As to painless execution, the simple
and practical way to make them both just and expedient
is the adoption by murderers of a system of painless
assassinations. Until this is done there seems
to be no call to renounce the wholesome discomfort
of the style of executions endeared to us by memories
and associations of the tenderest character. There
is, I fancy, a shaping notion in the observant mind
that the penologists and their allies have gone about
as far as they can safely be permitted to go in the
direction of a softer suasion of the criminal nature
toward good behavior. The modern prison has become
a rather more comfortable habitation than the dangerous
classes are accustomed to at home. Modern prison
life has in their eyes something of the charm and glamor
of an ideal existence, like that in the Happy Valley
from which Rasselas had the folly to escape.
Whatever advantages to the public may be secured by
abating the rigors of imprisonment and inconveniences
incident to execution, there is this objection:
it makes them less deterrent. Let the penologers
and philanthropers have their way and even hanging
might be made so pleasant and withal so interesting
a social distinction that it would deter nobody but
the person hanged. Adopt the euthanasian method
of electricity, asphyxia by smothering in rose-leaves,
or slow poisoning with rich food, and the death penalty
may come to be regarded as the object of a noble ambition
to the bon vivant, and the rising young suicide
may go and kill somebody else instead of himself, in
order to receive from the public executioner a happier
dispatch than his own ’prentice hand can assure
him.
But the advocates of agreeable pains
and penalties tell us that in the darker ages, when
cruel and degrading punishment was the rule, and was
freely inflicted for every light infraction of the
law, crime was more common than it is now; and in
this they appear to be right. But one and all,
they overlook a fact equally obvious and vastly significant,
that the intellectual, moral and social condition
of the masses was very low. Crime was more common
because ignorance was more common, poverty was more
common, sins of authority, and therefore hatred of
authority, were more common. The world of even
a century ago was a different world from the world
of today, and a vastly more uncomfortable one.
The popular adage to the contrary notwithstanding,
human nature was not by a long cut the same then that
it is now. In the very ancient time of that early
English king, George III, when women were burned at
the stake in public for various offenses and men were
hanged for “coining” and children for
theft, and in the still remoter period (circa
1530), when prisoners were boiled in several waters,
divers sorts of criminals were disemboweled and some
are thought to have undergone the peine forte et
dure of cold-pressing (an infliction which the
pen of Hugo has since made popular—in literature)—in
these wicked old days crime flourished, not because
of the law’s severity, but in spite of it.
It is possible that our law-making ancestors understood
the situation as it then was a trifle better than
we can understand it on the hither side of this gulf
of years, and that they were not the reasonless barbarians
that we think them to have been. And if they
were, what must have been the unreason and barbarity
of the criminal element with which they had to deal?
I am far from thinking that severity
of punishment can have the same restraining effect
as probability of some punishment being inflicted;
but if mildness of penalty is to be superadded to difficulty
of conviction, and both are to be mounted upon laxity
in detection, the pile will be complete indeed.
There is a peculiar fitness, perhaps, in the fact
that all these pleas for comfortable punishment should
be urged at a time when there appears to be a general
disposition to inflict no punishment at all.
There are, however, still a few old-fashioned persons
who hold it obvious that one who is ambitious to break
the laws of his country will not with so light a heart
and so airy an indifference incur the peril of a harsh
penalty as he will the chance of one more nearly resembling
that which he would himself select.