Laughter : An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic

We have followed the comic along many of its winding channels in an endeavour to discover how it percolates into a form, an attitude, or a gesture; a situation, an action, or an expression.  The analysis of comic characters has now brought us to the most important part of our task.  It would also be the most difficult, had we yielded to the temptation of defining the laughable by a few striking—­and consequently obvious—­examples; for then, in proportion as we advanced towards the loftiest manifestations of the comic, we should have found the facts slipping between the over-wide meshes of the definition intended to retain them.  But, as a matter of fact, we have followed the opposite plan, by throwing light on the subject from above.  Convinced that laughter has a social meaning and import, that the comic expresses, above all else, a special lack of adaptability to society, and that, in short, there is nothing comic apart from man, we have made man and character generally our main objective.  Our chief difficulty, therefore, has lain in explaining how we come to laugh at anything else than character, and by what subtle processes of fertilisation, combination or amalgamation, the comic can worm its way into a mere movement, an impersonal situation, or an independent phrase.  This is what we have done so far.  We started with the pure metal, and all our endeavours have been directed solely towards reconstructing the ore.  It is the metal itself we are now about to study.  Nothing could be easier, for this time we have a simple element to deal with.  Let us examine it closely and see how it reacts upon everything else.

There are moods, we said, which move us as soon us as soon as we perceive them, joys and sorrows with which we sympathise, passions and vices which call forth painful astonishment, terror or pity, in the beholder; in short, sentiments that are prolonged in sentimental overtones from mind to mind.  All this concerns the essentials of life.  All this is serious, at times even tragic.  Comedy can only begin at the point where our neighbour’s personality ceases to affect us.  It begins, in fact, with what might be called a growing callousness to social life.  Any individual is comic who automatically goes his own way without troubling himself about getting into touch with the rest of his fellow-beings.  It is the part of laughter to reprove his absentmindedness and wake him out of his dream.  If it is permissible to compare important things with trivial ones, we would call to mind what happens when a youth enters one of our military academies.  After getting through the dreaded ordeal of the examination, he finds the has other ordeals to face, which his seniors have arranged with the object of fitting him for the new life he is entering upon, or, as they say, of “breaking him into harness.”  Every small society that forms within the larger is thus impelled, by a vague kind of instinct, to devise some method of discipline or “breaking in,” so as to deal with the rigidity of habits that have been formed elsewhere and have now to undergo a partial modification.  Society, properly so-called, proceeds in exactly the same way.  Each member must be ever attentive to his social surroundings; he must model himself on his environment; in short, he must avoid shutting himself up in his own peculiar character as a philosopher in his ivory tower.  Therefore society holds suspended over each individual member, if not the threat of correction, at all events the prospect of a snubbing, which, although it is slight, is none the less dreaded.  Such must be the function of laughter.  Always rather humiliating for the one against whom it is directed, laughter is, really and truly, a kind of social “ragging.”

Hence the equivocal nature of the comic.  It belongs neither altogether to art nor altogether to life.  On the one hand, characters in real life would never make us laugh were we not capable of watching their vagaries in the same way as we look down at a play from our seat in a box; they are only comic in our eyes because they perform a kind of comedy before us.  But, on the other hand, the pleasure caused by laughter, even on the stage, is not an unadulterated enjoyment; it is not a pleasure that is exclusively esthetic or altogether disinterested.  It always implies a secret or unconscious intent, if not of each one of us, at all events of society as a whole.  In laughter we always find an unavowed intention to humiliate, and consequently to correct our neighbour, if not in his will, at least in his deed.  This is the reason a comedy is far more like real life than a drama is.  The more sublime the drama, the more profound the analysis to which the poet has had to subject the raw materials of daily life in order to obtain the tragic element in its unadulterated form.  On the contrary, it is only in its lower aspects, in light comedy and farce, that comedy is in striking contrast to reality:  the higher it rises, the more it approximates to life; in fact, there are scenes in real life so closely bordering on high-class comedy that the stage might adopt them without changing a single word.

Hence it follows that the elements of comic character on the stage and in actual life will be the same.  What are these elements?  We shall find no difficulty in deducing them.  It has often been said that it is the trifling faults of our fellow-men that make us laugh.

