What Recognition is has been already
explained. We will now enumerate its kinds.
First, the least artistic form, which,
from poverty of wit, is most commonly employed recognition
by signs. Of these some are congenital,—
such as ‘the spear which the earth-born race
bear on their bodies,’ or the stars introduced
by Carcinus in his Thyestes. Others are acquired
after birth; and of these some are bodily marks, as
scars; some external tokens, as necklaces, or the
little ark in the Tyro by which the discovery is effected.
Even these admit of more or less skilful treatment.
Thus in the recognition of Odysseus by his scar, the
discovery is made in one way by the nurse, in another
by the swineherds. The use of tokens for the
express purpose of proof —and, indeed, any
formal proof with or without tokens —is
a less artistic mode of recognition. A better
kind is that which comes about by a turn of incident,
as in the Bath Scene in the Odyssey.
Next come the recognitions invented
at will by the poet, and on that account wanting in
art. For example, Orestes in the Iphigenia reveals
the fact that he is Orestes. She, indeed, makes
herself known by the letter; but he, by speaking himself,
and saying what the poet, not what the plot requires.
This, therefore, is nearly allied to the fault above
mentioned:—for Orestes might as well have
brought tokens with him. Another similar instance
is the ‘voice of the shuttle’ in the Tereus
of Sophocles.
The third kind depends on memory when
the sight of some object awakens a feeling: as
in the Cyprians of Dicaeogenes, where the hero breaks
into tears on seeing the picture; or again in the
‘Lay of Alcinous,’ where Odysseus, hearing
the minstrel play the lyre, recalls the past and weeps;
and hence the recognition.
The fourth kind is by process of reasoning.
Thus in the Choephori: ’Some one resembling
me has come: no one resembles me but Orestes:
therefore Orestes has come.’ Such too is
the discovery made by Iphigenia in the play of Polyidus
the Sophist. It was a natural reflection for Orestes
to make, ‘So I too must die at the altar like
my sister.’ So, again, in the Tydeus of
Theodectes, the father says, ’I came to find
my son, and I lose my own life.’ So too
in the Phineidae: the women, on seeing the place,
inferred their fate:—’Here we are
doomed to die, for here we were cast forth.’
Again, there is a composite kind of recognition involving
false inference on the part of one of the characters,
as in the Odysseus Disguised as a Messenger.
A said that no one else was able to bend the bow;
. . . hence B (the disguised Odysseus) imagined that
A would recognise the bow which, in fact, he had
not seen; and to bring about a recognition by this
means that the expectation A would recognise the bow
is false inference.
But, of all recognitions, the best
is that which arises from the incidents themselves,
where the startling discovery is made by natural means.
Such is that in the Oedipus of Sophocles, and in the
Iphigenia; for it was natural that Iphigenia should
wish to dispatch a letter. These recognitions
alone dispense with the artificial aid of tokens or
amulets. Next come the recognitions by process
of reasoning.