Laughter : An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic

Before going further, let us halt a moment and glance around.  As we hinted at the outset of this study, it would be idle to attempt to derive every comic effect from one simple formula.  The formula exists well enough in a certain sense, but its development does not follow a straightforward course.  What I mean is that the process of deduction ought from time to time to stop and study certain culminating effects, and that these effects each appear as models round which new effects resembling them take their places in a circle.  These latter are not deductions from the formula, but are comic through their relationship with those that are.  To quote Pascal again, I see no objection, at this stage, to defining the process by the curve which that geometrician studied under the name of roulette or cycloid,—­the curve traced by a point in the circumference of a wheel when the carriage is advancing in a straight line:  this point turns like the wheel, though it advances like the carriage.  Or else we might think of an immense avenue such as are to be seen in the forest of Fontainebleau, with crosses at intervals to indicate the cross-ways:  at each of these we shall walk round the cross, explore for a while the paths that open out before us, and then return to our original course.  Now, we have just reached one of these mental crossways.  Something mechanical encrusted on the living, will represent a cross at which we must halt, a central image from which the imagination branches off in different directions.  What are these directions?  There appear to be three main ones.  We will follow them one after the other, and then continue our onward course.

1.  In the first place, this view of the mechanical and the living dovetailed into each other makes us incline towards the vaguer image of some rigidity or other applied to the mobility of life, in an awkward attempt to follow its lines and counterfeit its suppleness.  Here we perceive how easy it is for a garment to become ridiculous.  It might almost be said that every fashion is laughable in some respect.  Only, when we are dealing with the fashion of the day, we are so accustomed to it that the garment seems, in our mind, to form one with the individual wearing it.  We do not separate them in imagination.  The idea no longer occurs to us to contrast the inert rigidity of the covering with the living suppleness of the object covered:  consequently, the comic here remains in a latent condition.  It will only succeed in emerging when the natural incompatibility is so deep-seated between the covering and the covered that even an immemorial association fails to cement this union:  a case in point is our head and top hat.  Suppose, however, some eccentric individual dresses himself in the fashion of former times:  our attention is immediately drawn to the clothes themselves, we absolutely distinguish them from the individual, we say that the latter is disguising himself,—­as though every article of clothing were not a disguise!—­and the laughable aspect of fashion comes out of the shadow into the light.

Here we are beginning to catch a faint glimpse of the highly intricate difficulties raised by this problem of the comic.  One of the reasons that must have given rise to many erroneous or unsatisfactory theories of laughter is that many things are comic de jure without being comic de facto, the continuity of custom having deadened within them the comic quality.  A sudden dissolution of continuity is needed, a break with fashion, for this quality to revive.  Hence the impression that this dissolution of continuity is the parent of the comic, whereas all it does is to bring it to our notice.  Hence, again, the explanation of laughter by surprise, contrast, etc., definitions which would equally apply to a host of cases in which we have no inclination whatever to laugh.  The truth of the matter is far from being so simple.  But to return to our idea of disguise, which, as we have just shown, has been entrusted with the special mandate of arousing laughter.  It will not be out of place to investigate the uses it makes of this power.

Why do we laugh at a head of hair which has changed from dark to blond?  What is there comic about a rubicund nose?  And why does one laugh at a negro?  The question would appear to be an embarrassing one, for it has been asked by successive psychologists such as Hecker, Kraepelin and Lipps, and all have given different replies.  And yet I rather fancy the correct answer was suggested to me one day in the street by an ordinary cabby, who applied the expression “unwashed” to the negro fare he was driving.  Unwashed!  Does not this mean that a black face, in our imagination, is one daubed over with ink or soot?  If so, then a red nose can only be one which has received a coating of vermilion.  And so we see that the notion of disguise has passed on something of its comic quality to instances in which there is actually no disguise, though there might be.