Evidently there is a considerable amount of truth in this opinion; still, it cannot be regarded as altogether correct.  First, as regards faults, it is no easy matter to draw the line between the trifling and the serious; maybe it is not because a fault is trifling that it makes us laugh, but rather because it makes us laugh that we regard it as trifling, for there is nothing disarms us like laughter.  But we may go even farther, and maintain that there are faults at which we laugh, even though fully aware that they are serious,—­Harpagon’s avarice, for instance.  And then, we may as well confess—­though somewhat reluctantly—­that we laugh not only at the faults of our fellow-men, but also, at times, at their good qualities.  We laugh at Alceste.  The objection may be urged that it is not the earnestness of Alceste that is ludicrous, but rather the special aspect which earnestness assumes in his case, and, in short, a certain eccentricity that mars it in our eyes.  Agreed; but it is none the less true that this eccentricity in Alceste, at which we laugh, makes his earnestness laughable, and that is the main point.  So we may conclude that the ludicrous is not always an indication of a fault, in the moral meaning of the word, and if critics insist on seeing a fault, even though a trifling one, in the ludicrous, they must point out what it is here that exactly distinguishes the trifling from the serious.

The truth is, the comic character may, strictly speaking, be quite in accord with stern morality.  All it has to do is to bring itself into accord with society.  The character of Alceste is that of a thoroughly honest man.  But then he is unsociable, and, on that very account, ludicrous.  A flexible vice may not be so easy to ridicule as a rigid virtue.  It is rigidity that society eyes with suspicion.  Consequently, it is the rigidity of Alceste that makes us laugh, though here rigidity stands for honesty.  The man who withdraws into himself is liable to ridicule, because the comic is largely made up of this very withdrawal.  This accounts for the comic being so frequently dependent on the manners or ideas, or, to put it bluntly, on the prejudices, of a society.

It must be acknowledged, however, to the credit of mankind, that there is no essential difference between the social ideal and the rule, that it is the faults of others that make us laugh, provided we add that they make us laugh by reason of their unsociability rather than of their immorality.  What, then, are the faults capable of becoming ludicrous, and in what circumstances do we regard them as being too serious to be laughed at?

We have already given an implicit answer to this question.  The comic, we said, appeals to the intelligence, pure and simple; laughter is incompatible with emotion.  Depict some fault, however trifling, in such a way as to arouse sympathy, fear, or pity; the mischief is done, it is impossible for us to laugh.  On the other hand, take a downright vice,—­even one that is, generally speaking, of an odious nature,—­you may make it ludicrous if, by some suitable contrivance, you arrange so that it leaves our emotions unaffected.  Not that the vice must then be ludicrous, but it may, from that time forth, become so.  It must not arouse our feelings; that is the sole condition really necessary, though assuredly it is not sufficient.

But, then, how will the comic poet set to work to prevent our feelings being moved?  The question is an embarrassing one.  To clear it up thoroughly, we should have to enter upon a rather novel line of investigation, to analyse the artificial sympathy which we bring with us to the theatre, and determine upon the circumstances in which we accept and those in which we refuse to share imaginary joys and sorrows.  There is an art of lulling sensibility to sleep and providing it with dreams, as happens in the case of a mesmerised person.  And there is also an art of throwing a wet blanket upon sympathy at the very moment it might arise, the result being that the situation, though a serious one, is not taken seriously.  This latter art would appear to be governed by two methods, which are applied more or less unconsciously by the comic poet.  The first consists in isolating, within the soul of the character, the feeling attributed to him, and making it a parasitic organism, so to speak, endowed with an independent existence.  As a general rule, an intense feeling successively encroaches upon all other mental states and colours them with its own peculiar hue; if, then, we are made to witness this gradual impregnation, we finally become impregnated ourselves with a corresponding emotion.  To employ a different image, an emotion may be said to be dramatic and contagious when all the harmonics in it are heard along with the fundamental note.  It is because the actor thus thrills throughout his whole being that the spectators themselves feel the thrill.  On the contrary, in the case of emotion that leaves us indifferent and that is about to become comic, there is always present a certain rigidity which prevents it from establishing a connection with the rest of the soul in which it has taken up its abode.  This rigidity may be manifested, when the time comes, by puppet-like movements, and then it will provoke laughter; but, before that, it had already alienated our sympathy:  how can we put ourselves in tune with a soul which is not in tune with itself?  In Moliere’s L’Avare we have a scene bordering upon drama.  It is the one in which the borrower and the usurer, who have never seen each other, meet face to face and find that they are son and father.  Here we should be in the thick of a drama, if only greed and fatherly affection, conflicting with each other in the soul of Harpagon, had effected a more or less original combination.  But such is not the case.  No sooner has the interview come to an end than the father forgets everything.  On meeting his son again he barely alludes to the scene, serious though it has been:  “You, my son, whom I am good enough to forgive your recent escapade, etc.”  Greed has thus passed close to all other feelings ABSENTMINDEDLY, without either touching them or being touched.  Although it has taken up its abode in the soul and become master of the house, none the less it remains a stranger.  Far different would be avarice of a tragic sort.  We should find it attracting and absorbing, transforming and assimilating the divers energies of the man:  feelings and affections, likes and dislikes, vices and virtues, would all become something into which avarice would breathe a new kind of life.  Such seems to be the first essential difference between high-class comedy and drama.

