Ethics

Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share, and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.

The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the good man:  and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than that other to him:  “one who is useless,” they say, “ought not to share equally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits of the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:”  their notion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more receive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.

On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the opposite claim:  they urge that “it is the very business of a good friend to help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a good or powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?”

[Sidenote:  1163b] Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be entitled to get more out of the connection than the other, only not more of the same thing:  but the superior man should receive more respect, the needy man more profit:  respect being the reward of goodness and beneficence, profit being the aid of need.

This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities:  he receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock:  for the property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make money out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one will put up with the less in every respect:  so to him who suffers loss as regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by gifts:  since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion equalises and preserves Friendship.

Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to his power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours paid to the gods and to parents:  no man could ever make the due return in these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect according to his ability.

For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to disown his father, whereas a father may his son:  because he that owes is bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully requite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is always a debtor.  But they to whom anything is owed may cast off their debtors:  therefore the father may his son.  But at the same time it must perhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever would sever himself utterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity:  because, independently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not to put away from one’s self the assistance which a son might render.  But to the son, if depraved, assisting his father is a thing to be avoided, or at least one which he will not be very anxious to do; most men being willing enough to receive kindness, but averse to doing it as unprofitable.

Let thus much suffice on these points.