We have already shown what is the
nature of the supreme council in the state, and wherein
one may differ from another, and how the different
magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial
department, and what is best suited to what state;
and also to what causes both the destruction and preservation
of governments are owing.
As there are very many species of
democracies, as well as of other states, it will not
be amiss to consider at the same time anything which
we may have omitted to mention concerning either of
them, and to allot to each that mode of conduct which
is peculiar to and advantageous for them; and also
to inquire into the combinations of all these different
modes of government which we [1317a] have mentioned;
for as these are blended together the government is
altered, as from an aristocracy to be an oligarchy,
and from a free state to be a democracy. Now,
I mean by those combinations of government (which
I ought to examine into, but have not yet done), namely,
whether the deliberative department and the election
of magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent
to an oligarchy, or the judicial to an aristocracy,
or the deliberative part only to an oligarchy, and
the election of magistrates to an aristocracy, or
whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated
according to the nature of the government. But
we will first consider what particular sort of democracy
is fitted to a particular city, and also what particular
oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states,
what is advantageous to what. It is also necessary
to show clearly, not only which of these governments
is best for a state, but also how it ought to be established
there, and other things we will treat of briefly.
And first, we will speak of a democracy;
and this will at the same time show clearly the nature
of its opposite which some persons call an oligarchy;
and in doing this we must examine into all the parts
of a democracy, and everything that is connected therewith;
for from the manner in which these are compounded
together different species of democracies arise:
and hence it is that they are more than one, and of
various natures. Now, there are two causes which
occasion there being so many democracies; one of which
is that which we have already mentioned; namely, there
being different sorts of people; for in one country
the majority are husbandmen, in another mechanics,
and hired servants; if the first of these is added
to the second, and the third to both of them, the
democracy will not only differ in the particular of
better or worse, but in this, that it will be no longer
the same government; the other is that which we will
now speak of. The different things which are
connected with democracies and seem to make part of
these states, do, from their being joined to them,
render them different from others: this attending
a few, that more, and another all. It is necessary
that he who would found any state which he may happen
to approve of, or correct one, should be acquainted
with all these particulars. All founders of states
endeavour to comprehend within their own plan everything
of nearly the same kind with it; but in doing this
they err, in the manner I have already described in
treating of the preservation and destruction of governments.
I will now speak of these first principles and manners,
and whatever else a democratical state requires.