In the former set of examples, although his usual dress was distinct from the individual, it appeared in our mind to form one with him, because we had become accustomed to the sight.  In the latter, although the black or red colour is indeed inherent in the skin, we look upon it as artificially laid on, because it surprises us.

But here we meet with a fresh crop of difficulties in the theory of the comic.  Such a proposition as the following:  “My usual dress forms part of my body” is absurd in the eyes of reason.  Yet imagination looks upon it as true.  “A red nose is a painted nose,” “A negro is a white man in disguise,” are also absurd to the reason which rationalises; but they are gospel truths to pure imagination.  So there is a logic of the imagination which is not the logic of reason, one which at times is even opposed to the latter,—­with which, however, philosophy must reckon, not only in the study of the comic, but in every other investigation of the same kind.  It is something like the logic of dreams, though of dreams that have not been left to the whim of individual fancy, being the dreams dreamt by the whole of society.  In order to reconstruct this hidden logic, a special kind of effort is needed, by which the outer crust of carefully stratified judgments and firmly established ideas will be lifted, and we shall behold in the depths of our mind, like a sheet of subterranean water, the flow of an unbroken stream of images which pass from one into another.  This interpenetration of images does not come about by chance.  It obeys laws, or rather habits, which hold the same relation to imagination that logic does to thought.

Let us then follow this logic of the imagination in the special case in hand.  A man in disguise is comic.  A man we regard as disguised is also comic.  So, by analogy, any disguise is seen to become comic, not only that of a man, but that of society also, and even the disguise of nature.

Let us start with nature.  You laugh at a dog that is half-clipped, at a bed of artificially coloured flowers, at a wood in which the trees are plastered over with election addresses, etc.  Look for the reason, and you will see that you are once more thinking of a masquerade.  Here, however, the comic element is very faint; it is too far from its source.  If you wish to strengthen it, you must go back to the source itself and contrast the derived image, that of a masquerade, with the original one, which, be it remembered, was that of a mechanical tampering with life.  In “a nature that is mechanically tampered with” we possess a thoroughly comic theme, on which fancy will be able to play ever so many variations with the certainty of successfully provoking the heartiest hilarity.  You may call to mind that amusing passage in Tartarin Sur Les Alpes, in which Bompard makes Tartarin—­and therefore also the reader to some slight extent—­accept the idea of a Switzerland choke-full of machinery like the basement of the opera, and run by a company which maintains a series of waterfalls, glaciers and artificial crevasses.  The same theme reappears, though transposed in quite another key, in the Novel Notes of the English humorist, Jerome K. Jerome.  An elderly Lady Bountiful, who does not want her deeds of charity to take up too much of her time, provides homes within easy hail of her mansion for the conversion of atheists who have been specially manufactured for her, so to speak, and for a number of honest folk who have been made into drunkards so that she may cure them of their failing, etc.  There are comic phrases in which this theme is audible, like a distant echo, coupled with an ingenuousness, whether sincere or affected, which acts as accompaniment.  Take, as an instance, the remark made by a lady whom Cassini, the astronomer, had invited to see an eclipse of the moon.  Arriving too late, she said, “M. de Cassini, I know, will have the goodness to begin it all over again, to please me.”  Or, take again the exclamation of one of Gondiinet’s characters on arriving in a town and learning that there is an extinct volcano in the neighbourhood, “They had a volcano, and they have let it go out!”

Let us go on to society.  As we are both in and of it, we cannot help treating it as a living being.  Any image, then, suggestive of the notion of a society disguising itself, or of a social masquerade, so to speak, will be laughable.  Now, such a notion is formed when we perceive anything inert or stereotyped, or simply ready-made, on the surface of living society.  There we have rigidity over again, clashing with the inner suppleness of life.  The ceremonial side of social life must, therefore, always include a latent comic element, which is only waiting for an opportunity to burst into full view.  It might be said that ceremonies are to the social body what clothing is to the individual body:  they owe their seriousness to the fact that they are identified, in our minds, with the serious object with which custom associates them, and when we isolate them in imagination, they forthwith lose their seriousness.  For any ceremony, then, to become comic, it is enough that our attention be fixed on the ceremonial element in it, and that we neglect its matter, as philosophers say, and think only of its form.  Every one knows how easily the comic spirit exercises its ingenuity on social actions of a stereotyped nature, from an ordinary prize-distribution to the solemn sitting of a court of justice.  Any form or formula is a ready-made frame into which the comic element may be fitted.