There is a second, which is far more obvious and arises out of the first.  When a mental state is depicted to us with the object of making it dramatic, or even merely of inducing us to take it seriously, it gradually crystallises into actions which provide the real measure of its greatness.  Thus, the miser orders his whole life with a view to acquiring wealth, and the pious hypocrite, though pretending to have his eyes fixed upon heaven, steers most skilfully his course here below.  Most certainly, comedy does not shut out calculations of this kind; we need only take as an example the very machinations of Tartuffe.  But that is what comedy has in common with drama; and in order to keep distinct from it, to prevent our taking a serious action seriously, in short, in order to prepare us for laughter, comedy utilises a method, the formula of which may be given as follows:  Instead of CONCENTRATING our attention on actions, comedy DIRECTS it rather to gestures.  By gestures we here mean the attitudes, the movements and even the language by which a mental state expresses itself outwardly without any aim or profit, from no other cause than a kind of inner itching.  Gesture, thus defined, is profoundly different from action.  Action is intentional or, at any rate, conscious; gesture slips out unawares, it is automatic.  In action, the entire person is engaged; in gesture, an isolated part of the person is expressed, unknown to, or at least apart from, the whole of the personality.  Lastly—­and here is the essential point—­ action is in exact proportion to the feeling that inspires it:  the one gradually passes into the other, so that we may allow our sympathy or our aversion to glide along the line running from feeling to action and become increasingly interested.  About gesture, however, there is something explosive, which awakes our sensibility when on the point of being lulled to sleep and, by thus rousing us up, prevents our taking matters seriously.  Thus, as soon as our attention is fixed on gesture and not on action, we are in the realm of comedy.  Did we merely take his actions into account, Tartuffe would belong to drama:  it is only when we take his gestures into consideration that we find him comic.  You may remember how he comes on to the stage with the words:  “Laurent, lock up my hair-shirt and my scourge.”  He knows Dorine is listening to him, but doubtless he would say the same if she were not there.  He enters so thoroughly into the role of a hypocrite that he plays it almost sincerely.  In this way, and this way only, can he become comic.  Were it not for this material sincerity, were it not for the language and attitudes that his long-standing experience as a hypocrite has transformed into natural gestures, Tartuffe would be simply odious, because we should only think of what is meant and willed in his conduct.  And so we see why action is essential in drama, but only accessory in comedy.  In a comedy, we feel any other situation might equally well have been chosen for the purpose of introducing the character; he would still have been the same man though the situation were different.  But we do not get this impression in a drama.  Here characters and situations are welded together, or rather, events form part and parcel with the persons, so that were the drama to tell us a different story, even though the actors kept the same names, we should in reality be dealing with other persons.

To sum up, whether a character is good or bad is of little moment:  granted he is unsociable, he is capable of becoming comic.  We now see that the seriousness of the case is of no importance either:  whether serious or trifling, it is still capable of making us laugh, provided that care be taken not to arouse our emotions.  Unsociability in the performer and insensibility in the spectator—­ such, in a word, are the two essential conditions.  There is a third, implicit in the other two, which so far it has been the aim of our analysis to bring out.

