Clergymen and Chickens
[Extract from a lecture On Memory
as a Key to the Phenomena of Heredity delivered by
Butler at the Working Men’s College, Great Ormond
Street, on Saturday, 2nd December, 1882.]
Why, let me ask, should a hen lay
an egg which egg can become a chicken in about three
weeks and a full-grown hen in less than a twelvemonth,
while a clergyman and his wife lay no eggs but give
birth to a baby which will take three-and-twenty years
before it can become another clergyman? Why
should not chickens be born and clergymen be laid
and hatched? Or why, at any rate, should not
the clergyman be born full grown and in Holy Orders,
not to say already beneficed? The present arrangement
is not convenient, it is not cheap, it is not free
from danger, it is not only not perfect but is so
much the reverse that we could hardly find words to
express our sense of its awkwardness if we could look
upon it with new eyes, or as the cuckoo perhaps observes
it.
The explanation usually given is that
it is a law of nature that children should be born
as they are, but this is like the parched pea which
St. Anthony set before the devil when he came to supper
with him and of which the devil said that it was good
as far as it went. We want more; we want to know
with what familiar set of facts we are to connect
the one in question which, though in our midst, at
present dwells apart as a mysterious stranger of whose
belongings, reason for coming amongst us, antecedents,
and so forth, we believe ourselves to be ignorant,
though we know him by sight and name and have a fair
idea what sort of man he is to deal with.
We say it is a phenomenon of heredity
that chickens should be laid as eggs in the first
instance and clergymen born as babies, but, beyond
the fact that we know heredity extremely well to look
at and to do business with, we say that we know nothing
about it. I have for some years maintained this
to be a mistake and have urged, in company with Professor
Hering, of Prague, and others, that the connection
between memory and heredity is so close that there
is no reason for regarding the two as generically
different, though for convenience sake it may be well
to specify them by different names. If I can
persuade you that this is so, I believe I shall be
able to make you understand why it is that chickens
are hatched as eggs and clergymen born as babies.
When I say I can make you understand
why this is so, I only mean that I can answer the
first “why” that any one is likely to ask
about it, and perhaps a “why” or two behind
this. Then I must stop. This is all that
is ever meant by those who say they can tell us why
a thing is so and so. No one professes to be
able to reach back to the last “why” that
any one can ask, and to answer it. Fortunately
for philosophers, people generally become fatigued
after they have heard the answer to two or three “whys”
and are glad enough to let the matter drop.
If, however, any one will insist on pushing question
behind question long enough, he will compel us to admit
that we come to the end of our knowledge which is
based ultimately upon ignorance. To get knowledge
out of ignorance seems almost as hopeless a task as
to get something out of any number of nothings, but
this in practice is what we have to do and the less
fuss we make over it the better.
When, therefore, we say that we know
“why” a thing is so and so, we mean that
we know its immediate antecedents and connections,
and find them familiar to us. I say that the
immediate antecedent of, and the phenomenon most closely
connected with, heredity is memory. I do not
profess to show why anything can remember at all, I
only maintain that whereas, to borrow an illustration
from mathematics, life was formerly an equation of,
say, 100 unknown quantities, it is now one of only,
inasmuch as memory and heredity have been shown to
be one and the same thing.