Here, again, the comic will be emphasised by bringing it nearer to its source.  From the idea of travesty, a derived one, we must go back to the original idea, that of a mechanism superposed upon life.  Already, the stiff and starched formality of any ceremonial suggests to us an image of this kind.  For, as soon as we forget the serious object of a solemnity or a ceremony, those taking part in it give us the impression of puppets in motion.  Their mobility seems to adopt as a model the immobility of a formula.  It becomes automatism.  But complete automatism is only reached in the official, for instance, who performs his duty like a mere machine, or again in the unconsciousness that marks an administrative regulation working with inexorable fatality, and setting itself up for a law of nature.  Quite by chance, when reading the newspaper, I came across a specimen of the comic of this type.  Twenty years ago, a large steamer was wrecked off the coast at Dieppe.  With considerable difficulty some of the passengers were rescued in a boat.  A few custom-house officers, who had courageously rushed to their assistance, began by asking them “if they had anything to declare.”  We find something similar, though the idea is a more subtle one, in the remark of an M.P. when questioning the Home Secretary on the morrow of a terrible murder which took place in a railway carriage:  “The assassin, after despatching his victim, must have got out the wrong side of the train, thereby infringing the Company’s rules.”

A mechanical element introduced into nature and an automatic regulation of society, such, then, are the two types of laughable effects at which we have arrived.  It remains for us, in conclusion, to combine them and see what the result will be.

The result of the combination will evidently be a human regulation of affairs usurping the place of the laws of nature.  We may call to mind the answer Sganarelle gave Geronte when the latter remarked that the heart was on the left side and the liver on the right:  “Yes, it was so formerly, but we have altered all that; now, we practise medicine in quite a new way.”  We may also recall the consultation between M. de Pourceaugnac’s two doctors:  “The arguments you have used are so erudite and elegant that it is impossible for the patient not to be hypochondriacally melancholic; or, even if he were not, he must surely become so because of the elegance of the things you have said and the accuracy of your reasoning.”  We might multiply examples, for all we need do would be to call up Moliere’s doctors, one after the other.  However far, moreover, comic fancy may seem to go, reality at times undertakes to improve upon it.  It was suggested to a contemporary philosopher, an out-and-out arguer, that his arguments, though irreproachable in their deductions, had experience against them.  He put an end to the discussion by merely remarking, “Experience is in the wrong.”  The truth is, this idea of regulating life as a matter of business routine is more widespread than might be imagined; it is natural in its way, although we have just obtained it by an artificial process of reconstruction.  One might say that it gives us the very quintessence of pedantry, which, at bottom, is nothing else than art pretending to outdo nature.

To sum up, then, we have one and the same effect, which assumes ever subtler forms as it passes from the idea of an artificial MECHANISATION of the human body, if such an expression is permissible, to that of any substitution whatsoever of the artificial for the natural.  A less and less rigorous logic, that more and more resembles the logic of dreamland, transfers the same relationship into higher and higher spheres, between increasingly immaterial terms, till in the end we find a mere administrative enactment occupying the same relation to a natural or moral law that a ready-made garment, for instance, does to the living body.  We have now gone right to the end of the first of the three directions we had to follow.  Let us turn to the second and see where it will lead us.