This third condition is automatism.  We have pointed it out from the outset of this work, continually drawing attention to the following point:  what is essentially laughable is what is done automatically.  In a vice, even in a virtue, the comic is that element by which the person unwittingly betrays himself—­the involuntary gesture or the unconscious remark.  Absentmindedness is always comical.  Indeed, the deeper the absentmindedness the higher the comedy.  Systematic absentmindedness, like that of Don Quixote, is the most comical thing imaginable:  it is the comic itself, drawn as nearly as possible from its very source.  Take any other comic character:  however unconscious he may be of what he says or does, he cannot be comical unless there be some aspect of his person of which he is unaware, one side of his nature which he overlooks; on that account alone does he make us laugh. [Footnote:  When the humorist laughs at himself, he is really acting a double part; the self who laughs is indeed conscious, but not the self who is laughed at.] Profoundly comic sayings are those artless ones in which some vice reveals itself in all its nakedness:  how could it thus expose itself were it capable of seeing itself as it is?  It is not uncommon for a comic character to condemn in general terms a certain line of conduct and immediately afterwards afford an example of it himself:  for instance, M. Jourdain’s teacher of philosophy flying into a passion after inveighing against anger; Vadius taking a poem from his pocket after heaping ridicule on readers of poetry, etc.  What is the object of such contradictions except to help us to put our finger on the obliviousness of the characters to their own actions?  Inattention to self, and consequently to others, is what we invariably find.  And if we look at the matter closely, we see that inattention is here equivalent to what we have called unsociability.  The chief cause of rigidity is the neglect to look around—­and more especially within oneself:  how can a man fashion his personality after that of another if he does not first study others as well as himself?  Rigidity, automatism, absent-mindedness and unsociability are all inextricably entwined; and all serve as ingredients to the making up of the comic in character.

In a word, if we leave on one side, when dealing with human personality, that portion which interests our sensibility or appeals to our feeling, all the rest is capable of becoming comic, and the comic will be proportioned to the rigidity.  We formulated this idea at the outset of this work.  We have verified it in its main results, and have just applied it to the definition of comedy.  Now we must get to closer quarters, and show how it enables us to delimitate the exact position comedy occupies among all the other arts.  In one sense it might be said that all character is comic, provided we mean by character the ready-made element in our personality, that mechanical element which resembles a piece of clockwork wound up once for all and capable of working automatically.  It is, if you will, that which causes us to imitate ourselves.  And it is also, for that very reason, that which enables others to imitate us.  Every comic character is a type.  Inversely, every resemblance to a type has something comic in it.  Though we may long have associated with an individual without discovering anything about him to laugh at, still, if advantage is t taken of some accidental analogy to dub him with the name of a famous hero of romance or drama, he will in our eyes border upon the ridiculous, if only for a moment.  And yet this hero of romance may not be a comic character at all.  But then it is comic to be like him.  It is comic to wander out of one’s own self.  It is comic to fall into a ready-made category.  And what is most comic of all is to become a category oneself into which others will fall, as into a ready-made frame; it is to crystallise into a stock character.

Thus, to depict characters, that is to say, general types, is the object of high-class comedy.  This has often been said.  But it is as well to repeat it, since there could be no better definition of comedy.  Not only are we entitled to say that comedy gives us general types, but we might add that it is the only one of all the arts that aims at the general; so that once this objective has been attributed to it, we have said all that it is and all that the rest cannot be.  To prove that such is really the essence of comedy, and that it is in this respect opposed to tragedy, drama and the other forms of art, we should begin by defining art in its higher forms:  then, gradually coming down to comic poetry, we should find that this latter is situated on the border-line between art and life, and that, by the generality of its subject-matter, it contrasts with the rest of the arts.  We cannot here plunge into so vast a subject of investigation; but we needs must sketch its main outlines, lest we overlook what, to our mind, is essential on the comic stage.

