Ethics

Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some good:  for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of the Chief Good is, “that which all things aim at.”

Now there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed:  for in some cases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible results beyond and beside the acts of working:  and where there are certain Ends beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their nature better than the acts of working.  Again, since actions and arts and sciences are many, the Ends likewise come to be many:  of the healing art, for instance, health; of the ship-building art, a vessel; of the military art, victory; and of domestic management, wealth; are respectively the Ends.

And whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one faculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and all that are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in general; this itself again, and every action connected with war, under the military art; and in the same way others under others), in all such, the Ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than those ranging under them, because it is with a view to the former that the latter are pursued.

(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of working are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further beside them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just speaking of.)

[Sidenote:  II] Since then of all things which may be done there is some one End which we desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we desire everything else; and since we do not choose in all instances with a further End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so the desire would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the Chief Good, i.e. the best thing of all.

Surely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the knowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a mark in view, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right:  and if so, we ought to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of which of the sciences and faculties it is the End.

[Sidenote:  1094b] Now one would naturally suppose it to be the End of that which is most commanding and most inclusive:  and to this description, [Greek:  politikae] plainly answers:  for this it is that determines which of the sciences should be in the communities, and which kind individuals are to learn, and what degree of proficiency is to be required.  Again; we see also ranging under this the most highly esteemed faculties, such as the art military, and that of domestic management, and Rhetoric.  Well then, since this uses all the other practical sciences, and moreover lays down rules as to what men are to do, and from what to abstain, the End of this must include the Ends of the rest, and so must be The Good of Man.  And grant that this is the same to the individual and to the community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more perfect to discover and preserve:  for to do this even for a single individual were a matter for contentment; but to do it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.

[Sidenote:  III] Such then are the objects proposed by our treatise, which is of the nature of [Greek:  politikae]:  and I conceive I shall have spoken on them satisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly clear as the nature of the subject-matter will admit:  for exactness must not be looked for in all discussions alike, any more than in all works of handicraft.  Now the notions of nobleness and justice, with the examination of which politikea is concerned, admit of variation and error to such a degree, that they are supposed by some to exist conventionally only, and not in the nature of things:  but then, again, the things which are allowed to be goods admit of a similar error, because harm cornes to many from them:  for before now some have perished through wealth, and others through valour.

We must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data, to set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since we are speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also conclusions merely general.  And in the same spirit should each person receive what we say:  for the man of education will seek exactness so far in each subject as the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly much the same absurdity to put up with a mathematician who tries to persuade instead of proving, and to demand strict demonstrative reasoning of a Rhetorician.

[Sidenote:  1095a] Now each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a good judge:  on each particular matter then he is a good judge who has been instructed in it, and in a general way the man of general mental cultivation.

Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he has no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said presupposes and is concerned with these:  and in the next place, since he is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as though he heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice and not mere knowledge.

And I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in temper and disposition:  the defect to which I allude being no direct result of the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and following each object as it rises.  For to them that are such the knowledge comes to be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect self-control:  but, to those who form their desires and act in accordance with reason, to have knowledge on these points must be very profitable.

Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and the object which we propose.

[Sidenote:  IV] And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what good is that which we say [Greek:  politikai] aims at? or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action?

So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement:  for HAPPINESS both the multitude and the refined few call it, and “living well” and “doing well” they conceive to be the same with “being happy;” but about the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in their account of it agree with the wise.  For some say it is some one of those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health; when poor, wealth:  and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who talk grandly and above their comprehension.  Some again held it to be something by itself, other than and beside these many good things, which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good.

Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task; so it shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or are thought to have some reason in them.

[Sidenote:  1095b] And here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from principles, and reasoning to principles:  for with good cause did Plato too doubt about this, and inquire whether the right road is from principles or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the judges to the further end, or vice versâ.

Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two kinds, what we do know, and what we may know:  perhaps then as individuals we must begin with what we do know.  Hence the necessity that he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice and moral philosophy generally.  For a principle is a matter of fact, and if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in addition of the reason for the fact.  And he that has been thus trained either has principles already, or can receive them easily:  as for him who neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from Hesiod: 

He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things; Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion; But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from another Layeth it to heart;—­he is a useless man.

[Sidenote:  V] But to return from this digression.

Now of the Chief Good (i.e. of Happiness) men seem to form their notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect:  the many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are content with the life of sensual enjoyment.  For there are three lines of life which stand out prominently to view:  that just mentioned, and the life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation.

Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of brute animals:  yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great share the tastes of Sardanapalus.  The refined and active again conceive it to be honour:  for this may be said to be the end of the life in society:  yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to rest with those who pay rather than with him who receives it, whereas the Chief Good we feel instinctively must be something which is our own, and not easily to be taken from us.

And besides, men seem to pursue honour, that they may [Sidenote:  1096a] believe themselves to be good:  for instance, they seek to be honoured by the wise, and by those among whom they are known, and for virtue:  clearly then, in the opinion at least of these men, virtue is higher than honour.  In truth, one would be much more inclined to think this to be the end of the life in society; yet this itself is plainly not sufficiently final:  for it is conceived possible, that a man possessed of virtue might sleep or be inactive all through his life, or, as a third case, suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes:  and the man who should live thus no one would call happy, except for mere disputation’s sake.

And for these let thus much suffice, for they have been treated of at sufficient length in my Encyclia.