2.  Our starting-point is again “something mechanical encrusted upon the living.”  Where did the comic come from in this case?  It came from the fact that the living body became rigid, like a machine.  Accordingly, it seemed to us that the living body ought to be the perfection of suppleness, the ever-alert activity of a principle always at work.  But this activity would really belong to the soul rather than to the body.  It would be the very flame of life, kindled within us by a higher principle and perceived through the body, as if through a glass.  When we see only gracefulness and suppleness in the living body, it is because we disregard in it the elements of weight, of resistance, and, in a word, of matter; we forget its materiality and think only of its vitality, a vitality which we regard as derived from the very principle of intellectual and moral life, Let us suppose, however, that our attention is drawn to this material side of the body; that, so far from sharing in the lightness and subtlety of the principle with which it is animated, the body is no more in our eyes than a heavy and cumbersome vesture, a kind of irksome ballast which holds down to earth a soul eager to rise aloft.  Then the body will become to the soul what, as we have just seen, the garment was to the body itself—­inert matter dumped down upon living energy.  The impression of the comic will be produced as soon as we have a clear apprehension of this putting the one on the other.  And we shall experience it most strongly when we are shown the soul TANTALISED by the needs of the body:  on the one hand, the moral personality with its intelligently varied energy, and, on the other, the stupidly monotonous body, perpetually obstructing everything with its machine-like obstinacy.  The more paltry and uniformly repeated these claims of the body, the more striking will be the result.  But that is only a matter of degree, and the general law of these phenomena may be formulated as follows:  Any incident is comic that calls our attention to the physical in A person when it is the moral side that is concerned.

Why do we laugh at a public speaker who sneezes just at the most pathetic moment of his speech?  Where lies the comic element in this sentence, taken from a funeral speech and quoted by a German philosopher:  “He was virtuous and plump”?  It lies in the fact that our attention is suddenly recalled from the soul to the body.  Similar instances abound in daily life, but if you do not care to take the trouble to look for them, you have only to open at random a volume of Labiche, and you will be almost certain to light upon an effect of this kind.  Now, we have a speaker whose most eloquent sentences are cut short by the twinges of a bad tooth; now, one of the characters who never begins to speak without stopping in the middle to complain of his shoes being too small, or his belt too tight, etc.  A person embarrassed by his body is the image suggested to us in all these examples.  The reason that excessive stoutness is laughable is probably because it calls up an image of the same kind.  I almost think that this too is what sometime makes bashfulness somewhat ridiculous.  The bashful man rather gives the impression of a person embarrassed by his body, looking round for some convenient cloak-room in which to deposit it.

This is just why the tragic poet is so careful to avoid anything calculated to attract attention to the material side of his heroes.  No sooner does anxiety about the body manifest itself than the intrusion of a comic element is to be feared.  On this account, the hero in a tragedy does not eat or drink or warm himself.  He does not even sit down any more than can be helped.  To sit down in the middle of a fine speech would imply that you remembered you had a body.  Napoleon, who was a psychologist when he wished to be so, had noticed that the transition from tragedy to comedy is effected simply by sitting down.  In the “Journal inedit” of Baron Gourgaud—­ when speaking of an interview with the Queen of Prussia after the battle of Iena—­he expresses himself in the following terms:  “She received me in tragic fashion like Chimene:  Justice!  Sire, Justice!  Magdeburg!  Thus she continued in a way most embarrassing to me.  Finally, to make her change her style, I requested her to take a seat.  This is the best method for cutting short a tragic scene, for as soon as you are seated it all becomes comedy.”