What is the object of art?  Could reality come into direct contact with sense and consciousness, could we enter into immediate communion with things and with ourselves, probably art would be useless, or rather we should all be artists, for then our soul would continually vibrate in perfect accord with nature.  Our eyes, aided by memory, would carve out in space and fix in time the most inimitable of pictures.  Hewn in the living marble of the human form, fragments of statues, beautiful as the relics of antique statuary, would strike the passing glance.  Deep in our souls we should hear the strains of our inner life’s unbroken melody,—­a music that is ofttimes gay, but more frequently plaintive and always original.  All this is around and within us, and yet no whit of it do we distinctly perceive.  Between nature and ourselves, nay, between ourselves and our own consciousness a veil is interposed:  a veil that is dense and opaque for the common herd,—­thin, almost transparent, for the artist and the poet.  What fairy wove that veil?  Was it done in malice or in friendliness?  We had to live, and life demands that we grasp things in their relations to our own needs.  Life is action.  Life implies the acceptance only of the utilitarian side of things in order to respond to them by appropriate reactions:  all other impressions must be dimmed or else reach us vague and blurred.  I look and I think I see, I listen and I think I hear, I examine myself and I think I am reading the very depths of my heart.  But what I see and hear of the outer world is purely and simply a selection made by my senses to serve as a light to my conduct; what I know of myself is what comes to the surface, what participates in my actions.  My senses and my consciousness, therefore, give me no more than a practical simplification of reality.  In the vision they furnish me of myself and of things, the differences that are useless to man are obliterated, the resemblances that are useful to him are emphasised; ways are traced out for me in advance, along which my activity is to travel.  These ways are the ways which all mankind has trod before me.  Things have been classified with a view to the use I can derive from them.  And it is this classification I perceive, far more clearly than the colour and the shape of things.  Doubtless man is vastly superior to the lower animals in this respect.  It is not very likely that the eye of a wolf makes any distinction between a kid and a lamb; both appear t o the wolf as the same identical quarry, alike easy to pounce upon, alike good to devour.  We, for our part, make a distinction between a goat and a sheep; but can we tell one goat from another, one sheep from another?  The individuality of things or of beings escapes us, unless it is materially to our advantage to perceive it.  Even when we do take note of it—­as when we distinguish one man from another—­it is not the individuality itself that the eye grasps, i.e., an entirely original harmony of forms and colours, but only one or two features that will make practical recognition easier.

In short, we do not see the actual things themselves; in most cases we confine ourselves to reading the labels affixed to them.  This tendency, the result of need, has become even more pronounced under the influence of speech; for words—­with the exception of proper nouns—­all denote genera.  The word, which only takes note of the most ordinary function and commonplace aspect of the thing, intervenes between it and ourselves, and would conceal its form from our eyes, were that form not already masked beneath the necessities that brought the word into existence.  Not only external objects, but even our own mental states, are screened from us in their inmost, their personal aspect, in the original life they possess.  When we feel love or hatred, when we are gay or sad, is it really the feeling itself that reaches our consciousness with those innumerable fleeting shades of meaning and deep resounding echoes that make it something altogether our own?  We should all, were it so, be novelists or poets or musicians.  Mostly, however, we perceive nothing but the outward display of our mental state.  We catch only the impersonal aspect of our feelings, that aspect which speech has set down once for all because it is almost the same, in the same conditions, for all men.  Thus, even in our own individual, individuality escapes our ken.  We move amidst generalities and symbols, as within a tilt-yard in which our force is effectively pitted against other forces; and fascinated by action, tempted by it, for our own good, on to the field it has selected, we live in a zone midway between things and ourselves, externally to things, externally also to ourselves.  From time to time, however, in a fit of absentmindedness, nature raises up souls that are more detached from life.  Not with that intentional, logical, systematical detachment—­the result of reflection and philosophy—­but rather with natural detachment, one innate in the structure of sense or consciousness, which at once reveals itself by a virginal manner, so to speak, of seeing, hearing or thinking.  Were this detachment complete, did the soul no longer cleave to action by any of its perceptions, it would be the soul of an artist such as the world has never yet seen.  It would excel alike in every art at the same time; or rather, it would fuse them all into one.  It would perceive all things in their native purity:  the forms, colours, sounds of the physical world as well as the subtlest movements of the inner life.  But this is asking too much of nature.  Even for such of us as she has made artists, it is by accident, and on one side only, that she has lifted the veil.  In one direction only has she forgotten to rivet the perception to the need.  And since each direction corresponds to what we call a sense—­through one of his senses, and through that sense alone, is the artist usually wedded to art.  Hence, originally, the diversity of arts.  Hence also the speciality of predispositions.  This one applies himself to colours and forms, and since he loves colour for colour and form for form, since he perceives them for their sake and not for his own, it is the inner life of things that he sees appearing through their forms and colours.  Little by little he insinuates it into our own perception, baffled though we may be at the outset.  For a few moments at least, he diverts us from the prejudices of form and colour that come between ourselves and reality.  And thus he realises the loftiest ambition of art, which here consists in revealing to us nature.  Others, again, retire within themselves.  Beneath the thousand rudimentary actions which are the outward and visible signs of an emotion, behind the commonplace, conventional expression that both reveals and conceals an individual mental state, it is the emotion, the original mood, to which they attain in its undefiled essence.  And then, to induce us to make the same effort ourselves, they contrive to make us see something of what they have seen:  by rhythmical arrangement of words, which thus become organised and animated with a life of their own, they tell us—­or rather suggest—­ things that speech was not calculated to express.  Others delve yet deeper still.  Beneath these joys and sorrows which can, at a pinch, be translated into language, they grasp something that has nothing in common with language, certain rhythms of life and breath that. are closer to man than his inmost feelings, being the living law—­ varying with each individual—­of his enthusiasm and despair, his hopes and regrets.  By setting free and emphasising this music, they force it upon our attention; they compel us, willy-nilly, to fall in with it, like passers-by who join in a dance.  And thus they impel us to set in motion, in the depths of our being, some secret chord which was only waiting to thrill.  So art, whether it be painting or sculpture, poetry or music, has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to face with reality itself.  It is from a misunderstanding on this point that the dispute between realism and idealism in art has arisen.  Art is certainly only a more direct vision of reality.  But this purity of perception implies a break with utilitarian convention, an innate and specially localised disinterestedness of sense or consciousness, in short, a certain immateriality of life, which is what has always been called idealism.  So that we might say, without in any way playing upon the meaning of the words, that realism is in the work when idealism is in the soul, and that it is only through ideality that we can resume contact with reality.

