The desire for life everlasting has
commonly been affirmed to be universal—at
least that is the view taken by those unacquainted
with Oriental faiths and with Oriental character.
Those of us whose knowledge is a trifle wider are
not prepared to say that the desire is universal nor
even general.
If the devout Buddhist, for example,
wishes to “live always,” he has not succeeded
in very clearly formulating the desire. The sort
of thing that he is pleased to hope for is not what
we should call life, and not what many of us would
care for.
When a man says that everybody has
“a horror of annihilation,” we may be
very sure that he has not many opportunities for observation,
or that he has not availed himself of all that he
has. Most persons go to sleep rather gladly,
yet sleep is virtual annihilation while it lasts; and
if it should last forever the sleeper would be no
worse off after a million years of it than after an
hour of it. There are minds sufficiently logical
to think of it that way, and to them annihilation is
not a disagreeable thing to contemplate and expect.
In this matter of immortality, people’s
beliefs appear to go along with their wishes.
The man who is content with annihilation thinks he
will get it; those that want immortality are pretty
sure they are immortal; and that is a very comfortable
allotment of faiths. The few of us that are left
unprovided for are those who do not bother themselves
much about the matter, one way or another.
The question of human immortality
is the most momentous that the mind is capable of
conceiving. If it is a fact that the dead live
all other facts are in comparison trivial and without
interest. The prospect of obtaining certain knowledge
with regard to this stupendous matter is not encouraging.
In all countries but those in barbarism the powers
of the profoundest and most penetrating intelligences
have been ceaselessly addressed to the task of glimpsing
a life beyond this life; yet today no one can truly
say that he knows. It is as much a matter of faith
as ever it was.
Our modern Christian nations profess
a passionate hope and belief in another world, yet
the most popular writer and speaker of his time, the
man whose lectures drew the largest audiences, the
work of whose pen brought him the highest rewards,
was he who most strenuously strove to destroy the
ground of that hope and unsettle the foundations of
that belief.
The famous and popular Frenchman,
Professor of Spectacular Astronomy, Camille Flammarion,
affirms immortality because he has talked with departed
souls who said that it was true. Yes, monsieur,
but surely you know the rule about hearsay evidence.
We Anglo-Saxons are very particular about that.
M. Flammarion says:
“I don’t repudiate the
presumptive arguments of schoolmen. I merely
supplement them with something positive. For instance,
if you assumed the existence of God this argument
of the scholastics is a good one. God has implanted
in all men the desire of perfect happiness. This
desire cannot be satisfied in our lives here.
If there were not another life wherein to satisfy
it then God would be a declever. Voila tout.”
There is more: the desire of
perfect happiness does not imply immortality, even
if there is a God, for
(1) God may not have implanted it,
but merely suffers it to exist, as he suffers sin
to exist, the desire of wealth, the desire to live
longer than we do in this world. It is not held
that God implanted all the desires of the human heart.
Then why hold that he implanted that of perfect
happiness?
(2) Even if he did—even,
if a divinely implanted desire entail its own gratification—even
if it cannot be gratified in this life—that
does not imply immortality. It implies only
another life long enough for its gratification just
once. An eternity of gratification is not a logical
inference from it.
(3) Perhaps God is “a
deceiver” who knows that he is not? Assumption
of the existence of a God is one thing; assumption
of the existence of a God who is honorable and candid
according to our conception of honor and candor is
another.
(4) There may be an honorable and
candid God. He may have implanted in us the desire
of perfect happiness. It may be—it
is—impossible to gratify that desire in
this life. Still, another life is not implied,
for God may not have intended us to draw the inference
that he is going to gratify it. If omniscient
and omnipotent, God must be held to have intended
whatever occurs, but no such God is assumed in M. Flammarion’s
illustration, and it may be that God’s knowledge
and power are limited, or that one of them is limited.
M. Flammarion is a learned, if somewhat
theatrical, astronomer. He has a tremendous imagination,
which naturally is more at home in the marvelous and
catastrophic than in the orderly regions of familiar
phenomena. To him the heavens are an immense
pyrotechnicon and he is the master of the show and
sets off the fireworks. But he knows nothing of
logic, which is the science of straight thinking,
and his views of things have therefore no value; they
are nebulous.
Nothing is clearer than that our pre-existence
is a dream, having absolutely no basis in anything
that we know or can hope to know. Of after-existence
there is said to be evidence, or rather testimony,
in assurances of those who are in present enjoyment
of it—if it is enjoyable. Whether
this testimony has actually been given—and
it is the only testimony worth a moment’s consideration—is
a disputed point. Many persons living this life
profess to have received it. But nobody professes,
or ever has professed, to have received a communication
of any kind from one in actual experience of the fore-life.
“The souls as yet ungarmented,” if such
there are, are dumb to question. The Land beyond
the Grave has been, if not observed, yet often and
variously described: if not explored and surveyed,
yet carefully charted. From among so many accounts
of it that we have, he must be fastidious indeed who
cannot be suited. But of the Fatherland that spreads
before the cradle—the great Heretofore,
wherein we all dwelt if we are to dwell in the Hereafter,
we have no account. Nobody professes knowledge
of that. No testimony reaches our ears of flesh
concerning its topographical or other features; no
one has been so enterprising as to wrest from its
actual inhabitants any particulars of their character
and appearance. And among educated experts and
professional proponents of worlds to be there is a
general denial of its existence.
I am of their way of thinking about
that. The fact that we have no recollection of
a former life is entirely conclusive of the matter.
To have lived an unrecollected life is impossible
and unthinkable, for there would be nothing to connect
the new life with the old—no thread of
continuity—nothing that persisted from the
one life to the other. The later birth would
be that of another person, an altogether different
being, unrelated to the first—a new John
Smith succeeding to the late Tom Jones.
Let us not be misled here by a false
analogy. Today I may get a thwack o’ the
mazzard which will give me an intervening season of
unconsciousness between yesterday and to-morrow.
Thereafter I may live to a green old age with no recollection
of anything that I knew, or did, or was before the
accident; yet I shall be the same person, for between
the old life and the new there will be a nexus,
a thread of continuity, something spanning the gulf
from the one state to the other, and the same in both—namely,
my body with its habits, capacities and powers.
That is I; that identifies me to others as my former
self—authenticates and credentials me as
the person that incurred the cranial mischance, dislodging
memory.
But when death occurs all is
dislodged if memory is; for between two merely mental
or spiritual existences memory is the only nexus
conceivable; consciousness of identity is the only
identity. To live again without memory of having
lived before is to live another. Re-existence
without recollection is absurd. There is nothing
to re-exist.