Commotions also arise in aristocracies,
from there being so few persons in power (as we have
already observed they do in oligarchies, for in this
particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy,
for in both these states the administration of public
affairs is in the hands of a few; not that this arises
from the same cause in both, though herein they chiefly
seem alike): and these will necessarily be most
likely to happen when the generality of the people
are high-spirited and think themselves equal to each
other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon, called
the Partheniae (for these were, as well as others,
descendants of citizens), who being detected in a
conspiracy against the state, were sent to found Tarentum.
They will happen also when some great men are disgraced
by those who have received higher honours than themselves,
to whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as
Lysander by the kings: or when an ambitious man
cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign
of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against the
Spartans: and also when some are too poor and
others too rich, which will most frequently happen
in time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian
war, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a]
called “Eunomia;” for some persons being
reduced thereby, desired that the lands might be divided:
and also when some person of very high rank might still
be higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to
be Pausanias’s intention at Lacedaemon, when
he was their general in the Median war, and Anno’s
at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies
are mostly destroyed from want of a fixed administration
of public affairs; the cause of which evil arises
at first from want of a due mixture of the democratic
and the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an
aristocracy from the same causes, and also from virtue
not being properly joined to power; but chiefly from
the two first, I mean the undue mixture of the democratic
and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all free
states endeavour to blend together, and many of those
which we call aristocracies, in this particular these
states differ from each other, and on this account
the one of them is less stable than the other, for
that state which inclines most to an oligarchy is
called an aristocracy, and that which inclines most
to a democracy is called a free state; on which account
this latter is more secure than the former, for the
wider the foundation the securer the building, and
it is ever best to live where equality prevails.
But the rich, if the community gives them rank, very
often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others.
On the whole, whichever way a government inclines,
in that it will settle, each party supporting their
own. Thus a free state will become a democracy;
an aristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy
may change into a democracy (for the poor, if they
think themselves injured, directly take part with
the contrary side) and a free state into an oligarchy.
The only firm state is that where every one enjoys
that equality he has a right to and fully possesses
what is his own. And what I have been speaking
of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates being
elected according to a very high census, it was altered
to a lower, and they were subdivided into more courts,
but in consequence of the nobles possessing all the
land, contrary to law; the state was too much of an
oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching
greatly on the rest of the people; but these, after
they had been well inured to war, so far got the better
of their guards as to expel every one out of the country
who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as
all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles
therein endeavour to have rather too much power, as
at Lace-daemon, where property is now in the hands
of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do
as they please and make such alliances as they please.
Thus the city of the Locrians was ruined from an alliance
with Dionysius; which state was neither a democracy
nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an aristocracy
chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being
destroyed by degrees, as we [1307b] have already said
of all governments in general; and this happens from
the cause of the alteration being trifling; for whenever
anything which in the least regards the state is treated
with contempt, after that something else, and this
of a little more consequence, will be more easily altered,
until the whole fabric of government is entirely subverted,
which happened in the government of Thurium; for the
law being that they should continue soldiers for five
years, some young men of a martial disposition, who
were in great esteem amongst their officers, despising
those who had the management of public affairs, and
imagining they could easily accomplish their intention,
first endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view
of having it lawful to continue the same person perpetually
in the military, perceiving that the people would
readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates
who are called counsellers first joined together with
an intention to oppose it but were afterwards induced
to agree to it, from a belief that if that law was
not repealed they would permit the management of all
other public affairs to remain in their hands; but
afterwards, when they endeavoured to restrain some
fresh alterations that were making, they found that
they could do nothing, for the whole form of government
was altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced
the innovations. In short, all governments are
liable to be destroyed either from within or from
without; from without when they have for their neighbour
a state whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed
if it has great power the same thing will happen if
it is not their neighbour; of which both the Athenians
and the Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one, when
conquerors everywhere destroyed the oligarchies; the
other the democracies. These are the chief causes
of revolutions and dissensions in governments.