Dramatic art forms no exception to this law.  What drama goes forth to discover and brings to light, is a deep-seated reality that is veiled from us, often in our own interests, by the necessities of life.  What is this reality?  What are these necessities?  Poetry always expresses inward states.  But amongst these states some arise mainly from contact with our fellow-men.  They are the most intense as well as the most violent.  As contrary electricities attract each other and accumulate between the two plates of the condenser from which the spark will presently flash, so, by simply bringing people together, strong attractions and repulsions take place, followed by an utter loss of balance, in a word, by that electrification of the soul known as passion.  Were man to give way to the impulse of his natural feelings, were there neither social nor moral law, these outbursts of violent feeling would be the ordinary rule in life.  But utility demands that these outbursts should be foreseen and averted.  Man must live in society, and consequently submit to rules.  And what interest advises, reason commands:  duty calls, and we have to obey the summons.  Under this dual influence has perforce been formed an outward layer of feelings and ideas which make for permanence, aim at becoming common to all men, and cover, when they are not strong enough to extinguish it, the inner fire of individual passions.  The slow progress of mankind in the direction of an increasingly peaceful social life has gradually consolidated this layer, just as the life of our planet itself has been one long effort to cover over with a cool and solid crust the fiery mass of seething metals.  But volcanic eruptions occur.  And if the earth were a living being, as mythology has feigned, most likely when in repose it would take delight in dreaming of these sudden explosions, whereby it suddenly resumes possession of its innermost nature.  Such is just the kind of pleasure that is provided for us by drama.  Beneath the quiet humdrum life that reason and society have fashioned for us, it stirs something within us which luckily does not explode, but which it makes us feel in its inner tension.  It offers nature her revenge upon society.  Sometimes it makes straight for the goal, summoning up to the surface, from the depths below, passions that produce a general upheaval.  Sometimes it effects a flank movement, as is often the case in contemporary drama; with a skill that is frequently sophistical, it shows up the inconsistencies of society; it exaggerates the shams and shibboleths of the social law; and so indirectly, by merely dissolving or corroding the outer crust, it again brings us back to the inner core.  But, in both cases, whether it weakens society or strengthens nature, it has the same end in view:  that of laying bare a secret portion of ourselves,—­what might be called the tragic element in our character.

This is indeed the impression we get after seeing a stirring drama.  What has just interested us is not so much what we have been told about others as the glimpse we have caught of ourselves—­a whole host of ghostly feelings, emotions and events that would fain have come into real existence, but, fortunately for us, did not.  It also seems as if an appeal had been made within us to certain ancestral memories belonging to a far-away past—­memories so deep-seated and so foreign to our present life that this latter, for a moment, seems something unreal and conventional, for which we shall have to serve a fresh apprenticeship.  So it is indeed a deeper reality that drama draws up from beneath our superficial and utilitarian attainments, and this art has the same end in view as all the others.

