Now the foundation of a democratical
state is liberty, and people have been accustomed
to say this as if here only liberty was to be found;
for they affirm that this is the end proposed by every
democracy. But one part of liberty is to govern
and be governed alternately; for, according to democratical
justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not
by worth: and this being just, it is necessary
that the supreme power should be vested in the people
at large; and that what the majority determine should
be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought
to have more power than the rich, as being the greater
number; for this is one mark of liberty which all framers
of a democracy lay down as a criterion of that state;
another is, to live as every one likes; for this,
they say, is a right which liberty gives, since he
is a slave who must live as he likes not. This,
then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence
arises the claim to be under no command whatsoever
to any one, upon any account, any otherwise than by
rotation, and that just as far only as that person
is, in his turn, under his also. This also is
conducive to that equality which liberty demands.
These things being premised, and such being the government,
it follows that such rules as the following should
be observed in it, that all the magistrates should
be chosen out of all the people, and all to command
each, and each in his turn all: that all the
magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those
offices only which required some particular knowledge
and skill: that no census, or a very small one,
should be required to qualify a man for any office:
that none should be in the same employment twice, or
very few, and very seldom, except in the army:
that all their appointments should be limited to a
very short time, or at least as many as possible:
that the whole community should be qualified to judge
in all causes whatsoever, let the object be ever so
extensive, ever so interesting, or of ever so high
a nature; as at Athens, where the people at large
judge the magistrates when they come out of office,
and decide concerning public affairs as well as private
contracts: that the supreme power should be in
the public assembly; and that no magistrate should
be allowed any discretionary power but in a few instances,
and of no consequence to public business. Of all
magistrates a senate is best suited to a democracy,
where the whole community is not paid for giving their
attendance; for in that case it; loses its power;
for then the people will bring all causes before them,
by appeal, as we have already mentioned in a former
book. In the next place, there should, if possible,
be a fund to pay all the citizens—who have
any share in the management of public affairs, either
as members of the assembly, judges, and magistrates;
but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates,
the judges the senators, and members of the supreme
assembly, and also those officers who are obliged
to eat at a common table ought to be paid. Moreover,
as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of
family, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary,
a democracy is a government in the hands of men of
no birth, indigent circumstances, and mechanical employments.
In this state also no office [1318a] should be for
life; and, if any such should remain after the government
has been long changed into a democracy, they should
endeavour by degrees to diminish the power; and also
elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then,
appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established
on that principle of justice which is homogeneous
to those governments; that is, that all the members
of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality,
which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government
of the people: for it seems perfectly equal that
the rich should have no more share in the government
than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that all
should be equal, according to number; for thus, they
think, the equality and liberty of the state best preserved.