Hippodamus, the son of Euruphon a
Milesian, contrived the art of laying out towns, and
separated the Pireus. This man was in other respects
too eager after notice, and seemed to many to live
in a very affected manner, with his flowing locks
and his expensive ornaments, and a coarse warm vest
which he wore, not only in the winter, but also in
the hot weather. As he was very desirous of the
character of a universal scholar, he was the first
who, not being actually engaged in the management
of public affairs, sat himself to inquire what sort
of government was best; and he planned a state, consisting
of ten thousand persons, divided into three parts,
one consisting of artisans, another of husbandmen,
and the third of soldiers; he also divided the lands
into three parts, and allotted one to sacred purposes,
another to the public, and the third to individuals.
The first of these was to supply what was necessary
for the established worship of the gods; the second
was to be allotted to the support of the soldiery;
and the third was to be the property of the husbandman.
He thought also that there need only be three sorts
of laws, corresponding to the three sorts of actions
which can be brought, namely, for assault, trespasses,
or death. He ordered also that there should be
a particular court of appeal, into which all causes
might be removed which were supposed to have been
unjustly determined elsewhere; which court should
be composed of old men chosen for that purpose.
He thought also [1268a] that they should not pass sentence
by votes; but that every one should bring with him
a tablet, on which he should write, that he found
the party guilty, if it was so, but if not, he should
bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one
part of the indictment but not of the other, he should
express that also on the tablet; for he disapproved
of that general custom already established, as it
obliges the judges to be guilty of perjury if they
determined positively either on the one side or the
other. He also made a law, that those should
be rewarded who found out anything for the good of
the city, and that the children of those who fell in
battle should be educated at the public expense; which
law had never been proposed by any other legislator,
though it is at present in use at Athens as well as
in other cities, he would have the magistrates chosen
out of the people in general, by whom he meant the
three parts before spoken of; and that those who were
so elected should be the particular guardians of what
belonged to the public, to strangers, and to orphans.
These are the principal parts and
most worthy of notice in Hippodamus’s plan.
But some persons might doubt the propriety of his
division of the citizens into three parts; for the
artisans, the husbandmen, and the soldiers are to
compose one community, where the husbandmen are to
have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land,
which would in a manner render them slaves to the soldiery.
It is also impossible that the whole community should
partake of all the honourable employments in it—for
the generals and the guardians of the state must necessarily
be appointed out of the soldiery, and indeed the most
honourable magistrates; but as the two other parts
will not have their share in the government, how can
they be expected to have any affection for it?
But it is necessary that the soldiery should be superior
to the other two parts, and this superiority will
not be easily gained without they are very numerous;
and if they are so, why should the community consist
of any other members? why should any others have a
right to elect the magistrates? Besides, of what
use are the husbandmen to this community? Artisans,
’tis true, are necessary, for these every city
wants, and they can live upon their business.
If the husbandmen indeed furnished the soldiers with
provisions, they would be properly part of the community;
but these are supposed to have their private property,
and to cultivate it for their own use. Moreover,
if the soldiers themselves are to cultivate that common
land which is appropriated for their support, there
will be no distinction between the soldier and the
husbandman, which the legislator intended there should
be; and if there should be any others who are to cultivate
the private property of the husbandman and the common
lands of the military, there will be a fourth order
in the state which will have no share in it, and always
entertain hostile sentiments towards it. If any
one should propose that the same persons should cultivate
their own lands and the public ones also, then there
would be a deficiency [1268b] of provisions to supply
two families, as the lands would not immediately yield
enough for themselves and the soldiers also; and all
these things would occasion great confusion.
Nor do I approve of his method of
determining causes, when he would have the judge split
the case which comes simply before him; and thus,
instead of being a judge, become an arbitrator.
Now when any matter is brought to arbitration, it
is customary for many persons to confer together upon
the business that is before them; but when a cause
is brought before judges it is not so; and many legislators
take care that the judges shall not have it in their
power to communicate their sentiments to each other.
Besides, what can prevent confusion on the bench when
one judge thinks a fine should be different from what
another has set it at; one proposing twenty minae,
another ten, or be it more or less, another four,
and another five; and it is evident, that in this
manner they will differ from each other, while some
will give the whole damages sued for, and others nothing;
in this situation, how shall their determinations
be settled? Besides, a judge cannot be obliged
to perjure himself who simply acquits or condemns,
if the action is fairly and justly brought; for he
who acquits the party does not say that he ought not
to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay
a fine of twenty minae. But he that condemns him
is guilty of perjury if he sentences him to pay twenty
minae while he believes the damages ought not to be
so much.
Now with respect to these honours
which he proposes to bestow on those who can give
any information useful to the community, this, though
very pleasing in speculation, is what the legislator
should not settle, for it would encourage informers,
and probably occasion commotions in the state.
And this proposal of his gives rise also to further
conjectures and inquiries; for some persons have doubted
whether it is useful or hurtful to alter the established
law of any country, if even for the better; for which
reason one cannot immediately determine upon what
he here says, whether it is advantageous to alter
the law or not. We know, indeed, that it is possible
to propose to new model both the laws and government
as a common good; and since we have mentioned this
subject, it may be very proper to enter into a few
particulars concerning it, for it contains some difficulties,
as I have already said, and it may appear better to
alter them, since it has been found useful in other
sciences.
Thus the science of physic is extended
beyond its ancient bounds; so is the gymnastic, and
indeed all other arts and powers; so that one may
lay it down for certain that the same thing will necessarily
hold good in the art of government. And it may
also be affirmed, that experience itself gives a proof
of this; for the ancient laws are too simple and barbarous;
which allowed the Greeks to wear swords in the city,
and to buy their wives of each [1269a]. other.
And indeed all the remains of old laws which we have
are very simple; for instance, a law in Cuma relative
to murder. If any person who prosecutes another
for murder can produce a certain number of witnesses
to it of his own relations, the accused person shall
be held guilty. Upon the whole, all persons ought
to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what
is established; and it is probable that the first men,
whether they sprung out of the earth, or were saved
from some general calamity, had very little understanding
or knowledge, as is affirmed of these aborigines;
so that it would be absurd to continue in the practice
of their rules. Nor is it, moreover, right to
permit written laws always to remain without alteration;
for as in all other sciences, so in politics, it is
impossible to express everything in writing with perfect
exactness; for when we commit anything to writing we
must use general terms, but in every action there
is something particular to itself, which these may
not comprehend; from whence it is evident, that certain
laws will at certain times admit of alterations.
But if we consider this matter in another point of
view, it will appear to require great caution; for
when the advantage proposed is trifling, as the accustoming
the people easily to abolish their laws is of bad
consequence, it is evidently better to pass over some
faults which either the legislator or the magistrates
may have committed; for the alterations will not be
of so much service as a habit of disobeying the magistrates
will be of disservice. Besides, the instance brought
from the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same
thing to alter the one as the other. For a law
derives all its strength from custom, and this requires
long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy
matter to pass from the established laws to other new
ones, is to weaken the power of laws. Besides,
here is another question; if the laws are to be altered,
are they all to be altered, and in every goverment
or not, and whether at the pleasure of one person or
many? all which particulars will make a great
difference; for which reason we will at present drop
the inquiry, to pursue it at some other time.