Hence it follows that art always aims at what is individual.  What the artist fixes on his canvas is something he has seen at a certain spot, on a certain day, at a certain hour, with a colouring that will never be seen again.  What the poet sings of is a certain mood which was his, and his alone, and which will never return.  What the dramatist unfolds before us is the life-history of a soul, a living tissue of feelings and events—­something, in short, which has once happened and can never be repeated.  We may, indeed, give general names to these feelings, but they cannot be the same thing in another soul.  They are INDIVIDUALISED. Thereby, and thereby only, do they belong to art; for generalities, symbols or even types, form the current coin of our daily perception.  How, then, does a misunderstanding on this point arise?

The reason lies in the fact that two very different things have been mistaken for each other:  the generality of things and that of the opinions we come to regarding them.  Because a feeling is generally recognised as true, it does not follow that it is a general feeling.  Nothing could be more unique than the character of Hamlet.  Though he may resemble other men in some respects, it is clearly not on that account that he interests us most.  But he is universally accepted and regarded as a living character.  In this sense only is he universally true.  The same holds good of all the other products of art.  Each of them is unique, and yet, if it bear the stamp of genius, it will come to be accepted by everybody.  Why will it be accepted?  And if it is unique of its kind, by what sign do we know it to be genuine?  Evidently, by the very effort it forces us to make against our predispositions in order to see sincerely.  Sincerity is contagious.  What the artist has seen we shall probably never see again, or at least never see in exactly the same way; but if he has actually seen it, the attempt he has made to lift the veil compels our imitation.  His work is an example which we take as a lesson.  And the efficacy of the lesson is the exact standard of the genuineness of the work.  Consequently, truth bears within itself a power of conviction, nay, of conversion, which is the sign that enables us to recognise it.  The greater the work and the more profound the dimly apprehended truth, the longer may the effect be in coming, but, on the other hand, the more universal will that effect tend to become.  So the universality here lies in the effect produced, and not in the cause.

Altogether different is the object of comedy.  Here it is in the work itself that the generality lies.  Comedy depicts characters we have already come across and shall meet with again.  It takes note of similarities.  It aims at placing types before our eyes.  It even creates new types, if necessary.  In this respect it forms a contrast to all the other arts.

The very titles of certain classical comedies are significant in themselves.  Le Misanthrope, l’Avare, le Joueur, le Distrait, etc., are names of whole classes of people; and even when a character comedy has a proper noun as its title, this proper noun is speedily swept away, by the very weight of its contents, into the stream of common nouns.  We say “a Tartuffe,” but we should never say “a Phedre” or “a Polyeucte.”

Above all, a tragic poet will never think of grouping around the chief character in his play secondary characters to serve as simplified copies, so to speak, of the former.  The hero of a tragedy represents an individuality unique of its kind.  It may be possible to imitate him, but then we shall be passing, whether consciously or not, from the tragic to the comic.  No one is like him, because he is like no one.  But a remarkable instinct, on the contrary, impels the comic poet, once he has elaborated his central character, to cause other characters, displaying the same general traits, to revolve as satellites round him.  Many comedies have either a plural noun or some collective term as their title.  “Les Femmes savantes,” “Les Precieuses ridicules,” “Le Monde ou l’on s’ennuie,” etc., represent so many rallying points on the stage adopted by different groups of characters, all belonging to one identical type.  It would be interesting to analyse this tendency in comedy.  Maybe dramatists have caught a glimpse of a fact recently brought forward by mental pathology, viz. that cranks of the same kind are drawn, by a secret attraction, to seek each other’s company.  Without precisely coming within the province of medicine, the comic individual, as we have shown, is in some way absentminded, and the transition from absent-mindedness to crankiness is continuous.  But there is also another reason.  If the comic poet’s object is to offer us types, that is to say, characters capable of self-repetition, how can he set about it better than by showing us, in each instance, several different copies of the same model?  That is just what the naturalist does in order to define a species.  He enumerates and describes its main varieties.

This essential difference between tragedy and comedy, the former being concerned with individuals and the latter with classes, is revealed in yet another way.  It appears in the first draft of the work.  From the outset it is manifested by two radically different methods of observation.