Let us now give a wider scope to this image of the body taking precedence of the soul.  We shall obtain something more general—­the manner seeking to outdo the matter, the letter aiming at OUSTING the spirit.  Is it not perchance this idea that comedy is trying to suggest to us when holding up a profession to ridicule?  It makes the lawyer, the magistrate and the doctor speak as though health and justice were of little moment,—­the main point being that we should have lawyers, magistrates and doctors, and that all outward formalities pertaining to these professions should be scrupulously respected.  And so we find the means substituted for the end, the manner for the matter; no longer is it the profession that is made for the public, but rather the public for the profession.  Constant attention to form and the mechanical application of rules here bring about a kind of professional automatism analogous to that imposed upon the soul by the habits of the body, and equally laughable.  Numerous are the examples of this on the stage.  Without entering into details of the variations executed on this theme, let us quote two or three passages in which the theme itself is set forth in all its simplicity.  “You are only bound to treat people according to form,” says Doctor Diafoirus in the “Malade imaginaire”.  Again, says Doctor Bahis, in “L’Amour medecin”:  “It is better to die through following the rules than to recover through violating them.”  In the same play, Desfonandres had previously said:  “We must always observe the formalities of professional etiquette, whatever may happen.”  And the reason is given by Tomes, his colleague:  “A dead man is but a dead man, but the non-observance of a formality causes a notable prejudice to the whole faculty.”  Brid’oison’s words, though. embodying a rather different idea, are none the less significant:  “F-form, mind you, f-form.  A man laughs at a judge in a morning coat, and yet he would quake with dread at the mere sight of an attorney in his gown.  F-form, all a matter of f-form.”

Here we have the first illustration of a law which will appear with increasing distinctness as we proceed with our task.  When a musician strikes a note on an instrument, other notes start up of themselves, not so loud as the first, yet connected with it by certain definite relations, which coalesce with it and determine its quality.  These are what are called in physics the overtones of the fundamental note.  It would seem that comic fancy, even in its most far-fetched inventions, obeys a similar law.  For instance, consider this comic note:  appearance seeking to triumph over reality.  If our analysis is correct, this note must have as its overtones the body tantalising the mind, the body taking precedence of the mind.  No sooner, then, does the comic poet strike the first note than he will add the second on to it, involuntarily and instinctively.  In other words, he will DUPLICATE what is ridiculous PROFESSIONALLY with something that is ridiculous PHYSICALLY.

When Brid’oison the judge comes stammering on to the stage, is he not actually preparing us, by this very stammering, to understand the phenomenon of intellectual ossification we are about to witness?  What bond of secret relationship can there be between the physical defect and the moral infirmity?  It is difficult to say; yet we feel that the relationship is there, though we cannot express it in words.  Perhaps the situation required that this judging machine should also appear before us as a talking machine.  However it may be, no other overtone could more perfectly have completed the fundamental note.

When Moliere introduces to us the two ridiculous doctors, Bahis and Macroton, in L’Amour medecin, he makes one of them speak very slowly, as though scanning his words syllable by syllable, whilst the other stutters.  We find the same contrast between the two lawyers in Monsieur de Pourceaugnac.  In the rhythm of speech is generally to be found the physical peculiarity that is destined to complete the element of professional ridicule.  When the author has failed to suggest a defect of this kind, it is seldom the case that the actor does not instinctively invent one.

Consequently, there is a natural relationship, which we equally naturally recognise, between the two images we have been comparing with each other, the mind crystallising in certain grooves, and the body losing its elasticity through the influence of certain defects.  Whether or not our attention be diverted from the matter to the manner, or from the moral to the physical, in both cases the same sort of impression is conveyed to our imagination; in both, then, the comic is of the same kind.  Here, once more, it has been our aim to follow the natural trend of the movement of the imagination.  This trend or direction, it may be remembered, was the second of those offered to us, starting from a central image.  A third and final path remains unexplored, along which we will now proceed.

3.  Let us then return, for the last time, to our central image:  something mechanical encrusted on something living.  Here, the living being under discussion was a human being, a person.  A mechanical arrangement, on the other hand, is a thing.  What, therefore, incited laughter was the momentary transformation of a person into a thing, if one considers the image from this standpoint.  Let us then pass from the exact idea of a machine to the vaguer one of a thing in general.  We shall have a fresh series of laughable images which will be obtained by taking a blurred impression, so to speak, of the outlines of the former and will bring us to this new law:  We laugh every time A person gives us the impression of being A thing.

