Ethics

Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that he is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends his flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, “shepherd of the people.”  And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only that it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done; because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally):  and by the law of nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over their descendants, and the king over his subjects.

These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured.  The principle of Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but according to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.

Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in Aristocracy:  for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and the better person has the greater good and each has what befits:  so too also is the principle of Justice between them.

The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers are equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like feelings and like dispositions.  Like to this also is the Friendship of a Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and equitable:  rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is distributed on equal terms:  so too is the Friendship accordingly.

[Sidenote:  1161b] In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also:  and least of all in the most perverted form:  in Despotism there is little or no Friendship.  For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common there is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and body, and master and slave; all these are benefited by those who use them, but towards things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice:  nor even towards a horse or an ox, or a slave quâ slave, because there is nothing in common:  a slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an inanimate slave. Quâ slave, then, there is no Friendship towards him, only quâ man:  for it is thought that there is some principle of Justice between every man, and every other who can share in law and be a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so far as he is man.  So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of Justice are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most considerable because they who are equal have much in common.