A third line of life is that of contemplation, concerning which we shall make our examination in the sequel.

As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth manifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that is, for the sake of something further:  and hence one would rather conceive the forementioned ends to be the right ones, for men rest content with them for their own sakes.  Yet, clearly, they are not the objects of our search either, though many words have been wasted on them.  So much then for these.

[Sidenote:  VI] Again, the notion of one Universal Good (the same, that is, in all things), it is better perhaps we should examine, and discuss the meaning of it, though such an inquiry is unpleasant, because they are friends of ours who have introduced these [Greek:  eidae].  Still perhaps it may appear better, nay to be our duty where the safety of the truth is concerned, to upset if need be even our own theories, specially as we are lovers of wisdom:  for since both are dear to us, we are bound to prefer the truth.  Now they who invented this doctrine of [Greek:  eidae], did not apply it to those things in which they spoke of priority and posteriority, and so they never made any [Greek:  idea] of numbers; but good is predicated in the categories of Substance, Quality, and Relation; now that which exists of itself, i.e. Substance, is prior in the nature of things to that which is relative, because this latter is an off-shoot, as it were, and result of that which is; on their own principle then there cannot be a common [Greek:  idea] in the case of these.

In the next place, since good is predicated in as many ways as there are modes of existence [for it is predicated in the category of Substance, as God, Intellect—­and in that of Quality, as The Virtues—­and in that of Quantity, as The Mean—­and in that of Relation, as The Useful—­and in that of Time, as Opportunity—­and in that of Place, as Abode; and other such like things], it manifestly cannot be something common and universal and one in all:  else it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but in one only.

[Sidenote:  1096b] Thirdly, since those things which range under one [Greek:  idea] are also under the cognisance of one science, there would have been, on their theory, only one science taking cognisance of all goods collectively:  but in fact there are many even for those which range under one category:  for instance, of Opportunity or Seasonableness (which I have before mentioned as being in the category of Time), the science is, in war, generalship; in disease, medical science; and of the Mean (which I quoted before as being in the category of Quantity), in food, the medical science; and in labour or exercise, the gymnastic science.  A person might fairly doubt also what in the world they mean by very-this that or the other, since, as they would themselves allow, the account of the humanity is one and the same in the very-Man, and in any individual Man:  for so far as the individual and the very-Man are both Man, they will not differ at all:  and if so, then very-good and any particular good will not differ, in so far as both are good.  Nor will it do to say, that the eternity of the very-good makes it to be more good; for what has lasted white ever so long, is no whiter than what lasts but for a day.

No.  The Pythagoreans do seem to give a more credible account of the matter, who place “One” among the goods in their double list of goods and bads:  which philosophers, in fact, Speusippus seems to have followed.

But of these matters let us speak at some other time.  Now there is plainly a loophole to object to what has been advanced, on the plea that the theory I have attacked is not by its advocates applied to all good:  but those goods only are spoken of as being under one [Greek:  idea], which are pursued, and with which men rest content simply for their own sakes:  whereas those things which have a tendency to produce or preserve them in any way, or to hinder their contraries, are called good because of these other goods, and after another fashion.  It is manifest then that the goods may be so called in two senses, the one class for their own sakes, the other because of these.

Very well then, let us separate the independent goods from the instrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as under one [Greek:  idea].  But the question next arises, what kind of goods are we to call independent?  All such as are pursued even when separated from other goods, as, for instance, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and honours (for these, though we do pursue them with some further end in view, one would still place among the independent goods)? or does it come in fact to this, that we can call nothing independent good except the [Greek:  idea], and so the concrete of it will be nought?

If, on the other hand, these are independent goods, then we shall require that the account of the goodness be the same clearly in all, just as that of the whiteness is in snow and white lead.  But how stands the fact?  Why of honour and wisdom and pleasure the accounts are distinct and different in so far as they are good.  The Chief Good then is not something common, and after one [Greek:  idea].

But then, how does the name come to be common (for it is not seemingly a case of fortuitous equivocation)?  Are different individual things called good by virtue of being from one source, or all conducing to one end, or rather by way of analogy, for that intellect is to the soul as sight to the body, and so on?  However, perhaps we ought to leave these questions now, for an accurate investigation of them is more properly the business of a different philosophy.  And likewise respecting the [Greek:  idea]:  for even if there is some one good predicated in common of all things that are good, or separable and capable of existing independently, manifestly it cannot be the object of human action or attainable by Man; but we are in search now of something that is so.

It may readily occur to any one, that it would be better to attain a knowledge of it with a view to such concrete goods as are attainable and practical, because, with this as a kind of model in our hands, we shall the better know what things are good for us individually, and when we know them, we shall attain them.

Some plausibility, it is true, this argument possesses, but it is contradicted by the facts of the Arts and Sciences; for all these, though aiming at some good, and seeking that which is deficient, yet pretermit the knowledge of it:  now it is not exactly probable that all artisans without exception should be ignorant of so great a help as this would be, and not even look after it; neither is it easy to see wherein a weaver or a carpenter will be profited in respect of his craft by knowing the very-good, or how a man will be the more apt to effect cures or to command an army for having seen the [Greek:  idea] itself.  For manifestly it is not health after this general and abstract fashion which is the subject of the physician’s investigation, but the health of Man, or rather perhaps of this or that man; for he has to heal individuals.—­Thus much on these points.