Though the assertion may seem paradoxical, a study of other men is probably not necessary to the tragic poet.  We find some of the great poets have lived a retiring, homely sort of life, without having a chance of witnessing around them an outburst of the passions they have so faithfully depicted.  But, supposing even they had witnessed such a spectacle, it is doubtful whether they would have found it of much use.  For what interests us in the work of the poet is the glimpse we get of certain profound moods or inner struggles.  Now, this glimpse cannot be obtained from without.  Our souls are impenetrable to one another.  Certain signs of passion are all that we ever apperceive externally.  These we interpret—­though always, by the way, defectively—­only by analogy with what we have ourselves experienced.  So what we experience is the main point, and we cannot become thoroughly acquainted with anything but our own heart—­ supposing we ever get so far.  Does this mean that the poet has experienced what he depicts, that he has gone through the various situations he makes his characters traverse, and lived the whole of their inner life?  Here, too, the biographies of poets would contradict such a supposition.  How, indeed, could the same man have been Macbeth, Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, and many others?  But then a distinction should perhaps here be made between the personality we have and all those we might have had.  Our character is the result of a choice that is continually being renewed.  There are points—­at all events there seem to be—­all along the way, where we may branch off, and we perceive many possible directions though we are unable to take more than one.  To retrace one’s steps, and follow to the end the faintly distinguishable directions, appears to be the essential element in poetic imagination.  Of course, Shakespeare was neither Macbeth, nor Hamlet, nor Othello; still, he might have been these several characters if the circumstances of the case on the one hand, and the consent of his will on the other, had caused to break out into explosive action what was nothing more than an inner prompting.  We are strangely mistaken as to the part played by poetic imagination, if we think it pieces together its heroes out of fragments filched from right and left, as though it were patching together a harlequin’s motley.  Nothing living would result from that.  Life cannot be recomposed; it can only be looked at and reproduced.  Poetic imagination is but a fuller view of reality.  If the characters created by a poet give us the impression of life, it is only because they are the poet himself,—­multiplication or division of the poet,—­the poet plumbing the depths of his own nature in so powerful an effort of inner observation that he lays hold of the potential in the real, and takes up what nature has left as a mere outline or sketch in his soul in order to make of it a finished work of art.

Altogether different is the kind of observation from which comedy springs.  It is directed outwards.  However interested a dramatist may be in the comic features of human nature, he will hardly go, I imagine, to the extent of trying to discover his own.  Besides, he would not find them, for we are never ridiculous except in some point that remains hidden from our own consciousness.  It is on others, then, that such observation must perforce be practised.  But it; will, for this very reason, assume a character of generality that it cannot have when we apply it to ourselves.  Settling on the surface, it will not be more than skin-deep, dealing with persons at the point at which they come into contact and become capable of resembling one another.  It will go no farther.  Even if it could, it would not desire to do so, for it would have nothing to gain in the process.

To penetrate too far into the personality, to couple the outer effect with causes that are too deep-seated, would mean to endanger and in the end to sacrifice all that was laughable in the effect.  In order that we may be tempted to laugh at it, we must localise its cause in some intermediate region of the soul.  Consequently, the effect must appear to us as an average effect, as expressing an average of mankind.  And, like all averages, this one is obtained by bringing together scattered data, by comparing analogous cases and extracting their essence, in short by a process of abstraction and generalisation similar to that which the physicist brings to bear upon facts with the object of grouping them under laws.  In a word, method and object are here of the same nature as in the inductive sciences, in that observation is always external and the result always general.

And so we come back, by a roundabout way, to the double conclusion we reached in the course of our investigations.  On the one hand, a person is never ridiculous except through some mental attribute resembling absent-mindedness, through something that lives upon him without forming part of his organism, after the fashion of a parasite; that is the reason this state of mind is observable from without and capable of being corrected.  But, on the other hand, just because laughter aims at correcting, it is expedient that the correction should reach as great a number of persons as possible.  This is the reason comic observation instinctively proceeds to what is general.  It chooses such peculiarities as admit of being reproduced and consequently are not indissolubly bound up with the individuality of a single person,—­a possibly common sort of uncommonness, so to say,—­peculiarities that are held in common.  By transferring them to the stage, it creates works which doubtless belong to art in that their only visible aim is to please, but which will be found to contrast with other works of art by reason of their generality and also of their scarcely confessed or scarcely conscious intention to correct and instruct.  So we were probably right in saying that comedy lies midway between art and life.  It is not disinterested as genuine art is.  By organising laughter, comedy accepts social life as a natural environment, it even obeys an impulse of social life.  And in this respect it turns its back upon art, which is a breaking away from society and a return to pure nature.