Ethics

[Sidenote:  II52b]

To consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the province of the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who has to fix the Master-End which is to guide us in dominating any object absolutely evil or good.

But we may say more:  an inquiry into their nature is absolutely necessary.  First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and Moral Vice are both concerned with Pains and Pleasures:  next, because the greater part of mankind assert that Happiness must include Pleasure (which by the way accounts for the word they use, makarioz; chaireiu being the root of that word).

Now some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either in itself or as a matter of result, because Good and Pleasure are not identical.  Others that some Pleasures are good but the greater number bad.  There is yet a third view; granting that every Pleasure is good, still the Chief Good cannot possibly be Pleasure.

In support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is utterly not-good) it is urged that: 

I. Every Pleasure is a sensible process towards a complete state; but no such process is akin to the end to be attained:  e.g. no process of building to the completed house.

2.  The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.

3.  The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding Pain, not at attaining Pleasure.

4.  Pleasures are an impediment to thought, and the more so the more keenly they are felt.  An obvious instance will readily occur.

5.  Pleasure cannot be referred to any Art:  and yet every good is the result of some Art.

6.  Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.

In support of the second (that not all Pleasures are good), That there are some base and matter of reproach, and some even hurtful:  because some things that are pleasant produce disease.

In support of the third (that Pleasure is not the Chief Good), That it is not an End but a process towards creating an End.

This is, I think, a fair account of current views on the matter.