The Poetics of Aristotle

It remains to speak of Diction and Thought, the other parts of Tragedy having been already discussed.  Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in the Rhetoric, to which inquiry the subject more strictly belongs.  Under Thought is included every effect which has to be produced by speech, the subdivisions being,—­ proof and refutation; the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like; the suggestion of importance or its opposite.  Now, it is evident that the dramatic incidents must be treated from the same points of view as the dramatic speeches, when the object is to evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, or probability.  The only difference is, that the incidents should speak for themselves without verbal exposition; while the effects aimed at in speech should be produced by the speaker, and as a result of the speech.  For what were the business of a speaker, if the Thought were revealed quite apart from what he says?

Next, as regards Diction.  One branch of the inquiry treats of the Modes of Utterance.  But this province of knowledge belongs to the art of Delivery and to the masters of that science.  It includes, for instance,—­ what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, a question, an answer, and so forth.  To know or not to know these things involves no serious censure upon the poet’s art.  For who can admit the fault imputed to Homer by Protagoras,—­that in the words, ’Sing, goddess, of the wrath,’ he gives a command under the idea that he utters a prayer?  For to tell some one to do a thing or not to do it is, he says, a command.  We may, therefore, pass this over as an inquiry that belongs to another art, not to poetry.