Ethics

Meekness is a mean state, having for its object-matter Anger:  and as the character in the mean has no name, and we may almost say the same of the extremes, we give the name of Meekness (leaning rather to the defect, which has no name either) to the character in the mean.

The excess may be called an over-aptness to Anger:  for the passion is Anger, and the producing causes many and various.  Now he who is angry at what and with whom he ought, and further, in right manner and time, and for proper length of time, is praised, so this Man will be Meek since Meekness is praised.  For the notion represented by the term Meek man is the being imperturbable, and not being led away by passion, but being angry in that manner, and at those things, and for that length of time, which Reason may direct.  This character however is thought to err rather on [Sidenote:1126a] the side of defect, inasmuch as he is not apt to take revenge but rather to make allowances and forgive.  And the defect, call it Angerlessness or what you will, is blamed:  I mean, they who are not angry at things at which they ought to be angry are thought to be foolish, and they who are angry not in right manner, nor in right time, nor with those with whom they ought; for a man who labours under this defect is thought to have no perception, nor to be pained, and to have no tendency to avenge himself, inasmuch as he feels no anger:  now to bear with scurrility in one’s own person, and patiently see one’s own friends suffer it, is a slavish thing.

As for the excess, it occurs in all forms; men are angry with those with whom, and at things with which, they ought not to be, and more than they ought, and too hastily, and for too great a length of time.  I do not mean, however, that these are combined in any one person:  that would in fact be impossible, because the evil destroys itself, and if it is developed in its full force it becomes unbearable.

Now those whom we term the Passionate are soon angry, and with people with whom and at things at which they ought not, and in an excessive degree, but they soon cool again, which is the best point about them.  And this results from their not repressing their anger, but repaying their enemies (in that they show their feeings by reason of their vehemence), and then they have done with it.

The Choleric again are excessively vehement, and are angry at everything, and on every occasion; whence comes their Greek name signifying that their choler lies high.

The Bitter-tempered are hard to reconcile and keep their anger for a long while, because they repress the feeling:  but when they have revenged themselves then comes a lull; for the vengeance destroys their anger by producing pleasure in lieu of pain.  But if this does not happen they keep the weight on their minds:  because, as it does not show itself, no one attempts to reason it away, and digesting anger within one’s self takes time.  Such men are very great nuisances to themselves and to their best friends.

Again, we call those Cross-grained who are angry at wrong objects, and in excessive degree, and for too long a time, and who are not appeased without vengeance or at least punishing the offender.

To Meekness we oppose the excess rather than the defect, because it is of more common occurrence:  for human nature is more disposed to take than to forgo revenge.  And the Cross-grained are worse to live with [than they who are too phlegmatic].

Now, from what has been here said, that is also plain which was said before.  I mean, it is no easy matter to define how, and with what persons, and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point a person is right or is wrong.  For he that transgresses the strict rule only a little, whether on the side of too much or too little, is not blamed:  sometimes we praise those who [Sidenote:1126b] are deficient in the feeling and call them Meek, sometimes we call the irritable Spirited as being well qualified for government.  So it is not easy to lay down, in so many words, for what degree or kind of transgression a man is blameable:  because the decision is in particulars, and rests therefore with the Moral Sense.  Thus much, however, is plain, that the mean state is praiseworthy, in virtue of which we are angry with those with whom, and at those things with which, we ought to be angry, and in right manner, and so on; while the excesses and defects are blameable, slightly so if only slight, more so if greater, and when considerable very blameable.

It is clear, therefore, that the mean state is what we are to hold to.

This then is to be taken as our account of the various moral states which have Anger for their object-matter.