Ethics

Having determined these points, let us examine with respect to Happiness, whether it belongs to the class of things praiseworthy or things precious; for to that of faculties it evidently does not.

Now it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised for being of a certain kind and bearing a certain relation to something else:  for instance, the just, and the valiant, and generally the good man, and virtue itself, we praise because of the actions and the results:  and the strong man, and the quick runner, and so forth, we praise for being of a certain nature and bearing a certain relation to something good and excellent (and this is illustrated by attempts to praise the gods; for they are presented in a ludicrous aspect by being referred to our standard, and this results from the fact, that all praise does, as we have said, imply reference to a standard).  Now if it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what is applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher and better:  which is plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the gods blessed and happy, but of men also we pronounce those blessed who most nearly resemble the gods.  And in like manner in respect of goods; no man thinks of praising Happiness as he does the principle of justice, but calls it blessed, as being somewhat more godlike and more excellent.

Eudoxus too is thought to have advanced a sound argument in support of the claim of pleasure to the highest prize:  for the fact that, though it is one of the good things, it is not praised, he took for an indication of its superiority to those which are subjects of praise:  a superiority he attributed also to a god and the Chief Good, on the ground that they form the standard to which everything besides is referred.  For praise applies to virtue, because it makes men apt to do what is noble; but encomia to definite works of body or mind.

However, it is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomia to pursue this topic with exactness:  it is enough for our purpose that from what has been said it is evident that Happiness belongs to the class of things precious and final.  And it seems to be so also because of its being a starting-point; which it is, in that with a view to it we all do everything else that is done; now the starting-point and cause of good things we assume to be something precious and divine.