With respect to critical difficulties
and their solutions, the number and nature of the
sources from which they may be drawn may be thus exhibited.
The poet being an imitator, like a
painter or any other artist, must of necessity imitate
one of three objects,—things as they were
or are, things as they are said or thought to be,
or things as they ought to be. The vehicle of
expression is language,—either current terms
or, it may be, rare words or metaphors. There
are also many modifications of language, which we
concede to the poets. Add to this, that the standard
of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics,
any more than in poetry and any other art. Within
the art of poetry itself there are two kinds of faults,
those which touch its essence, and those which are
accidental. If a poet has chosen to imitate something,
but has imitated it incorrectly through want
of capacity, the error is inherent in the poetry.
But if the failure is due to a wrong choice if he has
represented a horse as throwing out both his off legs
at once, or introduced technical inaccuracies in medicine,
for example, or in any other art the error is not
essential to the poetry. These are the points
of view from which we should consider and answer the
objections raised by the critics.
First as to matters which concern
the poet’s own art. If he describes the
impossible, he is guilty of an error; but the error
may be justified, if the end of the art be thereby
attained (the end being that already mentioned), if,
that is, the effect of this or any other part of the
poem is thus rendered more striking. A case in
point is the pursuit of Hector. If, however,
the end might have been as well, or better, attained
without violating the special rules of the poetic
art, the error is not justified: for every kind
of error should, if possible, be avoided.
Again, does the error touch the essentials
of the poetic art, or some accident of it? For
example,—not to know that a hind has no
horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically.
Further, if it be objected that the
description is not true to fact, the poet may perhaps
reply,—’But the objects are as they
ought to be’: just as Sophocles said that
he drew men as they ought to be; Euripides, as they
are. In this way the objection may be met.
If, however, the representation be of neither kind,
the poet may answer,—This is how men say
the thing is.’ This applies to tales about
the gods. It may well be that these stories are
not higher than fact nor yet true to fact: they
are, very possibly, what Xenophanes says of them.
But anyhow, ’this is what is said.’
Again, a description may be no better than the fact:
‘still, it was the fact’; as in the passage
about the arms: ’Upright upon their butt-ends
stood the spears.’ This was the custom then,
as it now is among the Illyrians.
Again, in examining whether what has
been said or done by some one is poetically right
or not, we must not look merely to the particular act
or saying, and ask whether it is poetically good or
bad. We must also consider by whom it is said
or done, to whom, when, by what means, or for what
end; whether, for instance, it be to secure a greater
good, or avert a greater evil.
Other difficulties may be resolved
by due regard to the usage of language. We may
note a rare word, as in {omicron upsilon rho eta alpha
sigma / mu epsilon nu / pi rho omega tau omicron nu},
where the poet perhaps employs {omicron upsilon rho
eta alpha sigma} not in the sense of mules, but of
sentinels. So, again, of Dolon: ’ill-favoured
indeed he was to look upon.’ It is not
meant that his body was ill-shaped, but that his face
was ugly; for the Cretans use the word {epsilon upsilon
epsilon iota delta epsilon sigma}, ‘well-favoured,’
to denote a fair face. Again, {zeta omega rho
omicron tau epsilon rho omicron nu / delta epsilon
/ kappa epsilon rho alpha iota epsilon}, ‘mix
the drink livelier,’ does not mean `mix it stronger’
as for hard drinkers, but ‘mix it quicker.’
Sometimes an expression is metaphorical,
as ’Now all gods and men were sleeping through
the night,’—while at the same time
the poet says: ’Often indeed as he turned
his gaze to the Trojan plain, he marvelled at the
sound of flutes and pipes.’ ‘All’
is here used metaphorically for ‘many,’
all being a species of many. So in the verse,—’alone
she hath no part . . ,’ {omicron iota eta},
‘alone,’ is metaphorical; for the best
known may be called the only one.
Again, the solution may depend upon
accent or breathing. Thus Hippias of Thasos solved
the difficulties in the lines,—{delta iota
delta omicron mu epsilon nu (delta iota delta omicron
mu epsilon nu) delta epsilon / omicron iota,} and
{ tau omicron / mu epsilon nu / omicron upsilon (omicron
upsilon) kappa alpha tau alpha pi upsilon theta epsilon
tau alpha iota / omicron mu beta rho omega}.
Or again, the question may be solved
by punctuation, as in Empedocles,— ’Of
a sudden things became mortal that before had learnt
to be immortal, and things unmixed before mixed.’
Or again, by ambiguity of meaning,—as
{pi alpha rho omega chi eta kappa epsilon nu / delta
epsilon / pi lambda epsilon omega / nu upsilon xi},
where the word {pi lambda epsilon omega} is ambiguous.
Or by the usage of language.
Thus any mixed drink is called {omicron iota nu omicron
sigma}, ‘wine.’ Hence Ganymede is
said ’to pour the wine to Zeus,’ though
the gods do not drink wine. So too workers in
iron are called {chi alpha lambda kappa epsilon alpha
sigma}, or workers in bronze. This, however,
may also be taken as a metaphor.
Again, when a word seems to involve
some inconsistency of meaning, we should consider
how many senses it may bear in the particular passage.
For example: ’there was stayed the spear
of bronze’—we should ask in how many
ways we may take ‘being checked there.’
The true mode of interpretation is the precise opposite
of what Glaucon mentions. Critics, he says, jump
at certain groundless conclusions; they pass adverse
judgment and then proceed to reason on it; and, assuming
that the poet has said whatever they happen to think,
find fault if a thing is inconsistent with their own
fancy. The question about Icarius has been treated
in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a
Lacedaemonian. They think it strange, therefore,
that Telemachus should not have met him when he went
to Lacedaemon. But the Cephallenian story may
perhaps be the true one. They allege that Odysseus
took a wife from among themselves, and that her father
was Icadius not Icarius. It is merely a mistake,
then, that gives plausibility to the objection.
In general, the impossible must be
justified by reference to artistic requirements, or
to the higher reality, or to received opinion.
With respect to the requirements of art, a probable
impossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable
and yet possible. Again, it may be impossible
that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted.
‘Yes,’ we say, ’but the impossible
is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass
the reality.’ To justify the irrational,
we appeal to what is commonly said to be. In
addition to which, we urge that the irrational sometimes
does not violate reason; just as ’it is probable
that a thing may happen contrary to probability.’
Things that sound contradictory should
be examined by the same rules as in dialectical refutation
whether the same thing is meant, in the same relation,
and in the same sense. We should therefore solve
the question by reference to what the poet says himself,
or to what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence.
The element of the irrational, and,
similarly, depravity of character, are justly censured
when there is no inner necessity for introducing them.
Such is the irrational element in the introduction
of Aegeus by Euripides and the badness of Menelaus
in the Orestes.
Thus, there are five sources from
which critical objections are drawn. Things are
censured either as impossible, or irrational, or morally
hurtful, or contradictory, or contrary to artistic
correctness. The answers should be sought under
the twelve heads above mentioned.