Politics: A Treatise on Government

The government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, in some few particulars it is not worse, but in general it is far inferior in its contrivance.  For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the constitution of Lacedaemon was formed in imitation of that of Crete; and in general most new things are an improvement upon the old.  For they say, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilles he went abroad and spent a long time with his relations in Crete, for the Lycians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians; and those who first settled there adopted that body of laws which they found already established by the inhabitants; in like manner also those who now live near them have the very laws which Minos first drew up.

This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for it is entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean which washes almost all the maritime parts of that country, and is not far distant on the one side from Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks towards Asia, from Triopium and Rhodes.  By means of this situation Minos acquired the empire of the sea and the islands; some of which he subdued, in others planted colonies:  at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking Sicily.  There is this analogy between the customs of the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds [1272a] for the one, the domestic slaves for the other.  Both states have their common meals, and the Lacedaemonians called these formerly not psiditia but andpia, as the Cretans do; which proves from whence the custom arose.  In this particular their governments are also alike:  the ephori have the same power with those of Crete, who are called kosmoi; with this difference only, that the number of the one is five, of the other ten.  The senators are the same as those whom the Cretans call the council.  There was formerly also a kingly power in Crete; but it was afterwards dissolved, and the command of their armies was given to the kosmoi.  Every one also has a vote in their public assembly; but this has only the power of confirming what has already passed the council and the kosmoi.

The Cretans conducted their public meals better than the Lacedaemonians, for at Lacedsemon each individual was obliged to furnish what was assessed upon him; which if he could not do, there was a law which deprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned:  but in Crete they were furnished by the community; for all the corn and cattle, taxes and contributions, which the domestic slaves were obliged to furnish, were divided into parts and allotted to the gods, the exigencies of the state, and these public meals; so that all the men, women, and children were maintained from a common stock.  The legislator gave great attention to encourage a habit of eating sparingly, as very useful to the citizens.  He also endeavoured, that his community might not be too populous, to lessen the connection with women, by introducing the love of boys:  whether in this he did well or ill we shall have some other opportunity of considering.  But that the public meals were better ordered at Crete than at Lacedaemon is very evident.

The institution of the kosmoi, was still worse than that of the ephori:  for it contained all the faults incident to that magistracy and some peculiar to itself; for in both cases it is uncertain who will be elected:  but the Lacedae-monians have this advantage which the others have not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a share in the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the state:  whereas among the Cretans the kosmoi are not chosen out of the people in general, but out of some certain families, and the senate out of the kosmoi.  And the same observations which may be made on the senate at Lacedaemon may be applied to these; for their being under no control, and their continuing for life, is an honour greater than they merit; and to have their proceedings not regulated by a written law, but left to their own discretion, is dangerous. (As to there being no insurrections, although the people share not in the management of public affairs, this is no proof of a well-constituted government, as the kosmoi have no opportunity of being bribed like the ephori, as they live in an [1272b] island far from those who would corrupt them.) But the method they take to correct that fault is absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical:  for very often either their fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire together and turn out the kosmoi.  They are also permitted to resign their office before their time is elapsed, and if all this was done by law it would be well, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which is a bad rule to follow.  But what is worst of all is, that general confusion which those who are in power introduce to impede the ordinary course of justice; which sufficiently shows what is the nature of the government, or rather lawless force:  for it is usual with the principal persons amongst them to collect together some of the common people and their friends, and then revolt and set up for themselves, and come to blows with each other.  And what is the difference, if a state is dissolved at once by such violent means, or if it gradually so alters in process of time as to be no longer the same constitution?  A state like this would ever be exposed to the invasions of those who were powerful and inclined to attack it; but, as has been already mentioned, its situation preserves it, as it is free from the inroads of foreigners; and for this reason the family slaves still remain quiet at Crete, while the Helots are perpetually revolting:  for the Cretans take no part in foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any foreign troops have made an attack upon the island; and their ravages soon proved the ineffectualness of their laws.  And thus much for the government of Crete.