After what has been said I proceed
next to treat particularly of the magistrates; of
what nature they should be, how many, and for what
purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without
necessary magistrates no state can exist, nor without
those which contribute to its dignity and good order
can exist happily: now it is necessary that in
small states the magistrates should be few; in a large
one, many: also to know well what offices may
be joined together, and what ought to be separated.
The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulators
in the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate
should be appointed to inspect their contracts and
preserve good order; for of necessity, in almost every
city there must be both buyers and sellers to supply
each other’s mutual wants: and this is
what is most productive of the comforts of life; for
the sake of which men seem to have joined together
in one community. A second care, and nearly related
to the first, is to have an eye both to the public
and private edifices in the city, that they may be
an ornament; and also to take care of all buildings
which are likely to fall: and to see that the
highways are kept in proper repair; and also that the
landmarks between different estates are preserved,
that there may be no disputes on that account; and
all other business of the same nature. Now, this
business may be divided into several branches, over
each of which in populous cities they appoint a separate
person; one to inspect the buildings, another the
fountains, another the harbours; and they are called
the inspectors of the city. A third, which is
very like the last, and conversant nearly about the
same objects, only in the country, is to take care
of what is done out of the city. The officers
who have this employment we call inspectors of the
lands, or inspectors of the woods; but the business
of all three of them is the same. There must
also be other officers appointed to receive the public
revenue and to deliver it out to those who are in the
different departments of the state: these are
called receivers or quaestors. There must also
be another, before whom all private contracts and
sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well as
proceedings and declarations. Sometimes this
employment is divided amongst many, but there is one
supreme over the rest; these are called proctors,
notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer
whose business is of all others the most necessary,
and yet most difficult; namely, to take care that
sentence is executed upon those who are condemned;
and that every one pays the fines laid on him; and
also to have the charge of those who are in prison.
[1322a] This office is very disagreeable on account
of the odium attending it, so that no one will engage
therein without it is made very profitable, or, if
they do, will they be willing to execute it according
to law; but it is most necessary, as it is of no service
to pass judgment in any cause without that judgment
is carried into execution: for without this human
society could not subsist: for which reason it
is best that this office should not be executed by
one person, but by some of the magistrates of the
other courts. In like manner, the taking care
that those fines which are ordered by the judges are
levied should be divided amongst different persons.
And as different magistrates judge different causes,
let the causes of the young be heard by the young:
and as to those which are already brought to a hearing,
let one person pass sentence, and another see it executed:
as, for instance, let the magistrates who have the
care of the public buildings execute the sentence
which the inspectors of the markets have passed, and
the like in other cases: for by so much the less
odium attends those who carry the laws into execution,
by so much the easier will they be properly put in
force: therefore for the same persons to pass
the sentence and to execute it will subject them to
general hatred; and if they pass it upon all, they
will be considered as the enemies of all. Thus
one person has often the custody of the prisoner’s
body, while another sees the sentence against him
executed, as the eleven did at Athens: for which
reason it is prudent to separate these offices, and
to give great attention thereunto as equally necessary
with anything we have already mentioned; for it will
certainly happen that men of character will decline
accepting this office, and worthless persons cannot
properly be entrusted with it, as having themselves
rather an occasion for a guard than being qualified
to guard others. This, therefore, ought by no
means to be a separate office from others; nor should
it be continually allotted to any individuals, but
the young men; where there is a city-guard, the youths
ought in turns to take these offices upon them.
These, then, as the most necessary magistrates, ought
to be first mentioned: next to these are others
no less necessary, but of much higher rank, for they
ought to be men of great skill and fidelity.
These are they who have the guard of the city, and
provide everything that is necessary for war; whose
business it is, both in war and peace, to defend the
walls and the gates, and to take care to muster and
marshal the citizens. Over all these there are
sometimes more officers, sometimes fewer: thus
in little cities there is only one whom they call
either general or polemarch; but where there are horse
and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they
sometimes put distinct commanders over each of these;
who again have others under them, according to their
different divisions; all of which join together to
make one military body: and thus much for this
department. Since some of the magistrates, if
not all, have business with the public money, it is
necessary that there should be other officers, whose
employment should be nothing else than to take an account
of what they have, and correct any mismanagement therein.
But besides all these magistrates there is one who
is supreme over them all, who very often has in his
own power the disposal of the public revenue and taxes;
who presides over the people when the supreme power
is in them; for there must be some magistrate who
has a power to summon them together, and to preside
as head of the state. These are sometimes called
preadvisers; but where there are many, more properly
a council. These are nearly the civil magistrates
which are requisite to a government: but there
are other persons whose business is confined to religion;
as the priests, and those who are to take care of the
temples, that they are kept in proper repair, or, if
they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever
else belongs to public worship. This charge is
sometimes entrusted to one person, as in very small
cities: in others it is delegated to many, and
these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders
or keepers of holy places, and officers of the sacred
revenue. Next to these are those who are appointed
to have the general care of all those public sacrifices
to the tutelar god of the state, which the laws do
not entrust to the priests: and these in different
states have different appellations. To enumerate
in few words the different departments of all those
magistrates who are necessary: these are either
religion, war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public
buildings, harbours, highways. Belonging to the
courts of justice there are scribes to enroll private
contracts; and there must also be guards set over
the prisoners, others to see the law is executed,
council on either side, and also others to watch over
the conduct of those who are to decide the causes.
Amongst the magistrates also may finally be reckoned
those who are to give their advice in public affairs.
But separate states, who are peculiarly happy and have
leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are
very attentive to good order, require particular magistrates
for themselves; such as those who have the government
of the women; who are to see the laws are executed;
who take care of the boys and preside over their education.
To these may be added those who have the care of their
gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every
other public spectacle which there may happen to be.
Some of these, however, are not of general use; as
the governors of the women: for the poor are
obliged to employ their wives and children in servile
offices for want of slaves. As there are three
magistrates to whom some states entrust the supreme
power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers,
and senators; guardians of the laws suit best to an
aristocracy, preadvisers to an oligarchy, and a senate
to a democracy. And thus much briefly concerning
all magistrates.