Ethics

Now the acts of inquiring and deliberating differ, though deliberating is a kind of inquiring.  We ought to ascertain about Good Counsel likewise what it is, whether a kind of Knowledge, or Opinion, or Happy Conjecture, or some other kind of faculty.  Knowledge it obviously is not, because men do not inquire about what they know, and Good Counsel is a kind of deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is inquiring and calculating. [Sidenote:1142b]

Neither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of reasoning, and a rapid operation; but men deliberate a long time, and it is a common saying that one should execute speedily what has been resolved upon in deliberation, but deliberate slowly.

Quick perception of causes again is a different faculty from good counsel, for it is a species of Happy Conjecture.  Nor is Good Counsel Opinion of any kind.

Well then, since he who deliberates ill goes wrong, and he who deliberates well does so rightly, it is clear that Good Counsel is rightness of some kind, but not of Knowledge nor of Opinion:  for Knowledge cannot be called right because it cannot be wrong, and Rightness of Opinion is Truth:  and again, all which is the object of opinion is definitely marked out.

Still, however, Good Counsel is not independent of Reason, Does it remain then that it is a rightness of Intellectual Operation simply, because this does not amount to an assertion; and the objection to Opinion was that it is not a process of inquiry but already a definite assertion; whereas whosoever deliberates, whether well or ill, is engaged in inquiry and calculation.

Well, Good Counsel is a Rightness of deliberation, and so the first question must regard the nature and objects of deliberation.  Now remember Rightness is an equivocal term; we plainly do not mean Rightness of any kind whatever; the [Greek:  akrataes], for instance, or the bad man, will obtain by his calculation what he sets before him as an object, and so he may be said to have deliberated rightly in one sense, but will have attained a great evil.  Whereas to have deliberated well is thought to be a good, because Good Counsel is Rightness of deliberation of such a nature as is apt to attain good.

But even this again you may get by false reasoning, and hit upon the right effect though not through right means, your middle term being fallacious:  and so neither will this be yet Good Counsel in consequence of which you get what you ought but not through proper means.

Again, one man may hit on a thing after long deliberation, another quickly.  And so that before described will not be yet Good Counsel, but the Rightness must be with reference to what is expedient; and you must have a proper end in view, pursue it in a right manner and right time.

Once more.  One may deliberate well either generally or towards some particular End.  Good counsel in the general then is that which goes right towards that which is the End in a general way of consideration; in particular, that which does so towards some particular End.

Since then deliberating well is a quality of men possessed of Practical Wisdom, Good Counsel must be “Rightness in respect of what conduces to a given End, of which Practical Wisdom is the true conception.” [Sidenote:  X 1143_a_] There is too the faculty of Judiciousness, and also its absence, in virtue of which we call men Judicious or the contrary.

Now Judiciousness is neither entirely identical with Knowledge or Opinion (for then all would have been Judicious), nor is it any one specific science, as medical science whose object matter is things wholesome; or geometry whose object matter is magnitude:  for it has not for its object things which always exist and are immutable, nor of those things which come into being just any which may chance; but those in respect of which a man might doubt and deliberate.

And so it has the same object matter as Practical Wisdom; yet the two faculties are not identical, because Practical Wisdom has the capacity for commanding and taking the initiative, for its End is “what one should do or not do:”  but Judiciousness is only apt to decide upon suggestions (though we do in Greek put “well” on to the faculty and its concrete noun, these really mean exactly the same as the plain words), and Judiciousness is neither the having Practical Wisdom, nor attaining it:  but just as learning is termed [Greek:  sunievai] when a man uses his knowledge, so judiciousness consists in employing the Opinionative faculty in judging concerning those things which come within the province of Practical Wisdom, when another enunciates them; and not judging merely, but judging well (for [Greek:  eu] and [Greek:  kalos] mean exactly the same thing).  And the Greek name of this faculty is derived from the use of the term [Greek:  suvievai] in learning:  [Greek:  mavthaveiv] and [Greek:  suvievai] being often used as synonymous.

[Sidenote:  XI] The faculty called in right of which we call men or say they have [Greek:  gvomh], is “the right judgment of the equitable man.”  A proof of which is that we most commonly say that the equitable man has a tendency to make allowance, and the making allowance in certain cases is equitable.  And [Greek:  sungvomae] (the word denoting allowance) is right [Greek:  gvomh] having a capacity of making equitable decisions, By “right” I mean that which attains the True.  Now all these mental states tend to the same object, as indeed common language leads us to expect:  I mean, we speak of [Greek:  gnomae], Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing the possession of [Greek:  gnomae] and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals whom we denominate Practically-Wise and Judicious:  because all these faculties are employed upon the extremes, i.e. on particular details; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which come within the province of the Practically-Wise, a man is Judicious and possessed of good [Greek:  gnomae]; i.e. he is disposed to make allowance, for considerations of equity are entertained by all good men alike in transactions with their fellows.

And all matters of Moral Action belong to the class of particulars, otherwise called extremes:  for the man of Practical Wisdom must know them, and Judiciousness and [Greek:  gnomae] are concerned with matters of Moral Actions, which are extremes.

[Sidenote:1143b] Intuition, moreover, takes in the extremes at both ends:  I mean, the first and last terms must be taken in not by reasoning but by Intuition [so that Intuition comes to be of two kinds], and that which belongs to strict demonstrative reasonings takes in immutable, i.e.  Necessary, first terms; while that which is employed in practical matters takes in the extreme, the Contingent, and the minor Premiss:  for the minor Premisses are the source of the Final Cause, Universals being made up out of Particulars.  To take in these, of course, we must have Sense, i.e. in other words Practical Intuition.  And for this reason these are thought to be simply gifts of nature; and whereas no man is thought to be Scientific by nature, men are thought to have [Greek:  gnomae], and Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition:  a proof of which is that we think these faculties are a consequence even of particular ages, and this given age has Practical Intuition and [Greek:  gnomae], we say, as if under the notion that nature is the cause.  And thus Intuition is both the beginning and end, because the proofs are based upon the one kind of extremes and concern the other.

And so one should attend to the undemonstrable dicta and opinions of the skilful, the old and the Practically-Wise, no less than to those which are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having gained their power of moral vision from experience.