We laugh at Sancho Panza tumbled into a bed-quilt and tossed into the air like a football.  We laugh at Baron Munchausen turned into a cannon-ball and travelling through space.  But certain tricks of circus clowns might afford a still more precise exemplification of the same law.  True, we should have to eliminate the jokes, mere interpolations by the clown into his main theme, and keep in mind only the theme itself, that is to say, the divers attitudes, capers and movements which form the strictly “clownish” element in the clown’s art.  On two occasions only have I been able to observe this style of the comic in its unadulterated state, and in both I received the same impression.  The first time, the clowns came and went, collided, fell and jumped up again in a uniformly accelerated rhythm, visibly intent upon affecting a CRESCENDO.  And it was more and more to the jumping up again, the REBOUND, that the attention of the public was attracted.  Gradually, one lost sight of the fact that they were men of flesh and blood like ourselves; one began to think of bundles of all sorts, falling and knocking against each other.  Then the vision assumed a more definite aspect.  The forms grew rounder, the bodies rolled together and seemed to pick themselves up like balls.  Then at last appeared the image towards which the whole of this scene had doubtless been unconsciously evolving—­large rubber balls hurled against one another in every direction.  The second scene, though even coarser than the first, was no less instructive.  There came on the stage two men, each with an enormous head, bald as a billiard ball.  In their hands they carried large sticks which each, in turn, brought down on to the other’s cranium.  Here, again, a certain gradation was observable.  After each blow, the bodies seemed to grow heavier and more unyielding, overpowered by an increasing degree of rigidity.  Then came the return blow, in each case heavier and more resounding than the last, coming, too, after a longer interval.  The skulls gave forth a formidable ring throughout the silent house.  At last the two bodies, each quite rigid and as straight as an arrow, slowly bent over towards each other, the sticks came crashing down for the last time on to the two heads with a thud as of enormous mallets falling upon oaken beams, and the pair lay prone upon the ground.  At that instant appeared in all its vividness the suggestion that the two artists had gradually driven into the imagination of the spectators:  “We are about to become …we have now become solid wooden dummies.”

A kind of dim, vague instinct may enable even an uncultured mind to get an inkling here of the subtler results of psychological science.  We know that it is possible to call up hallucinatory visions in a hypnotised subject by simple suggestion.  If he be told that a bird is perched on his hand, he will see the bird and watch it fly away.  The idea suggested, however, is far from being always accepted with like docility.  Not infrequently, the mesmeriser only succeeds in getting an idea into his subject’s head by slow degrees through a carefully graduated series of hints.  He will then start with objects really perceived by the subject, and will endeavour to make the perception of these objects more and more indefinite; then, step by step, he will bring out of this state of mental chaos the precise form of the object of which he wishes to create an hallucination.  Something of the kind happens to many people when dropping off to sleep; they see those coloured, fluid, shapeless masses, which occupy the field of vision, insensibly solidifying into distinct objects.

Consequently, the gradual passing from the dim and vague to the clear and distinct is the method of suggestion par excellence.  I fancy it might be found to be at the root of a good many comic suggestions, especially in the coarser forms of the comic, in which the transformation of a person into a thing seems to be taking place before our eyes.  But there are other and more subtle methods in use, among poets, for instance, which perhaps unconsciously lead to the same end.  By a certain arrangement of rhythm, rhyme and assonance, it is possible to lull the imagination, to rock it to and fro between like and like with a regular see-saw motion, and thus prepare it submissively to accept the vision suggested.  Listen to these few lines of Regnard, and see whether something like the fleeting image of a doll does not cross the field of your imagination: 

...  Plus, il doit a maints particuliers La somme de dix mil une livre une obole, Pour l’avoir sans relache un an sur sa parole Habille, voiture, chauffe, chausse, gante, Alimente, rase, desaltere, porte.

