not grumble if they find lofty Quixotism an expensive
luxury, whose rewards belong to a kingdom that is
not of this world. They must not wonder if they
cut a poor figure in trying to make the most of both
worlds. Disbelieve as we may the details of
the accounts which record the growth of the Christian
religion, yet a great part of Christian teaching will
remain as true as though we accepted the details.
We cannot serve God and Mammon; strait is the way
and narrow is the gate which leads to what those who
live by faith hold to be best worth having, and there
is no way of saying this better than the Bible has
done. It is well there should be some who think
thus, as it is well there should be speculators in
commerce, who will often burn their fingers—but
it is not well that the majority should leave the
“mean” and beaten path.
For most men, and most circumstances,
pleasure—tangible material prosperity in
this world—is the safest test of virtue.
Progress has ever been through the pleasures rather
than through the extreme sharp virtues, and the most
virtuous have leaned to excess rather than to asceticism.
To use a commercial metaphor, competition is so keen,
and the margin of profits has been cut down so closely
that virtue cannot afford to throw any bona fide
chance away, and must base her action rather on the
actual moneying out of conduct than on a flattering
prospectus. She will not therefore neglect—as
some do who are prudent and economical enough in other
matters—the important factor of our chance
of escaping detection, or at any rate of our dying
first. A reasonable virtue will give this chance
its due value, neither more nor less.
Pleasure, after all, is a safer guide
than either right or duty. For hard as it is
to know what gives us pleasure, right and duty are
often still harder to distinguish and, if we go wrong
with them, will lead us into just as sorry a plight
as a mistaken opinion concerning pleasure. When
men burn their fingers through following after pleasure
they find out their mistake and get to see where they
have gone wrong more easily than when they have burnt
them through following after a fancied duty, or a
fancied idea concerning right virtue. The devil,
in fact, when he dresses himself in angel’s
clothes, can only be detected by experts of exceptional
skill, and so often does he adopt this disguise that
it is hardly safe to be seen talking to an angel at
all, and prudent people will follow after pleasure
as a more homely but more respectable and on the whole
much more trustworthy guide.
Returning to Mr Pontifex, over and
above his having lived long and prosperously, he left
numerous offspring, to all of whom he communicated
not only his physical and mental characteristics, with
no more than the usual amount of modification, but
also no small share of characteristics which are less
easily transmitted—I mean his pecuniary
characteristics. It may be said that he acquired
these by sitting still and letting money run, as it
were, right up against him, but against how many does
not money run who do not take it when it does, or
who, even if they hold it for a little while, cannot
so incorporate it with themselves that it shall descend
through them to their offspring? Mr Pontifex
did this. He kept what he may be said to have
made, and money is like a reputation for ability—more
easily made than kept.
Take him, then, for all in all, I
am not inclined to be so severe upon him as my father
was. Judge him according to any very lofty standard,
and he is nowhere. Judge him according to a fair
average standard, and there is not much fault to be
found with him. I have said what I have said
in the foregoing chapter once for all, and shall not
break my thread to repeat it. It should go without
saying in modification of the verdict which the reader
may be inclined to pass too hastily, not only upon
Mr George Pontifex, but also upon Theobald and Christina.
And now I will continue my story.