We will now speak to those who, while
they agree that a life of virtue is most eligible,
yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to
both these parties; for there are some who disapprove
of all political governments, and think that the life
of one who is really free is different from the life
of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:
others again think that the citizen is the best; and
that it is impossible for him who does nothing to
be well employed; but that virtuous activity and happiness
are the same thing. Now both parties in some
particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong,
thus, that the life of a freeman is better than the
life of a slave is true, for a slave, as a slave,
is employed in nothing honourable; for the common
servile employments which he is commanded to perform
have nothing virtuous in them; but, on the other hand,
it is not true that a submission to all sorts of governments
is slavery; for the government of freemen differs
not more from the government of slaves than slavery
and freedom differ from each other in their nature;
and how they do has been already mentioned. To
prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity is also
wrong, for happiness consists in action, and many
noble ends are produced by the actions of the just
and wise. From what we have already determined
on this subject, some one probably may think, that
supreme power is of all things best, as that will enable
a man to command very many useful services from others;
so that he who can obtain this ought not to give it
up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for
this purpose, the father should have no attention
or regard for the son, or the son for the father, or
friend for friend; for what is best is most eligible:
but to be a member of the community and be in felicity
is best. What these persons advance might probably
be true, if the supreme good was certainly theirs who
plunder and use violence to others: but it is
[1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it
is a mere supposition: for it does not follow
that their actions are honourable who thus assume the
supreme power over others, without they were by nature
as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father
to a child, a master to a slave: so that he who
so far forsakes the paths of virtue can never return
back from whence he departed from them: for amongst
equals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal;
for this is equal and right; but that equals should
not partake of what is equal, or like to like, is contrary
to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature
is not right; therefore, if there is any one superior
to the rest of the community in virtue and abilities
for active life, him it is proper to follow, him it
is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but
must be joined to the other also: and, if we
are right in what we have now said, it follows that
happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that both
with respect to the community as well as the individual
an active life is the happiest: not that an active
life must necessarily refer to other persons, as some
think, or that those studies alone are practical which
are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are
much more so whose final object is in themselves,
and to improve the judgment and understanding of the
man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore is
something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan
which others follow are more particularly said to act,
and are superior to the workmen who execute their
designs. But it is not necessary that states
which choose to have no intercourse with others should
remain inactive; for the several members thereof may
have mutual intercourse with each other; for there
are many opportunities for this among the different
citizens; the same thing is true of every individual:
for, was it otherwise, neither could the Deity nor
the universe be perfect; to neither of whom can anything
external separately exist. Hence it is evident
that that very same life which is happy for each individual
is happy also for the state and every member of it.