[Footnote:  Further, he owes to many an honest wight Item-the sum two thousand pounds, one farthing, For having on his simple word of honour Sans intermission for an entire year Clothed him, conveyed him, warmed him, shod him, gloved him, Fed him and shaved him, quenched his thirst and borne him.]

Is not something of the same kind found in the following sally of Figaro’s (though here an attempt is perhaps made to suggest the image of an animal rather than that of a thing):  “Quel homme est-ce?—­C’est un beau, gros, court, jeune vieillard, gris pommele, ruse, rase, blase, qui guette et furette, et gronde et geint tout a la fois.” [Footnote:  “What sort of man is here?—­He is a handsome, stout, short, youthful old gentleman, iron-grey, an artful knave, clean shaved, clean ‘used up,’ who spies and pries and growls and groans all in the same breath.”]

Now, between these coarse scenes and these subtle suggestions there is room for a countless number of amusing effects, for all those that can be obtained by talking about persons as one would do about mere things.  We will only select one or two instances from the plays of Labiche, in which they are legion.

Just as M. Perrichon is getting into the railway carriage, he makes certain of not forgetting any of his parcels:  “Four, five, six, my wife seven, my daughter eight, and myself nine.”  In another play, a fond father is boasting of his daughter’s learning in the following terms:  “She will tell you, without faltering, all the kings of France that have occurred.”  This phrase, “that have occurred,” though not exactly transforming the kings into mere things, likens them, all the same, to events of an impersonal nature.

As regards this latter example, note that it is unnecessary to complete the identification of the person with the thing in order to ensure a comic effect.  It is sufficient for us to start in this direction by feigning, for instance, to confuse the person with the function he exercises.  I will only quote a sentence spoken by a village mayor in one of About’s novels:  “The prefect, who has always shown us the same kindness, though he has been changed several times since 1847…”

All these witticisms are constructed on the same model.  We might make up any number of them, when once we are in possession of the recipe.  But the art of the story-teller or the playwright does not merely consist in concocting jokes.  The difficulty lies in giving to a joke its power of suggestion, i.e. in making it acceptable.  And we only do accept it either because it seems to be the natural product of a particular state of mind or because it is in keeping with the circumstances of the case.  For instance, we are aware that M. Perrichon is greatly excited on the occasion of his first railway journey.  The expression “to occur” is one that must have cropped up a good many times in the lessons repeated by the girl before her father; it makes us think of such a repetition.  Lastly, admiration of the governmental machine might, at a pinch, be extended to the point of making us believe that no change takes place in the prefect when he changes his name, and that the function gets carried on independently of the functionary.

We have now reached a point very far from the original cause of laughter.  Many a comic form, that cannot be explained by itself, can indeed only be understood from its resemblance to another, which only makes us laugh by reason of its relationship with a third, and so on indefinitely, so that psychological analysis, however luminous and searching, will go astray unless it holds the thread along which the comic impression has travelled from one end of the series to the other.  Where does this progressive continuity come from?  What can be the driving force, the strange impulse which causes the comic to glide thus from image to image, farther and farther away from the starting-point, until it is broken up and lost in infinitely remote analogies?  But what is that force which divides and subdivides the branches of a tree into smaller boughs and its roots into radicles?  An inexorable law dooms every living energy, during the brief interval allotted to it in time, to cover the widest possible extent in space.  Now, comic fancy is indeed a living energy, a strange plant that has nourished on the stony portions of the social soil, until such time as culture should allow it to vie with the most refined products of art.  True, we are far from great art in the examples of the comic we have just been reviewing.  But we shall draw nearer to it, though without attaining to it completely, in the following chapter.  Below art, we find artifice, and it is this zone of artifice, midway between nature and art, that we are now about to enter.  We are going to deal with the comic playwright and the wit.